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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of an ideological conflict within the 
Presbyterian Church of New Zealand. It is about a controversy 
which stimulated fiercer debate than the church had seen in 
its previous sixty years of united existence. It concerns a 
conflict which at some stage encompassed most of the 
fundamental doctrines of the organization and involved the 
participation of nearly all its leading figures. The central 
personality of the whole debate was Lloyd Geering, principal 
of the denominational seminary, who found himself at the end 
of 1967 arraigned before the highest court of his church on 
a charge of heresy. 
This thesis is an examination of the dynamics of that 
conflict: why did it expand into a full-scale controversy, 
and what factors led to its eventual contraction? It is also 
an analysis of the organization of the controversy: what 
strategies did combatants use in following their goals, and 
what techniques did others use to conciliate them? But more 
than this it is an examination of the role of ideology in 
the whole dispute: how important were ideas to the development, 
of the controversy? 
Ideological conflicts such as this constitute an 
important part of politics. They can be observed at every 
level of political behaviour from individual adaptation to 
change 1 to international feuding between superpowers. 2 
1 E.g. R.E. Lane, Political Ideolo_gy (New York: Free Press, 
19 6 2 ) , pp . 419 f. 
2 E.g. D.S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflictr 1956-1961 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). 
Whenever ideas come into question, or people try to justify 
their actions in terms of values, there is a potential for 
ideological conflict. Such conflict is clearly frequent 
within a wide range of human situations. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The term 'ideology' itself has been used in a great 
variety of ways. Freud saw ideology as a mechanism for 
achieving psychological stability through the rationalization, 
projection or displacement of guilt. 3 For Fromm it produced 
more of a spiritual catharsis, providing release from the 
anxieties of the human predicament. 4 Mannheim saw an ideology 
as a conservative instrument designed to bolster up the 
status quo, 5 while for Apter an ideology facilitated an 
6 'intellectual and moral leap forward'. 
In this study, however, an ideology is seen more 
generally as a belief-system prescribing norms, allocating 
values and indicating desirable goals: it provides both 
general principles on which behaviour 'should' be based, 
and specific objectives or courses of action. 7 Therefore 
an ideology might prescribe radical change or proscribe any 
change at all; it might alleviate guilt feelings or even 
induce spiritual euphoria. But it need not be defined in 
terms of such consequences. 
Rather, what distinguishes an 'ideology' from a group 
of merely random ideas or beliefs is that the beliefs 
3 Summarized in Herbert Waltzer, 'Political Ideology: Belief 
and Action in the Arenas of Politics', in Christenson 
(1971) p 1-33. 
4 E.g. The Sane Society (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1955). 
5 Ideologpna Utopia (New York: Harc~ourt Brace & Co" , 19 4 9) . 
6 ~~e Politics ~l Modernization (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1967), p.315. 
7 This distinction comes from F. Schurmann, (1968), pp.24ff. 
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comprising an ideology are associated in some systematic 
way. Because they are derived from general principles they 
will tend to be consistent, applying irrespective of the 
private inter~sts of particular actors. Because their 
range includes norms, values and goals, they will tend to 
be comprehensive, able to cope with and explain a wide range 
of possible situations. 
But obviously a controversy is never purely ideological, 
for by definition it goes beyond an impassive exchange of 
ideas to involve public disagreement and even discord; 
consequently it may generate emotions quite beyond the control 
of logic. So while an 'ideology' is a set of beliefs 
ordered in a systematic way, an 'ideological controversy' 
can be seen as a public dispute which uses a particular 
brand of ideas as its currency of conflict. 8 Such a conflict 
will involve ideas, but it need not be limited to them. One 
theologian saw this possibility very clearly: 
When there is a controversy ••. about something 
as vital as the meaning of one's existence, 
people get very quickly disturbed. It arouses 
emotions and establishes attitudes of antipathy 
and prejudice which are very hard to overcome in 
the period that follows.9 
The theologian was Lloyd Geering. But this perception has 
been given more systematic expression in a model developed 
by J.S. Coleman. 
C 1 t h 't t . 10 o eman wro ea monograp on communi y con roversies, 
in which he found that certain patte,,ns of conflict continually 
reappeared. He therefore developed a 'portrait of the 
8 This metaphor is not of course original. See T. Hobbes, 
Leviathan, Part I, Chapter IV: 'For words are wise men's 
counters, they do but reckon by them; but they are the 
money of fools. ' 
9 Thursday, December 10 1970, p.31. 
10 Community Conflict (Glencoe: Free Press, 1967). 
processes 1 which are normally observed in such controversies?1 
and tried to establish which factors would be likely to 
limit or accentuate their development. 
The issues usually spread from a single issue to 
embrace new and different issues, and expand from the 
specific to the general. Coleman cites the case of one 
Iowa city where a controversy began with a complaint from 
a local carpenter that a creek had overflowed into his home. 
Other grievances were soon forthcoming, and more general 
attacks were made on the city government, culminating 
eventually in the abandonment of the whole system of local 
administration. 
Another change in the nature of the issues, Coleman 
suggests, is from disagreement to antagonism. Personal 
attacks replace dispassionate discussion of issues, and 
opponents begin to dislike one another personally. This is 
because, he considers, men have a drive towards internal 
consistency in their attitudes. They find it easier to see 
virtues in their allies and vices in their adversaries. 
As the issues change, so too does the social organization 
of the community. With an increase in the antagonism 
between opponents, there is a corresponding decrease in the 
contact between them. Meanwhile associations strengthen 
within each group, where members tend to find mutual 
reinforcement and support. This polarization·is accompanied 
by the formation of partisan organizations which arise to 
channel the discontent on both sides. New leaders usually 
emerge, men often with little previous experience of power 
11 Ibid. p.3. 
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and without any strong loyalty to the community. In some 
of the disputes Coleman mentions, especially about desegre-
gation, leaders were marginal members of the community such 
as outsiders, convicts or young people. In others~ notably 
those concerning city-manager plans, opposition leaders 
tended to be 'personally frustrated and maladjusted' . 12 
These organizational changes are sometimes accentuated 
by the .ifl.ability of more moderate community organizations 
to take a strong stand on the issues. The unions and the 
Democratic Party were, for instance, unable to oppose 
McCarthyism because their memberships were split over the 
issues. So the extremist group under McCarthy had 
considerably more influence than they would normally have 
had. 
But this description of the patterns of controversy 
only explains how a conflict develops: it does not explain 
why it grows, or conversely why it should stop short of a 
complete disruption of community life. So Coleman goes on 
to examine the factors which facilitate the emergence of a 
controversy and limit its growth. 
For an isssue to have any explosive potential, it must 
impinge on people's lives in an important way or pose some 
threat to them. Coleman sees such matters as education, 
economic welfare and religion as meeting this criterion. 
But for a controversy to develop out of this, it must have 
a differential impact on the community. A flood would affect 
people similarly and so would be unlikely to accentuate 
social divisions. But desegregation of schools on the other 
hand could divide whites from blacks, parents from non-parents, 
and could precipitate such a conflict; It is also necessary, 
12 Ibid., p.12. 
he adds, that those involved feel action~ be taken. A 
prolonged drought would be more likely to induce despair 
than stimulate protest, while a fluoridation proposal could 
be defeated by concerted action. 
The way such dissatisfaction is handled will depend on 
the way a community is accustomed to dealing with such 
problems. It may rigorously suppress any dissident opinions, 
or it may have built-in means of expressing dissent, or it 
may force opponents to work extraconstitutionally to achieve 
change. On the community's style of conflict management 
will depend, therefore, whether dissatisfaction disappears 
through co-optation, takes the form of a loyal opposition, 
or spurs the formation of a revolutionary army. 
But a community will react differently in different 
areas of its life. The first such area Coleman singles out 
is economic. Any economic crisis will directly affect many 
people. This contrasts with the 'power' area, in which 
comparatively few may be competing for office or actively 
campaigning. The third area, that of values, provides an 
underlying residue of conflict which may be triggered by a 
particular issue. A controversy would usually draw on all 
three 'bases of response' to some extent. · Working-class 
opposition to a city-manager plan may, for example, arise 
in the 'power' area, where workers sense their lack of 
influence in the city's administration. But it would 
probably involve the economic area, where the 'pork barrel' 
no longer provides the jobs and services it once could, and 
it may spread to the value area, with the claim that all 
citizens should have equal access to the decision-making 
facilities of government. 
7. 
It is also relevant to note the importance participants 
give to these three issue-areas compared to the value they 
attach to their social relationships. Lower status members 
of society, Coleman suggests, have limited group memberships 
and are consequently more accessible through certain types 
of issues: 'those which catch up peculiarly the frustrations 
and dissatisfaction of persons in a depressed economic and 
social state•. 13 Higher class participants will be more 
accessible through issues of a 'value' nature, but are more 
likely to become involved through organizational ties. This 
associational involvement would incline them towards 
upholding community norms against conflict and personal 
attacks. Lower-status participants on the other hand will 
be less inhibited by such constraints, and consequently 
more prone to indulge in personal attacks. The extent of 
participation has therefore an important effect on the style 
of controversy, for it helps to determine the relative 
importance and nature of issues which may arise. 
The mass media also affects the development of a 
controversy. It often has a role in sparking off issues 
and transmitting opinions. But its persuasive effect is 
considerably less significant than interpersonal networks 
and mouth-to-mouth communications. Indeed, in the latter 
stages of a controversy, the main role of the media is to 
reinforce opinions that have already been formed in this way. 
Thus Coleman gives quite a comprehensive picture of 
the course a controversy will be likely to take. He indicates 
some of the forces which may accelerate or limit conflict, 
and examines the importance of issues in this development. 
13 Ibid., p.19. 
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But the concept of ideology does not really find a place 
in his framework. He certainly mentions 'value' issues, 
yet in the case studies he cites, these values are loosely 
related and often appear to be little more than rationali-
zations of economic frustrations or power drives. For 
Coleman, also, only a few extremists are really 'ideologists'. 
This may well be an accurate description of the role of 
ideology in American urban controversies. But it is 
interesting to ask how the patterns of conflict would be 
affected if ideology did play a more central part in the 
development of a controversy? What impact would the 
inclusion of ideology have on the overall model? 
Two answers might be given to this question. The 
first is that it would have no real impact, that ideology 
is little more than a smokescreen to cover selfish ambitions 
or subliminal drives. In this view, people employ ideas 
not because they believe them (though they might), but 
because the ideas are useful to them. 14 A few rather naive 
people can be placated with ideological concessions rather 
than policy handouts, an Order of Lenin rather than a plot 
of land, but most would find their ideological convictions 
coinciding with their self-interest. 
The second answer would be that ideology is indeed an 
important determinant of behaviour, that people do in fact 
often act on principle. The constant procession of heretics 
to the stake during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
would suggest that, whatever the psychological motivations 
of the victims, they certainly believed in their ideology. 
14 E.g. 'Ideologies are embraced because they serve some 
function - often implicit and unrecognized - for their 
adherents. They fulfil needs and allay anxieties! 
. T.F. O'Dea, 'The Ideologists and the Missing Dialogue', 
in O'Dea (1970~ p.89. 
So, to discover the genesis of a belief, in this view, is 
not to explain its impact. 
Both of these attitudes contain an element of truth in 
them. An ideology may provide a ready rationalization for 
more pragmatic goals, but it may then, in turn, become an 
important stimulus to action. Stalin, for example, probably 
used the theme of 'socialism in one country' to ensure his 
dominance in the power struggle against Trotsky. But he also 
acted on it, with considerable significance for Soviet 
society, and in the context of a shattered economy, it was 
probably a wise policy. In this case both ideological and 
pragmatic considerations were linked within the one policy. 
It is only in the specific situation, then, that one can 
assess the impact of ideology on behaviour. 
'l'he Geering controversy can now be examined in terms 
of Coleman 1 s framework. In making this examination, the 
study will be attempting to describe the patterns of conflict 
and explain the organizational activities of those involved. 
It will then be possible to understand how important ideas 
were to these developments, and to answer the question of 
what the role of ideology was in the controversy. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
New Zealand had been involved in doctrinal disputes 
in one way or another ever since Vergil of Salzburg had been 
accused of heresy for claiming that the antipodes were 
inhabited. 1 Controversy was not something new to the New 
Zealand Presbyterian church either. The last major dispute 
had lasted forty years, dividing Otago and Southland 
Presbyterians from their fellow churchmen north of the 
Waitaki, and preventing union until 1901. The Southern 
church had been disturbed by some of the more radical 
innovations of their northern colleagues, such as the 
sanctioning of marriage to a deceased wife's sister, 2 or 
the introduction of instrumental music into worship. When 
it became known for instance that a British regimental 
band had accompanied the psalms of a Napier congregation, a 
-:1 
decidedly unfavourable reaction was reported from the south.-
One of the major issues in any theological debate in 
the church was the place to be given to its confessional 
standards, especially the seventeenth century Westminster 
documents, which were largely the work of English Calvinists 
during the English Civil War. There were some who wanted 
a clear affirmation of the Westminster Confession, including 
everything from a description of the Pope as 'that antichrist 1 
that man of sin, and son of perdition', to the doctrine that 
some men are 'foreordained to everlasting death' • 4 On the 
1 See Russell (1971), p.6. 
2 This was considered important enough to warrant special 
mention in the Agreement for Union, 1901. See the Book 
of Order, p.152. 
3 See Elder (1940), p.163. 
4 Chapter 25, Article 6; Chapter 3u Article 3. 
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other extreme were those who considered that the confession 
had more historical interest than theological merit. Those 
inclined towards this view were likely to see the faith as 
something which must find new expression in changing 
historical circumstances. These sentiments were verbalized 
in the basis for union worked out in 1862, the provisions 
of which were to be continued 'insofar as these .•. are 
applicable to the circumstances of the church 1 • 5 This was 
the key phrase on which the plan foundered. 
Flexibility in doctrine was finally accepted with the 
adoption of a 'Declaratory Act' by southern and northern 
churches on the eve of union. This Act gave ministers and 
elders liberty of opinion 'on such points in the Confession 
as do not enter into the substance of the Reformed Faith', 
but gave the church itself 'full authority to determine, in 
any case which may arise, what points fall within this 
description•. 6 It consequently empowered the church to 
'formulate, interpret, or modify its subordinate standards', 
leaving it to the discretion of successive Assemblies to 
determine what was legitimate for Presbyterians to believe. 
This was one of the distinctively presbyterian features of 
the church: it was the courts of the church rather than 
individual members or past regulations which determined 
its doctrine. 
But there was nevertheless a conviction that the church 
was 'confessional' in nature: that it found its historical 
identity given expression in the Reformed confessions, and 
its historical continuity confirmed by its recognition of 
5 Elder,~-, p.161. 
6 Book of Order, p.99. 
the traditional creeds of the church. Therefore confessional 
standards could not be taken lightly, even though their 
constitutional status might appear uncertain. 7 Tension 
arising from this uncertainty - holding the belief that the 
church was confessional while making the observation that 
it was not - underlay much of the theological anxiety in 
the Presbyterian church. 
But most of the theological debating had been carried 
on within the ranks of the clergy. This was quite 
understandable, since they alone had any real training in 
the field, and because the church occupied a large portion 
of their lives. Laymen had traditionally kept their distance 
from the esoteric realms of doctrinal disputation, and 
tended to confuse respect for scholarship (on which 
Presbyterianism prided itself) with theological apathy. So 
many of the issues fiercely debated in theological colleges 
did not filter down to the ordinary layman. 
However, ministers who were conscious of the 'richness 
of the Reformed tradition' often forgot that laymen were 
largely ignorant of it and were unaware of many of the finer 
points of Presbyterian doctrine. 8 It therefore came as 
something of a surprise to many of the more theologically 
sophisticated conservatives to hear some laymen proposing· 
congregaticmalism in government and espousing Sabellianisrn 
7 For a good summary of the various attitudes to this 
question., see G.R. Ferguson, ''The Nature of Confessional 
Authority', SJT, XXIV (1971), 271-289. 
8 The same }'.)Oi.nt has been ma.de about a NSW conflict, where two theologi · 
cally opposed synods were carpeting: 'Many of the laity cared so little 
for the differences betvveen the Synods ,,CJ,S to belong to two or more 
churches simultaneously'. K.R. Campbell, 'Presbyterian Conflicts in Nev,1 
South wales, 1837-1865', ~' v (1969), p.246. 
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in doctrine. 9 
In fact, laymen tended to show far less denominational 
distinctiveness than their clerical colleagues. The laymen 
who were to oppose Geering showed a general 'ultra protestant' 
tendency rather than anything peculiarly Presbyterian. This 
was partly due, no doubt,to ignorance; but it was also due 
to the irrelevance in New Zealand conditions of denominational 
divisions which had arisen in response to historical 
circumstances peculiar to Europe. This was compounded by a 
high level of denominational mobility: New Zealanders tended 
to change their denominational allegiances without much 
difficulty. 10 Even some of the top laymen opposing Geering 
had been members of other religious organizations at some 
stage in their lives. This mobility meant that it was 
rarely a momentous step for a layman to leave his present 
deno~ination: withdrawal was not an option to be countenanced 
only in the last resort. 
PERSONALITIES OF THE DEBATE 
~he techniques for training boxer~ can be applied to 
the training of gangsters or funeral directors, 
insurance salesmen or Presbyterian clergymen. One 
important difference is that boxers, on the whole, 
live in a less delusional world than Presbyterian 
clergymen, so that the latter require much thicker 
ideology. (Peter Berger)ll 
9 Presbyterianism, as a form of government, involves rule 
by church courts which are hierarchically structured. 
The national court (called the 'General ~ssembly') has 
the final say. Congregationalism on the other hand 
entrusts this power to the local congregation. Sabellian-
ism was an ancient heresy which identified the Son with 
the Father. 
10 R.D. Arnold, interview. 
11 Berger (1961}, p~61. 
4. 
The ideology was not only thick, it appeared at times 
to be quite impenetrable. Indeed much of the debate was to 
focus around the question of what the ideology really 
required people to believe. There was one group, called 
here 'conservatives', who took a rather narrow line, and had 
very little deciding which doctrines the ideology required 
its adherents to accept. This group called themselves 
'evangelicals' , 12 but were often dubbed by their opponents 
'literalists' or 'fundamentalists'. On the other extreme 
were some 'radicals' who were less keen to tie their faith 
to particular doctrines. They sometimes called themselves 
'liberals', or more commonly, denied that they could be 
categorized at all. This denial did nothing to deter the 
conservatives however, who referred to them as everything 
from 1 secularists' to 'unbelievers'. 
But the terms 1 radical 1 and 'conservative' are used 
politically rather than theologically in this thesis: they 
refer to people who took particular stands on issues and 
identified themselves with the perspectives of particular 
groups. 'Radicals' were persons who supported Geering 1 s· 
right to speak within the church, while 'conservatives' 
were those who accused him of unorthodoxy. Those who 
refrained from doing either, or perhaps even did both, are 
considered 1 moderates 1 • 
(1) The radicals 
This fool wishes to revise the entire science of 
astronomy; but sacred Scripture tells us that 
,Joshua commanded the sun to stand still and not 
the earth. {Martin Lutherf referring to 
12 The political significance of this theological label has 
been descril-:,ed by Henderson, (1967)1 p.94: '·By taking to itself the 
great name of the Evangel ••• (the group) successfully conveyed the 
idea that to oppose it was to oppose the gospel. • • They used 
accordingly to boast that .•• they feared not the face of man. 
·This they took to irrply that they feared God. In practice it 9nly 
:mE!ant that they went around being very rude to everyone who disagreed 
with them.' 
15" 
. . )13 Copernicus 
Lloyd Geering was undoubtedly the central figure of 
the controversy, for it was his radical ideas which initially 
aroused the ire of the conservatives, and it was he who bore 
the brunt of their attack. Geering was an Old Testament 
scholar, and considered a brilliant teacher in the subject. 
He became Principal of Knox Theological Hall in 1962, having 
served his professorial apprenticeship in Australia. Before 
entering the ministry he had been trained in mathematics, 
and later earned a reputation as a 'financial wizard' for 
helping to extricate the church from one of its innumerable 
financial crises. He had also been a successful convenor 
of the committee on church union, although he was noted in 
Assembly debates more for his ability than his tact. 
The 'Moderator of the General Assembly' was the 
titular leader of the church, holding office for a one year 
term. During the first stage of the debate the incumbent 
was J.M. Bates, a Dunedin minister. Bates had written a 
book on doctrine for the church, which had become something 
of a classic; and he had served on many committees, 
including an interdenominational one on church union. He 
was under fire for being a supporter of Geering, though as 
moderator he tried to avoid passing judgement on the matters 
in dispute. But shortly afterwards he wrote the foreward 
to one of Geering's books, which made it quite clear where 
his sympathies lay, and during the heresy trial the following 
year established himself as one of the leaders of the 
radical group. 
13 Cited in Dunham (1965), p.315. 
Another such leader was I.W. Fraser, who would become 
Moderator in 1968. Fraser was a good theologian, having 
trained under Karl Barth, but he was known more for his 
expertise in the finer points of procedure. One of Fraser's 
sons-in-law, G.R. Ferguson, was also in the radical camp, 
and would become convenor of the church's committee on 
international relations. Fraser 1 s other son-in-law would 
become convenor of the church union committee. This 
perhaps illustrated the close theological (and social) 
relationship between radicalism and ecumenism. 
But it was from his colleagues in the Theological 
Hall that Geering was to receive his most active support, 
especially from such men .. as T.E. Pollard and F.W.R. Nichol. 
They acted as a primary reference group for him, giving him 
i 
I 
their loyalty, and at timJs even protectio~. Nichol on one 
I 
occasion helped to write q strongly worded letter to the 
I 
Otago Daily Times, denouncing Geering's opponents: 
We believe .•• that t6e real source of disquiet 
in the Church is not ~he Principal, but a small 
vociferous group, familiar with the techniques 
of mass-comrnunicatio~, determined to discredit 
the Principal on alrnqst any pretext, and willing 
to use any propaganda, however scurrilous, to 
achieve that ena.14 / 
So there existed in the church a group who were willing 
to give Geering support, and act together to defeat his 
opponents. 
(2) The conservatives 
Xanthias: Oh, we'll soon get rid of them: we can throw 
stones at them if necessary. 
Anticleon: My poor mutt, if you provoke this gang of old 
geezers, it'll be like stirring up a wasps nest. They've 
all got sharp stings in their behinds - and they know how 
14 April 1, 1967. 
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to sting too! They shout and hop around and leap at you 
like sparks from a bonfire. (Aristophanes)l5 
The most prominent conservative in the nest at the 
beginning of the debate was A.G. Gunn, who was the leading 
figure of an evangelical enclave in South Auckland. He 
was generally considered vocal rather than articulate; but 
he was an able author, editing the Evangelical Presbyterian 
(hereafter EP) and .other publications of the Westminster 
Fellowship (hereafter WF). In this capacity he wrote or 
published articles dealing with a wide range of subjects, 
attacking everyone from ecumenists to homosexuals, and 
everything from modern theology to jazz. 16 The contemporary 
crisis, he believed, emanated from a 'noisy and nasty band 
of propagandists who sneer at the Bible and the moral 
t • t 't • I 17 res rains 1 imposes • 
But he was not representative of the WF as a whole. 
There were some, like A.C. Webster, J.L. Wilson, and 
C.L. Gosling, who tempered their criticisms with more 
positive responses. 
However, the strongest opposition to Geering came from 
a group of laymen, who banded together in an 'Association 
of Presbyterian Laymen' with the sponsorship of Sir William 
Goodfellow. This group was led in its first eighteen months 
of operation by R.J. Wardlaw, a successful advertising 
executive. Wardlaw was a relative newcomer to ecclesiastical 
politics, (although he had served on an Assembly committee 
for some fifteen years), and he displayed considerable 
15 'The Wasps' Act I, Scene I;in The Wasps, The Poet and 
the Women, The Frogs, tr. D. Barrett, (Middlesex: Penguin, 
1964), pp.46f. 
16 In one pamphlet he edited, an archbishop was quoted approvingly as 
expressing the opinion that 'the confessional reveals the fact that 
nearly every known lapse of female virtue is traceable to the dance 1 • 
Dancing and the Christian, {Manurewa: WF, 1964), p.8. 
17 -Sex and the Christian, (Manurewa: WF, 1964), p.3. 
18. 
enthusiasm and energy in establishing the Auckland~based 
. t" 18 associa ion. As a man of simple faith he refused to 
accept the argument that only professional theologians 
should venture an opinion on theological matters. But as 
an advertising expert, he ensured that his association's 
opinions did not go unpublicized. 
The chairman of the Wellington branch of the association, 
R.D. Arnold, was a more restrained leader than Wardlaw, and 
as a university lecture3:'." was considered to lend some 
respectability to the association. He was chosen as the 
national chairman of the .APL when Wardlaw decided to resign 
from the church, and followed a lower-keyed approach with 
greater success. 
One minister who allied himself with the APL, but who 
took a more liberal position, was R-.J. Blaikie, a former 
missionary in Central Africa. Blaikie was considered 
something of an anomaly by both sides, for while he was 
opposed to Geering, he was less than enthusiastic about the 
'subordinate standards' of the church, which conservatives 
were using as their basis of attack. However, politically 
his position was much clearer: he was implacably opposed 
to the type of theological thinking that Geering represented. 
{3) The moderates 
The Rev. Mr Sutherland, after referring to the length 
of time during which he had been connected with the Church, 
said that, with regard to the question at issue, he was not 
prepared to say that he occupied an extreme position on one 
side or the other ••. He did not say that improvements could 
not-now be made, but he·did say that they ought to be 
extremely careful what steps they took in an age remarkable 
for changes of a decidedly wrong kind. (Otago Daily Times, 
January 7 1870) 
18 It was usually referred to as the 'Laymen's Association', 
or the 'APL', although more colourful names were sometimes 
used. 
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Many of those who were in official positions in the 
church were careful to avoid taking sides on controversial 
issues, but they were not necessarily inactive, and many 
used their influence to try to bring the parties together. 
One former moderator who exercised a degree of informal 
power was J.S. Murray. Murray was essentially a conciliator 
rather than a debater, and was one of the moderates in 
Auckland who tried to prevent open schism at the height of 
the controversy. 
Moderators and former moderators often assumed the 
mantles of elder statesmen, and wielded considerably more 
power than they had been constitutionally endowed with. 
This was largely through the impact of their personalities 
and their powers of persuasion than from any sanctions they 
19 might apply. Consequently some were rather reticent in 
providing leadership, while others were more dynamic. 
Probably the most influential moderator was S.C. Read, who 
as Clerk of Assembly was reputedly the best informed person 
in the church. His moderatorial year was 1967, which 
coincided with the peak of the controversy, and he displayed 
considerable diplomatic skill in restricting its expansion. 
Others who were highly regarded for their impartiality 
were I. Breward, the sole Knox professor who would escape 
castigation as a 'modernist'; L.H. Jenkins, the cautious 
convenor of the committee on doctrine; and W.A. Best., the 
man responsible for the passage of business through the 
Assembly. 
19 As with many other positions of influence, it was the 
ability of an incumbent to persuade his subordinates, 
rather than order them, whichdetermined the extent of 
his power. ~.E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: the 
Politics of Leadership, (New York: John Wiley & Sons,1960). 
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POSITION OF THE CHURCH IN 1966 
While there were long-standing differences between the 
groups in the church, the occasional disputes which flared 
up did not involve the majority of church members. Most 
laymen were quite unaware of any theological ferment, and 
the majority of ministers had identified themselves with 
neither extreme. In fact there was a strong belief that 
such polarization was undesirable and any categorization 
was improper. 20 Even those who had aligned themselves with 
one of the extremes were not inclined to precipitate any 
controversy~ Conservatives saw their primary role as one 
of winning souls rather than engaging in theological 
polemics, while radicals thought that pluralism in 
theological matters ought to be encouraged. So, although 
there were tensions and divisions within the church, the 
position appeared to be relatively stable. Why then did the 
theological differences break out into the open and escalate 
into a full-scale controversy? 
Three reasons are suggested for this change. Firstly, 
some of the more radical ideas which had been widely debated 
among theologians were beginning to be distilled into 
paperbacks. This process was associated with the name of 
John Robinson, an English bishop who had ensured himself a 
place in the annals of apostasy with the 1963 publication of 
his book, Honest to God. This book, and the publicity 
surrounding it, made many people painfully aware of the 
divergence between popular religious thought and much of 
modern theology. Robinson himself received attention from 
20 See, for instance, L.R. Miller, 'The Westminster 
Fellowship Within', Forum, XVIII (November 1965), p.3 0 
where he warns his readers that they could not 'pigeon-
hole Christians without offending the Holy Spirit'. 
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the~ editor, who deplored his testimony at the Lady 
Chatterley trial, in which he described 'the adulterous 
actions of Lady Chatterley as a 11 kind of holy communion 11 • 121 
Secondly, Geering was clearly identifying himself with 
this process of theological popularizing. This fact was 
communicated to others in the church in an article he wrote 
for the Outlook, in which he asserted that 'for the man who 
has stepped into the twentieth century with his eyes open 
(rather than for just the theologian), the old distinction 
between a natural and a supernatural world is a thing of the 
past•. 22 He went on to contrast a 'modern' world-view with 
a 'medieval' outlook, and suggested that it might be time 
for a 'new Reformation·' • This meant that many ordinary 
laymen were now being challenged to rethink their beliefs in 
a way that they had rarely had to do before. Some felt it 
was bad taste to air radical views in public lest theologi-
cally untrained laymen be influenced. But insofar as 
Geering had any strategy, it was to bring ordinary churchmen 
to a greater awareness of theological issues. He, like 
Robinson, saw his role as that of a popularizer. In his 
eyes he was not so much a radical introducing new ideas into 
a theological debate as a teacher passing on the insights of 
others to his pupils. So to some extent it was not the 
introduction of novel ideas, but the level at which these 
ideas were discussed, which created the climate in which a 
full-scale controversy could develop. 
21 A.G. Gunn, op.cit., p.3. 
22 'Is a New Reformation Possible?' Outlook, (September 25 
1965) p.17. For other speeches and booklets in which 
Geering had already developed this theme, see Otago Daily 
Times (February 24 1961, May 13 1963, October 17 1963); 
What is our Gospel? Faith and Order Studies: 1963, 
(Cfiristchurch: National Council of Churches, 1963.) 
The third reason for the opening up of the controversy 
was the inability of the more moderate conservatives to 
lead the opposition to Geering and therefore control its 
intensity. This situation really began with the return of 
Gunn to New Zealand in the early 1960's, which stimulated 
a new activism and confidence in the conservative group. 
But it was accentuated by the absence of more restraining 
influences at the beginning of the controversy. Wilson was 
in Britain; two former conservative strategists, J.G. and 
R.S. Miller, had recently been appointed to positions in 
Australia; and one of the few conservatives left with any 
real procedural knowledge, D.A. Kirkby, was incapacitated 
at this time. Blaikie, even if he had had leadership 
aspirations, would have been too moderate to win general 
WF support .. Thus there was something of a leadership 
vacuum in the conservative movement. It would be left, 
therefore, to relative newcomers, less wary of conflict; 
and to their extremist sympathizers, less concerned about 
harmony, to unfurl the conservative banner in the 
confrontation that was to follow. 
SUMMARY OF' THE CONFLICT 
The doctrinal controversy can be divided into three 
distinct stages: 
(1) March - November 1966 
(2) December 1966 - November 1967 
(3) December 1967 - December·l970 
This section will give a brief description of the scope and 
nature of the controversy within these periods. 
23. 
(1) March - November 1966 
This period of the debate began with an article Geering 
wrote for the Outlook, which called into question traditional 
interpretations of the 'resurrection' of Jesus. The immedi-
ate response was largely uncoordinated but predictable: 
conservatives voiced their disagreement, while radicals found 
Geering's ideas relevant and sensible. At first the debate 
was confined largely to the correspondence column of the 
Outlook, and to the precipitating issue of 'resurrection'. 
But it soon spread to other media and expanded to include 
new and different issues. Many conservatives began to feel 
that some sort of action must be taken to limit the 
publicity given to this radical theology. But more 
established conservatives were reluctant to attack Geering 
directly, and so the leadership of the conservative 
opposition passed to laymen who were less committed to 
the norms of the organization. They formed themselves into 
an 'Association of Presbyterian Laymen' and elected Wardlaw 
their first chairman. 
(2) December 1966 - November 1967 
During the second period the issues were broadened to 
include such questions as whether man has an 'immortal 
soul'; and the debate became more general to include 
fundamental questions of doctrine. Personal attacks 
increased, while disagreements became antagonisms. 'I'his 
expansion was partly checked, however, by a moratorium 
requested by the moderator in April. But the climax was 
yet to come: in November of 1967, in front of television 
cameras and before a packed General Assembly, Geering was 
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formally charged with heresy. 23 The charges were dismissed 
and Wardlaw resigned. The matte.r seemed to have been 
settled with a victory for the radicals and a defeat for 
their opponents. 
(3) December 1967 - December 1970 
Despite their seeming failure, the conservatives did 
not resign en masse. There were many in the evangelical 
group whose loyalty to the church was greater than their 
dissatisfaction with some of its decisions. One of these 
was Arnold, the new chairman of the APL, under whose 
guidance the association began to adopt more realistic 
_policies. But they were also less exciting, and so the 
interest of the media began to wane. This enabled the 
conservatives to keep attention on the constitutional 
issues which they felt were at stake: they wanted the 
church to make an unambiguous affirmation of at least the 
doctrines it considered fundamental. This the Assembly 
decided to do in 1968, and two years later these doctrines 
achieved regulative status. Such clarification, 
conservatives hoped, would assist them in any future attempt 
to bring deviants into line. This hope was largely realized 
when, in 1970, the Assembly agreed to 'disassociate' itself 
from some of Geering's statements. 
The third stage of the controversy can therefore be 
seen as a partial victory for the conservative group. They 
certainly saw it that way, and at the end of 1970, the APL 
23 While the word 'heresy' was not actually used in the 
charges, it was a fair description of them. Wardlaw 
accused Geering of teaching 'doctrines •.• which are clearly 
doctrinal errors'. Blaikie suggested he could not 'affirm 
.•. his own personal belief in (certain) fundamental 
doctrines of the Reformed Faith'. 
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felt secure enough to go into abeyance. But the theological 
divisions were still deep and many of the scars remained. 
26. 
CHAPTER III 
I. DYNAMICS OF THE CONTROVERSY 
At the end of 1966, a major rift divided Presbyterians 
on a wide variety of issues and with considerable intensity. 
The purpose of this section is to examine the nature of 
this split. What features characterized the expanding 
I 
controversy, and how did the issues develop? 
(1) The issues were perceived as threatening 
The potential for conflict was already present with an 
ideological split in the church revealed particularly in 
church union, but it required the injection of a specific 
issue to spark it off. The spark came with the publication 
of an Outlook article written by Geering in which traditional 
views of the 'resurrection' were challenged. In this 
article Geering suggested the 'resurrection' was not 
something that happened to the body of Jesus, but more 
properly could be seen as a presence experienced by his 
disciples. 
Now, conservatives tended to regard the church as an 
organization committed to.the preservation of certain 
doctrines in their traditional formulations. If any such 
doctrines were denied, the basis of the church was, in a 
sense, being challenged. Therefore the pub~ication of an 
1 article such as Geering's was a problem. 
But secondly, 'resurrection' was a doctrine fundamental 
to the belief-system of the church; it could not be considered 
1 A particularly clear expression of this attitude to the 
church was given by an Outlook correspondent (July 9 1966) 
p.16 who suggests that 'the Presbyterian standards are the 
Word of God and the Westminster Confession. Those who 
adhere to those standards are Presbyterians and those who 
do not are in varying degree not Presbyterian.' 
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peripheral. Indeed, many conservatives seemed to see it as 
~ key doctrine of the church. Hemi Potatau, a moderator 
of the church's Maori Synod, pointed out that the first 
Maori converts to Christianity believed in a bodily 
resurrection, adding, 'if the Assembly does not believe in 
this, I want to become a savage again' • 2 
Because it was fundamental, it was seen as inevitably 
affecting other doctrines. The very coherence of the 
ideology required that other beliefs would be involved. 
This is why one critic could suggest that the 'logical 
end' for Geering's theology was 'sheer unbelief 1 • 3 The 
situation was all the more serious because this 'unbelief' 
had already found a foothold in the Presbyterian church, 
which had led to ministers 'denying' their ordination 
vows. 4 Geering was identifying himself with this trend. 
It was not therefore an isolated error that was being 
encouraged by Geering, but a whole current of theological 
opinion, anathema to 'orthodox' Christianity. Unless 
this trend was decisively reversed, the church itself would 
be in danger of losing its theological identity. Thus, 
in terms of Coleman's framework, the issues were perceived 
as threatening. 
This threat was magnified because of the position 
Geering held within the church. He was, and the fact was 
continually stressed, principal of the church's only 
2 Outlook, (November 26 1966) p.15. 
3 Ibid., (May 14 1966) p.15. 
4 See, for instance, A.F. Olsen, It's a Scandal, (tract no.5, 
WF1 1965,pl) 'Men solemnly take ordination vows', the tract 
notes, 'dedicating their lives to defending and propagating. 
the historic Christian Faith, only to go out into seminaries 
and churches and repudiate by their teaching and preaching 
these very vows. This is both immoral and dishonest'. 
theological college, and consequently seen by many as a 
spokesman for the church. This meant that his theological 
utterances could not afford to be ignored. While the 
heterodox opinions of an ordinary minister could perhaps 
be overlooked, those of a theological professor demanded 
action if the church was to retain its integrity. 
(2) The issues become more numerous 
Another of the symptoms, Coleman suggests, of an 
expanding controversy, is an increase in the number of 
the issues. In this case, a whole range of issues was 
generated by the controversy, and while some were new, 
others were part of a long tradition. 
One subject which had separated theological factions 
in the church for almost a century was quickly introduced 
into the new controversy. This was church union, over 
which the Presbyterian church was currently negotiating 
with four other denominations. Fear of doctrinal 
compromise had always made many conservatives rather 
suspicious of unionu for,as the title of one EP article 
declared, 'Faith in Christ could be lost in Church Union•. 5 
The editor of the magazine, Gunn, saw a likelihood of 
'doctrinal reduction' in a united church, which would 
eventually lead to a situation where 'the most brazen heretic' 
might be 'hailed as a brave and adventurous pioneer' 6 
These conservative misgivings about union were inherited 
by the APL which regretted the proposal of the negotiating 
churches 1 to do away with the office of elder and accept the 
5 C.L. Gosling, EP, XVI (1966), 227-230. 
6 A.G. Gunn,~, XVI (1966), p.262. 
office of bishop' "7 Even some who were in favour of union 
saw its future being threatened by the theological 
disagreements,, 
The current ferment in the Presbyterian Church, 
for one thing, suggests that this church is 
hardly :ready to attempt embracing a wider and 
more diverse fellowship, without running a serious 
risk of losing a large number of dissidents.8 
Another issue which had been discussed in conservative 
circles for some time, but enjoyed a revival of interest 
during the controversy, was the problem of 'doubting ministers'. 
The APL felt strongly on this question, and recommended to 
'doubters' that they 'withdraw from Christian service 
rather than spread their doubts through the church' . 9 
However, the APL added a new dimension to the question by 
relating tl1E, recommendation to an underlying anti-clericalism. 
The unbelief of many ministers was contrasted with the 
orthodox beliefs of the average layman: 
The search by theologians for a more intellectually 
satisfying philosophy has not really been for the 
benefit of doubters in the pews, because few of us 
have important doubts in this direction, but for the 
benefit of doubters in many pulpits.10 
It is therefore left to laymen to uphold the truths of 
evangelical Christianity. 
But the theological unorthodoxy which came from the 
pulpit was not solely the fault of ministers: it could be 
traced back to the theological teachers who had introduced 
them to these ideas. So the APL criticized the theological 
hall for attempting to s..lence conservati.ve students, 11 and 
7 NZAPL, (hereafter NZAPL) press release, (September 12 1966) p.5. 
B church and People, toctober 28 1966) p.2. 
9 NZAPL, p. 4. .. 
10 Lo67cit. 
11 Wardfaw had suggested that theological students had been 
forced to take an 'oath of allegiance', preventing them 
from criticizing their professors. This accusation was 
retracted under pressure. Press, (October 13 1966). 
claimed that most of the recent appointees to theological 
chairs had been 'men with liberal (or modernist) theological 
, I 12 VJ_ews . 
Appointments to other influential positions in the 
church were also criticized for the 'unsanctioned 
modernistic bias' they displayed. A new director of 
Christian Education had recently been appointed, who had 
declared an intention to train 'the young generation to be 
radicals and revolutionaries 1 • 13 His appointment marked 
the beginning of a conservative antipathy to the Christian 
Education department of the church, which continued long 
after the theological controversy had died down. 
Even the official journal of the church came under 
scrutiny with the criticism that it was slanted toward 
radicalism. 
Unjust bias is very evident in "Outlook", (sic) 
our official national publication. Originating 
articles in "Outlook", if they have a doctrinal 
bias are, without exception, modernist.14 
More moderate conservatives tended to share these misgivings 
·about the Outlook's impartiality. Blaikie saw 
a clear indication .that the Outlook, although it 
is the official journal of the whole church, has 
a definite bias in its editorial policy towards 
a theological view which many consider to be a 
radical departure from the biblical Christian 
Faith, and to constitute a serious threat to the 
welfare of the church.15 
This disagreement arose over the decision of the editor to 
publish four 'articles-in-reply' from Geering, but only 
letters from his opponents. Blaikie submitted several 
· 12 NZAPL l' p. 5. 
13 Ibid., p.6. 
14 Loc.cit. 
15 outlook, (October 1 1966) p.13. 
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articles for publication, and indicated that he would get 
them printed in the EP if they were not accepted for the 
Outlook. The editor expressed his preference for the former 
alternative. 
Thus the issues multiplied quickly, proving thereby a 
foundation of disagreement on which a full controversy could 
grow. 
(3) The issues become more general 
Closely allied with the increasing number of the issues 
was an increase in their generality. The disagreement soon 
passed from specific questions about the form of 'resurrection' 
to the general presuppositions underlying different beliefs 
on the subject, and the implications following from their 
acceptance. 
One of the key issues here was the attitude to the 
primary documents of Christianity, the biblical records. 
Most conservatives spoke of the bible as the 'inspired Word 
of God' and some suggested that it was 'infallible'. They 
distinguished this 'traditional view of those who accept 
complete dependability of scripture' from the 'secular' view 
which treated 'the scriptures as an indistinguishable 
mixture of fact and fiction' . 16 Geering admitted that this 
was one of the fundamental issues at stake17 and even seemed 
to agree with the APL's delineation of their respective 
positions. He admitted that he did not explain the bible 
'.:i.n terms of inspiration and revealed knowledge' but rather 
16 NZAPL, p.2. 
17 At one stage he declined a debate with an American funda-
mentalist on the grounds that they started from different 
assumptions about the nature of the bible. Press, 
(January 2 1968). 
saw it as beirKJ compiled by fallible men and therefore 
reflecting 'the language, customs and current beliefs of 
their time 1 • 18 So both the APL and Geering were in 
agreement that the issue was one between fundamentalism, which 
took the bible literally, and biblical criticism, which 
opened the bible up to historical and literary examination. 19 
This was not particularly fair to many of those opposing 
Geering, who were far from being fundamentalists. But it 
suited Geering to defend biblical criticism against an 
unthinking fundamentalism, and it suited the populist APL 
to defend simple faith against sophisticated doubt. 
Similarly, the role of the confessional standards was 
introduced into the debate. The WF believed that the 
Confession from which it took its name was an accurate 
summary of biblical doctrine and therefore to be taken 
seriously. The APL generally agreed with this assessment. 20 
Geering on the other hand, along with many others in the 
church not considered particularly radical, thought the 
Confession to be rather legalistic and outmodea. 21 But at 
this stage the discussion was confined to the merits of the 
seventeenth century documents; there was as yet no attempt 
to explore the nature of confessional authority within the 
church or relate this to the apparently fluid credal position. 
18 L.G. Geeringv 'The Word of God and the Bible', in What Does the 
Resurrection Mean: Articles and Corres ence fran the outlook, 
herea ter WDRM, 1.stc mr : Pre '.Yterian can, 9 6 , p. 29. 
He also adrnltted. that he could not be certain that Jesus actually 
said any of the words attribute::1 to him. (Assembly tapes, 1967). 
19 See, for instance, Donald Glenny, St.Stephens newsletter, (Christchurch, 
May 1966), where he tells his parishioners that they 'will have 
observed that Principal Geering has upset some Presbyterians, mainly 
in the Auckland area. This only sh0vs h0v far they are behind in their 
reading, and h0v little they knCM about the Neifl Testament'. 
20 R.J. Wardlaw, (intervievv). 
21 L.G. Geering, 'The Westminster Confession, Our Master or our Servant?' 
in WDRM, p.22. 
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Some of the implications of the 'new theology' also 
entered the debate. Some felt that the whole education 
22 
programme of the church was in jeopardy. Others felt 
that the role of ministers might be threatened if Geering's 
ideas came into vogue, and that they might be relegated to 
the status of 'moral lecturers and undertakers' assistants' . 23 
Further implications of the controversy itself were brought 
up, such as the possibility of a decrease in the number of 
candidates offering themselves for the ministry, and the harm 
open conflict could do to the church's image in the community. 
Thus the issues were becoming more general as the assump-
tions and implications of particular doctrinal positions were 
examined. 
(4) The positions became hardened 
As the controversy developed, it became harder to 
maintain a position of detachment. Those who tried to do so 
were sometimes accused of 'fence-sitting', or 'failing to 
give guidance' to others. Conservatives tended to stress 
the importance of doctrinal purity, while radicals accepted 
a position of theological pluralism. This meant that even 
to perrni t a diversity of theological viewpoints, to say for 
instance that both radical and conservative interpretations 
of scripture were valid, was to align oneself. 24 As Wardlaw 
put it, 'Ministers in Auckland who will not make a firm stand 
22 An illustration of this was given by one informant, who spoke of an 
elderly Sunday school teacher approaching him alnost in tears after 
she had tried to tell her class the story of Easter Sunday. 
'But it isn't true', one pupil protested. 
'Of course it is', replied the bewildered teacher. 
'But', carre the coup de grace frcro this SUnday school radical, 
'Professor Geering says its not and he ought to know'. 
23 outlook, (May 14 1966) p.14. . 
24 As Bates found to his cost when he suggested that churchmen sho~ld give 
serious consideration to the points of view Geering_was ~1;ess1ng. 
Auckland Star (September 15 1966). Gunn accused him of hviitf-11Y, 
corrineriding tff~ opinions of Principal Geering to the churc a arge • 
outlook, (August 20 1966) p.13. 
stand on the matter are willing to share their pulpits with 
b . . k v 25 a 1g question mar. So there could be little ground 
between the two eositions, even though a large majority of 
the church's membership agreed neither with Geering nor the 
APL. This meant that when people became involved in the 
controversy, they tended to be drawn towards one of the two 
26 camps, and a degree of polarization ensued. 
~rhe positions could become hardened all the more easily 
because the strongholds of the groups tended to be isolated 
geographically from each other. The major particpants seemed 
to lack the moderating influence that personal contact with 
their adversaries might have providea. 27 This geographical 
clustering of theological groups was described by one 
correspondent to the Otago Daily Times: 
It is interesting to note that opposition to 
Professor Geering's teachings seems to vary in intensity 
in direct relationship to its distance from Knox 
College. Around Christchurch opposition is almost 
non-existent, in Wellington it is articulate, if 
temperate and restrained, while Auckland seems to be 
the place where all the noise and ballyhoo is coming 
from.28 
One who had been closely associated with the APL in Auckland 
was Euan Campbell, a future president of the association. 
He saw a similar picture, but stressed that misunderstandings 
were reciprocal: 
25 Evening Post, (October 10 1966). 
26 See Outlook, (September 3 1966), p.4, where Blaikie makes 
the same point: 'To allow this situation to continue 
developing unchecked, with increasing numbers clustering 
around the lopsided extremes, is to contribute to the 
already acute danger of a tragic organic division in our 
church 1 • 
27 This was a moderating factor, at least for more central 
members of the community, for those conservatives who knew 
Geering had considerable respect for him, and those 
radicals who knew Wardlaw could understand his position 
better. 
28 Otago Daily Times, (April 4 1967). 
I believe that Assembly has grossly underestimated 
the concern and feeling about the Geering affair 
countrywide and particularly amongst informed laymen 
in Auckland. It appears that in the south the 
clergy particularly have failed to comprehend the 
dismay the Professor's public statements have created 
in the north.29 
The growing bipolarity of the conflict meant that participants 
were being given a choice between two ideological 
perspectives, thereby simplifying their task of interpreting 
information. Geering offered his ideas for those who had 
30 'stepped into the twentieth century with their eyes open'. 
So those who supported him could see themselves as 
enlightened inhabitants of a modern world in which goblins 
were confined to fairy stories and cows did not jump over 
31 the moon. The APL offered their programme for those who 
were loyal to the teachings of the bible. Those who supported 
them saw themselves as guardians of truth holding back the 
encroaching tide of heresy. Radicals saw the whole 
controversy as being a domestic dispute between fellow 
Christians, but the conservatives tended to see it rather as 
a battle between Christianity and humanism. 
Moreover, because the groups disagreed in their 
definition of the situation, they saw different issues as 
being involved in the controversy. It is understandable 
therefore, that Geering should accuse his opponents of 
32 'lacking a grasp of the issues at stake', or that he should 
'remain silent.on many issues which his accusers believe are 
29 Challenge, (December 16 1967). 
30 'Is a New Reformation Possible?', Outlook, (September 25 
1965) p.17. 
31 Some of Geering's supporters ridiculed belief in the 
supernatural, suggesting that 'belief in magic is some-
thing one outgrows', Outlook, (June 25 1966) p.l0j and 
that '(we) cannot go on swallowing outmoded ideas in an 
age of space exploration and satelites'. Ibid, (October 
15 1966} p.15. 1 No intelligent person believes, for 
instance, that the pictorial portrayal of the creation 
story is literally correct'. outlook, (July 9 1966) p.14. 
32 NZ Herald, (September 9 1966). 
f k • t I 33 o ey impor ance . For Geering the central issue became 
freedom of speech, while for his critics it was the need for 
doctrinal orthodoxy. Thus a fundamental difference in the 
perception of the issues helped to accentuate the divisions 
that were already splitting the church. 
So church opinion was crystallizing into two loose 
coalitions, those supporting Geering and those opposing him. 
It was therefore the extremes of the church who were 
dictating the terms of the debate, and those who took neither 
position found themselves almost defined ,,out of theologi-
cal existence. Blaikie recognized this, and commented 
that 'the vocal leaders at opposite ends of the church's 
theological spectrum appear to agree that their two positions 
are the only ones that count. 34 · Even Blaikie soon found that 
he too had to make a choice. 
This polarization can be illustrated in diagrammatic 
form. While the total 'population' of the church can be 
represented as a normal curve, as Downs 35 suggests for an 
ordinary two-party system, those who were actually 
participating came from (or at least were identified with) 
the extremes. This was essentially an unstable situation, 
and liable to survive only as long as the larger mndle group 
remained silent or allowed themselves to be linked with one 
of the factions. 
33 Sunday Times, (November 12 1967). 
34 Outlook, (September 3 1966 )·p4 • 
35 A. Downs, (1957), p.118. 
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(5) The intensity of the conflict increased 
As theological polarization increased, social (and 
later economic) patterns tended to follow theological 
alliances. Associations and friendships tended to proliferate 
within rather than across groups. Wardlaw claimed to have 
made many new friends during the controversy, largely among 
'Presbyterians who hold like me to the fundamentals of their 
faith 1 • 36 A radical informant suggested similarly that 'we 
seemed to mix mainly with like-minded people'. One 
correspondent to the Outlook said that he had been prepared 
to work alongside radicals because he thought they had concurred 
with him on fundamentals. But 'now it seems that this 
assumption is wrong', and the friendships would have to 
terminate. 37 Thus people tended to associate with those who 
shared their theological perspective. 
It was in the context of these groups consequently that 
attitudes took shape and found reinforcement. But the shape 
and style of these reference groups varied considerably. In 
some presbyteries, minorities held occasional caucus meetings, 
while in others small informal discussions were arranged to 
36 Auckland Star-, (May 7 1968). 
37 Outlook, (May 14 1966), p.15. 
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work out common approaches. Wardlaw, for instance, had 
frequent meetings with Gunn, which probably helped to 
formulate some of the APL policy. Morning tea conversation 
at the Theological Hall Senior Common Room is reported to 
have been dominated for months on end by news about the 
controversy, and this professorial community seems to have 
t d ' t' 1 f G ' 38 Th b d ace in a suppor ive roe or eering. ese ons 
were strengthened when the Hall itself was attacked as an 
'odd-ball college of theology•, 39 and a second theological 
40 college was proposed. So theological reference groups 
began to emer9e to a greater extent than previously, and the 
mutual reinforcement this provided contributed to an expansion 
of the controversy. 
But there was a reluctance in the church to engage in 
any sort of personal attack. One leading member of the WF, 
for example, said that ha 'felt rotten' about criticizing 
Geering, especially because of the position the latter held. 
This reticence was seen as doctrinal 'flabbiness' by some 
of the more extreme members of the conservative movement 
who saw the importance of his position as even more reason 
to criticize him. It was therefore left to less cautious 
conservatives to lead the attack, men temperamentally 
unsuited to compromise and averse to moderation. This in 
38 In an APL press statement, Professor Breward had been 
exempted from the 'modernism' imputed to his colleagues, 
but he protested strongly about the 'invidious distinction 
drawn between me and my colleagues', and went on to 
attack the APL, claiming that 'the truth of God and the 
unity of the church is not served by press statements which 
lack even the Christian courtesy of allowing those 
attacked to reply in the courts of the church'. Telegram, 
(September 13 1966). 
39 R.D. Arnold, in the Evening Post, (November 3 1966). 
40 South Auckland presbytery made this suggestion to Assembly 
in the form of an overture. Blue Book, (1966) 316a-317a. 
itself was an important factor in increasing the intensity 
of the conflict. 
Thus the controversy, even by the end of 1966, had 
considerably broadened in scope and heightened noticeably 
in intensity. It had now gone far beyond the precipitating 
issue to include beliefs at every ideological level and to 
involve particpants from almost every theological position. 
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONTROVERSY 
As the controversy expanded, members of the various 
groups within the church became more aware of the need for 
concerting their efforts and organizing their energies. 
The purpose of this section is to describe the nature and 
extent of this organization and assess its effect upon the 
course of the controversy. 
(1) The conservative groups 
The main feature of 1966 from the point of view of 
organization was the emergence of a partisan organization 
to oppose Geering. This 'Association of Presbyterian 
Laymen 1 , as it was known, soon found itself ·following 
different policies from the longer established WF. The 
divergence between the two groups sprang primarily from a 
difference in the constituency each was appealing to, but 
it also led to marked differences in the strategies they 
employed, 
The WF was essentially an established conservative 
group. It was established in that it had acquired a 
respectab image in the church and worked through the 
structures of the institution. It was conservative in that 
its members were committed to preserving traditional 
40. 
doctrinal formulations and generally opposed to theological 
innovation. Its most influential members were ministers, 
and its main appeal was to them. Even its lay members 
showed a respectful att.i tude towards the clergy. The 
fellowship was not then in a strong position to lead any 
populist opposition to Geering, a minister and member of 
the theological establishment. 41 
The APL on the other hand was a new association, 
headed by men with little previous experience of ecclesiastical 
politics. They preferred to work extraconstitutionally, and 
to place less reliance on the official channels of the 
church. This was partly because they were appealing not to 
ministers, but to the 'ordinary' laymen in the local 
congregations, men who had been underrepresented in the 
42 past and who had been excluded from any real decision-
k . 43 ma ing. This led to an element of anti-clericalism in 
their attitude44 as well as a strain of anti-intellectualism45 
41 There was an extreme group within the WF under the leadership of Gunn 
which sanewhat tarnished their 'respectable' image, but in fact the 
existence of this group only added to the inability of the WF to lead 
the conservative opposition to Geering, because the division it caused 
within the WF created an ircmobilisrne which prevented vigorous action. 
42 'Even in the memory of those of middle age, Presbyterian laymen in New 
Zealand have played a very insignificant part in the life of the 
Church. ' NZAPL, p .1. 
43 This reluctance of the church to listen to laymen, the APL believed, 
meant that the regular channels of the church were not really open to 
laymen. As Wardlaw put it, 'If we are referred to constitutional 
avenues to express our concerns the recent decisio~ of the Auckland 
Presbytery not to overture the General Assembly on the score of 
theological training ••• indicates the need for a real · la! mind to be 
known through new channels. ' Auckland Star, (September 9 1966) . 
44 '!he APL spoke of the 'doubters in many pulpits' ; and the 'negotiating 
ministers' who were responsible for unacceptable proposals for union. 
NZAPL, pp.4,6. 
45 '!he APL denied it was anti-intellectual, claiming that.:it. was opposed 
only to the unchristian uses to which learning had been put. But from 
the point of view of conflict expansion, it was the perception that 
intellectuals were being attacked which was inp:>rtant. Moreover when 
Christianity was linked with·a fundamentalist understanding of the 
bible, and 'unchristian' beliefs with a more historical approach, it was 
understandable that intellectuals in the church should feel attacked. 
1 
and an antipathy towards 'the establishment•. 46 
But an avoidance of the routine procedures of the church 
was also part of the strategy of the APL leadership, who 
realized the effectiveness of mass communication techniques. 
Wardlaw, as an advertising specialist, decided to make 'the 
nation' his 'sounding board 147 and within two months had 
spent over a thousand dollars on advertising costs alone. 48 
The APL organized public meetings in many towns and cities, 
which attracted further publicity in the way of local news 
coverage. These activities stimulated considerable support 
from conservative laymen around the country. 
So while the APL met with some success amongst laymen, 
it is not surprising that it made powerful enemies in the 
church. For a policy of anti-clericalism did not endear 
itself to the clergy, nor did their anti-intellectualism 
find much favour with academics. If 'the hierarchy' was 
accused of 'being biased towards unbelief 149 then it was 
hardly likely to sympathize with the association's goals. 
Thus the APL in its very success amongst laymen ensured its 
failure in the corridors of ecclesiastical power. 
But while many of the more moderate conservatives were 
less than whole-hearted about some of the public statements 
50 of the APL, they made little public criticism of the 
46 The APL sought to 'challenge despotic control by the 
excessively liberal minded', and saw the church as being 
'controlled by a hierarchy biased towards unbelief'. 
NZAPL, p.5. 
47 · R.J. Wardlaw, (interview). 
48 APL broadsheet, 1967. 
49 See footnote 46. 
50 As Blaikie commented in his parish newsletter (Mangere 
Presbyterian Church, October 1966) p.l. 'The association 
could turn into a pressure group for extreme right-wing 
closed-mind fundamentalism, and result in weakening the 
resistance to Professor Geering's theological "reformatio~.' 
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association since they shared basically the same attitude 
towards Geering. But they were aware that to maximize their 
chances of winning support from ministers, academics and 
the 'establishment', they had to distinguish themselves from 
the APL in some way. So1 rather than silently concur with 
the APL, a few conservative ministers conducted their own 
parallel campaign against Geering. Blaikie was the leading 
member of this group, but he found support from many WF 
members who were theologically more conservative than him. 
(2) The radical response 
Since it was only the conservatives who felt threatened, 
they were the only ones who felt compelled to mobilize. 
Geering saw himself primarily as an educator, and the 
appropriate form of education was exposition not organization. 
As one key radical rather optimistically put it, 'truth is 
so strong that we don't need to organize•. 51 Even those who 
rallied to support Geering attacked the policies and goals 
of the APL rather than defend his beliefs. A Christchurch 
radical complained to the Press that the policy of the 
association was stated 'in many cases, in libellous terms 
as far as ordained men of the Presbyterian Church are 
52 concerned',- Another member of Christchurch presbytery saw 
the formation of the group as a 'vivid example of religious 
McCarthyism 1 arising in the church. 53 
Ridicule was one of the techniques used to discredit the 
APL, who were described by Geering as 'reactionary elements 154 
51 Interivew. 
52 J. K. Nichol, Press, (October 12 1966) . 
53 I. C. McBride, Ibid. 
54 N. Z. Herald, (September 16 1966) . 
and whose objectives were seen as a 'fabrication of the 
d '1' 55 ev1. • A radical reporter for the Reformed and 
Presbyterian World suggested that the APL members were 
1 h t · d b · t 1 d closed mi·nas•. 56 c arac erize yin o erance an 
The conservatives were also accused of indulging in 
personal attacks. A criticism of Bates for his moderatorial 
remarks about the controversy, for example, met with a 
stiff rebuke from one of the radical group: 
Mr Bates integrity was known to all men before 
Mr Gunn felt led to question it. Let us have 
no more of this in the Outlook, or in any other 
publication. It is not decent.57 
This was one of the radicals strongest strategies, for it 
was valuable in attracting moderates to their banner. 58 One 
leading moderate said that the reason they seemed to be 
agreeing with Geering was that they 'wouldn't be seen dead 
59 with his opponents'. This attitude was elaborated in a 
letter to the Outlook, where indignation was expressed at 
the attacks made on Geering: 
God preserve us .•• from the cruel and self-
righteous attacks of those who would brand 
a man a.s a heretic because he tries to translate 
the gospel :into the language and thought forms 
of his day, even if he fails.60 
Radicals generally tried to appear unorganized, and react 
to the APL with spontaneous indignation. This was also a 
useful strategy, for it enabled them to deplore 'party spirit' 
and place themselves about conflict. Organization was seen 
as a sort of institutional manipulation and was something to 
55 Otago Daily Times, (September 14 1966). 
56 W.W. Ryburn, XXIX (1966) p.168 . 
57 D.M. Hercus, Outlook, (October 1 1966) p.13 • 
58 Blaikie recognised this, and commented 'it has usually 
been those claiming to defend the "secular" interpretation 
of Christiantity who, when the question of truth is raised 
for decision, drag in personalities as a sort of emotional 
sympathy-catching tactic'. Sunday Times, (April 20 1969). 
59 In an interview. 
60 D~W. Starkey, Outlook, (October 29 1966) p.13. 
be avoided. This was the public position radicals adopted: 
it did not describe the way they actually behaved. Bates, 
for instancev circulated a petition in Dunedin presbytery 
expressing support for Geering, and a Wellington radical, 
I.D. Borrie, tried to form a group of like-minded persons. 
But the main form of radical coordination was through an 
informal letter-writing network, which kept theological 
allies (usually personal friends) informed of latest 
developments. 'I'his type of organization through personal 
contact was clearly more suited to their strategy than mass 
mobilization would have been. But the general rationale for 
not opposing the conservative laymen in a more systematic 
way was that diversity was something to be encouraged rather 
than condemned. It was therefore healthy that conservative 
laymen were sufficiently motivated to express their 
theological viewpoint through an organization set up to 
·articulate their beliefs. However, by the same token, radical 
theological beliefs should also be permissible within the 
church. This was the key question of the controversy for 
radicals: not whether Geering's theological conclusions 
were right or wrong, but whether there was a place in the 
church for such theological exploration. Their style of 
organization was largely compatible with their stand on 
this question, although some of the criticisms they made of 
the APL showed little of the tolerance they claimed to 
61 
encourage. 
(3) How did the organization contribute to an expansion of 
the controversy? 
61 A good example of this is found in the New Zealand Herald, 
(September 9 1966), where a correspondent pen-named 
'Shame 1 suggests that 'the presbytery should disallow such 
meetings which show so great a lack of tolerance'. 
(a) The more moderate conservatives did not act as a 
check on the APL, but rather sought to appeal to another 
constituency within the church. Their actions did not 
therefore limit antagonisms, but had the effect of increasing 
participation in the controversy. 
(b) The APL mobilized groups of laymen in all areas of 
the country to oppose Geering, increasing the level of 
participation, and giving in the process further publicity 
t I,.. 'd 62 o 111.s 1. eas. Moreover, because they were a new group, 
they preferred to bypass procedures designed to routinize 
conflict; and their use of mass media and public meetings 
to mobilize laymen facilitated a rapid expansion of the 
conflict. 
i 
(c) The APL also brought others into the conflict 
against them in defence of ministerial integrity, academic 
freedom and presbyterian procedure. These were often 
people with a professional (or bureaucratic) role in the 
church, who normally carefully ~voided taking sides in 
63 domestic quarrels. 
(d) The attempt of radicals to define the conflict in 
terms of a pe-ISOnal attack mobilized many people in defence 
of norms prohbiting personal attacks. 
i 
(e) The mutual definition of the underlyinJ theological 
disagreement as one of dogmatism vs. tolerance b~ought some 
churchmen into a fierce defence of academic freedom, and 
62 See, for instance, a letter by G.H. Robinson, Outlook, 
(April 15 1967) p.14: 'The tragedy is that Mr R.J. Wardlaw 
has ... scattered abroad these very ideas he ••. considers to 
be so dangerous.' 
63 Harrison saw similarly in the American Bapti'st Convention 
that there was normally a 'zone of indifference' to 
theology on the part of administrators. (1959) p.149. 
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others into an attack on the permissiveness of a society 
without clear standards. Both responses increased the 
saliency of the issues, and augmented the level of 
participation. 
(f) The attitude taken by radicals to the APL was quite 
unconciliatory, and the description of them as ignorant 
and reactionary helped to increase the bitterness on both 
sides. 
(g) The way the radicals attacked those who disagreed 
with them in general rather than just the APL meant that 
even those moderates who preferred silence were being 
d d . . 64 goa e into action. 
III. FACTORS WORKING AGAINST EXPANSION 
While the conflict was clearly in a stage of expansion 
during 1966, there were at the same time attempts made to 
limit the extent of the controversy. Organizational norms 
were invoked against personal attacks, and more generally, 
against conflict in the church. Others accepted the 
existence of conflict, but tried to routinize it within 
traditional constitutional boundaries. Indeed, the 
constitutional, and also the social environment, had some 
effect on the expansion of the controversy. 
(1) Norms were invoked 
(a) Against personal attacks. 
It was felt by many that personal attacks were impermissible 
in an organization which boasted love as its fundamental 
64 Storkey, for instance, said that he had 'felt hurt' by 
Geering's implied suggestion that anyone who disagreed 
with him was 'a sort of theological nitwit'. Outlook, 
(October 29 1966) p.13. 
ideological requirement, and so the APL especially were 
chastised for making personal criticisms. Some laymen 
countered this by claiming that the issues were so crucial 
that the whole organization was in danger and that this 
. 'f' d th b h f h 't 65 Justi 1e e reac o c ari y. However, sometimes the 
criticism was averted by prefacing critical remarks with 
h 1 . f. . I • th. . 1 I 66 t e qua 1 1cat1on, I am saying is in ove 
While the invocation of norms against personal attack 
had some escalatory side-effects, 67 it did act as some 
sort of check to the controversy. It meant that the APL 
tried to avoid, or at least tone down, any personal 
criticisms. A Press Association report quotes Wardlaw as 
d . 1 d tt . t G ' 68 ' th t enying a persona ven e a agains eering, saying a 
the APL was 1 not in any way asking for the removal of 
Professor Geering from his post as Principal of Knox 
69 
Theological College 1 • It also curtailed the desire of 
of radicals to attack the APL leadership, for as a 
65 Wardlaw said that he was sorry if there was 'any 
bitterness', but they were doing it in the Lord's name. 
NZ Herald, (September 30 1966). 
66 This was not confined to laymen however. See for example, 
Forum, XVIII (November 1965) p.4: where L.R. Miller, 
after a scathing denunciation of the WF, adds 'Let us 
speak the truth in love to each other'. 
67 See above, p.45 (d). 
68 Other APL members spoke similarly. Before likening 
Geering to Hitler and accusing him of 'a prostitution of 
the English language and a mockery of sincere speech', an 
APL speaker claimed that 'although I will frequently refer 
to Professor Geering by name and quote from his statements, 
there is nothing personal in the matter'. Austen Ward, 
cyclostyled copy of speech, Nelson (December 17 1967). 
69 Otago Daily Times, (October 29 1966). 
Christchurch minister pointed out, if presbytery condemned 
the association for its intolerant policies, it would be 
doing the very thing it was accusing the association of. 70 
(b) Against conflict in the church. 
There were attempts to prevent conflict by confining dis-
agreement to the level of a theological debate and avoid 
the bitterness of a public controversy. This was primarily 
a radical strategy, since they wanted to have Geering's 
theology accepted as legitimate, even if wrong. 71 
But the ideal of harmony in the church was also used 
against Geering. It was pointed out that, whether or not 
he had intended to, he had upset quite a few people in the 
church by his Outlook articles. While freedom of speech 
and education were important, controversy could be harmful 
to the Christian community. Enlightenment should not be 
pursued at the expense of unity. It was with these 
considerations in mind that an unofficial delegation of 
senior ministers approached Geering during 1966, asking 
him to refrain from making public statements which could 
aggravate tensions within the church. 72 
The desire to avoid conflict was shared by some South 
Auckland conservatives,like J.A.Balchin and J.N.A. Smith. 
They arranged meetings in which a variety of points of 
view could find expression, and displayed greater restraint 
in their writing than either Gunn or the APL. 73 Such 
70 L. Jones, Press, (October 12 1966). 
71 One Outlook correspondent (July 9 1966) p.15: expressed 
his hope that 'whatever we think or say relative to the present 
discussions on Principal Geering's articles we will always remember 
that we are fellow Christians with him'. But obviously if the 
conse....rva.tives accepted that, they would be denying their whole case, 
for as one APL leader put It, 'those who can go along with these 
negatives of secular religion have no right •.. to call themselves ••. 
Christians' • Press, (October 10 1966) . 
72 According to one well-placed informant Geering did not react very 
kindly to this request. 
73 I. Brevvctrd. (interview). 
conservatives were conscious of· the strands- in Reformed 
theology which placed emphasis on the unity of the churc_h, and 
the imperfections of the visible church. Since they were 
conservative they took these elements seriously. Others 
agreed with this general position, feeling that even if 
Geering's theology was unchristian they had no right to 
exclude it. 74 Both wheat and tares co-existed in the church 
and it was not for them to anticipate the final judgement. 
Thus, some of the conservative group joined with radicals 
in invoking organizational norms against conflict. 
(2) Attempts were made to routinize the conflict 
The intensity of the conflict was somewhat reduced by 
the perception of the controversy as a routine engagement 
between old adversaries. 75 It was, according to radicals, 
a disagreement between those who were up with current 
thinking and those who had yet to develop a twentieth century 
approach to Christianity. This was the 'educational' argument: 
conservatives were potential radicals in need of education. 
Such education was a continuing task for the church, but one 
that became particularly urgent at certain stages of her 
history. This argument blunted the accusations of novelty 
levelled at Geering, but gave a credible justification for 
the presence of theological disagreements. Disputes of 
this sort were therefore quite normal and should not, it was 
claimed, lead to serious conflict. 
Some conservatives agreed that it was a routine encounter, 
74 This was the position C.L. Gosling in effect adopted when 
he suggested that while 'secular' theology was impermissibl~ 
it might be a catalyst to something better. 
75 But, as with the invocation of norms against conflict, 
there were side-effects, in this case to stir up old 
antagonisms and issues not immediately relevant to the 
current debate. 
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76 one they believed between liberalism and orthodoxy, although 
more serious in this case because of the position Geering 
held as principal of the theological college. The issue was 
between those who believed in the fundamental truths of 
Christianity and those who did not. This was the 'unbelief' 
argument: radicals were potential conservatives in need of 
conversion. 77 All the missionary zeal of evangelicalism 
could therefore be unleashed on unsuspecting radicals. 11-us 
r.ealization did not diminish the conservative opposition to 
Geering, but it may have increased their patience. 
The professionals of the church also attempted to see 
the controversy as a routine matter: another item of 
business b be dealt with as smoothly as possible. This 
attitude was examplified by the man responsible for 
Assembly business, W.A. Best: 
(Some), including the Convenor of Bills and 
business (sic), the Rev. W.A. Best, felt that 
the debate was not an important one. Though 
it was stated that ttiousands of laymen throughout 
the country were waiting for a reaffirmation of 
the basis of Presbyterianism, he suggested that 
other business should take priority.78 
Doctrinal revision was also suggested to be routine activity 
in the church; it was not a proi::;pect which should warrant 
public alarm. In an article in the Outlook, N.F. Gilkison, 
an Auckland minister, indicated the historically relative 
76 See, K. Runia, 'The Geering Case: A Victory for Neo-
Liberalism', in New Life, (November 23 1967) p.2. 'The 
~ontroversy is nothing else than a repetition of the 
battle between scriptural orthodoxy and unscriptural 
modernism, as we have witnessed it in the nineteenth 
century and the first decades of this century.' 
77 Some sociologists a·greed with this assessment, at least 
in the American context: 'The liberal clergy (have become) 
weathercocks turning freely in the cultural winds •.• In 
matters of doctrine the liberal clergy has lost its 
moorings.' D, Bell, 'Religion in the Sixties~ in Social 
Researcl}_ , XXXVIII (1'111) ·P, i,.60 
78 Sun~_'I'imes, (November 6 1966). 
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nature of theological statements: 'There is no perfect 
statement, as there is no perfect creed or Confession. The 
church is called upon to revise such statements in language 
which can be understood, and to clarify its mind on questions 
about the faith raised either because of false teaching or 
because of the challenge of new knowledge. 179 
Thus attempts were made to routinize the conflict by 
explaining it in terms of perennial tensions within the 
church surfacing once again, or perceiving the theological 
issues raised as just another piece of ecclesiastical 
business. 
(3) The effect of social and constitutional environment 
Ministers in the church comprised a small community, or 
rather several small communities, bound together by social 
ties such as school loyalties, 80 marriage connections and 
personal friendships. Most had attended Knox Theological 
College, and almost a quarter had studied under Geering. 
The smallness of the community meant that any adversary 
system was frowned upon, and any displays of 'party spirit' 
condemned. This did not mean that political groupings were 
unable to emerge, but rather that when they did, they were 
kept unpublicized. 
So both radicals and conservatives tended to deny careful 
organization, preferring to attribute success to 'the Holy 
Spirit' and failure to the schemings of their opponents. This 
social environment helped to reinforce the norms of unity and 
79 'What is the Faith?' Outlook, (October 1 1966) p.7. 
80 One leader of the APL suggested that they were opposed by 
an 'old boy network,' which rallied around any of their 
members under attack. (In an interview). This opinion 
was shared by another APL member who saw an 'element of 
the "old school tie'' loyalty' in the 1967 Assembly. A. 
Ward, speech, op.cit., p.4. 
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h . th . . 81 armony in · e organization. But those who had been 
trained overseas were not always part of this small 
community and were sometimes viewed with suspicion. Blaikie 
for instance had done his theological training in Scotland 
and was something of an 'outsider'. 
Even·the theological divisions that did exist were 
somewhat reduced by th.e lack of contact between combatants: 
family groups and theological allies tended to concentrate 
in particular geographical areas. Thus Dunedin, Christchurch 
and Wellinqt.on were known as concentrations of more radical 
ministers, while Mataura and South Auckland tended to act as 
magnets for conservatives. 
It has been suggested that the constitutional 
environment of the church may have taken some of the heat out 
of the controversy; 82 that the structure of Presbyterian 
procedure delayed any hasty action, and gave a breathing 
space in which the issues could be looked at more 
dispassionately. It was certainly true that the delays 
consequent on Presbyterian procedure did provide 
opportunities for dialogue, but there is little evidence to 
suggest that either side moderated their position because of 
it. Moreover, the belief of the APL that the official 
channels discriminated against laymen meant that they had 
little real confidence in the procedures. 
81 One example of this tendency to deny organization was 
given by J,A. Ba;chin in a letter to the writer (dated 
19 November 1973}. In referring to the 1970 disassoci-
ation decision, which climaxed the most carefully planned 
campaign of the conservatives in the whole controversy, 
he suggests, "I really had little to do with this ••. The 
matter was quite straight forward and .• was passed over-
whelmingly by the Assembly in 1970. As it was on such a 
basic matter as a denial of life after death it could 
hardly have gone otherwise." 
82 I. Breward (intervi~) C.L. Gosling suggested similarly that the 'lines 
of communication' were better in the Presbyterian church than in some 
other denominations; so the controversy could take J?lace within the 
more temperate atmosphere of church courts and camuttees. 
53. 
However, there had been conscious attempts for some 
time to ensure greater representation of conservative opinion 
in the courts and committees of the church83 and bring 
representatives of different positions together in this way. 
This meant that, for instance, Arnold, Blaikie and Geering 
were all on the Doctrine Committee, while Wardlaw, Gilkison 
and Blaikie were together on the Overseas Missions Committee. 
However, the contact this committee work may have provided 
did little to reduce mutual suspicions in a period of 
increasing tension. Indeed, one APL leader said that it 
was from serving on a committee with Geering that he first 
became aware of the latter's heterodox views. 84 
'l'hus, while the social environment of the church did 
something to dampen down the conflict, the constitutional 
climate only exacerbated the tension that was present. 
IV. THE SITUATION AT THE END OF 1966 
The year 1966 ended with what appeared to be an 
acceptable compromise. Some doctrinal statements were 
proposed for adoption by the Doctrine Committee, and these 
were accepted by Assembly with only ope dissent being recorded. 
83 This was de.scribed in ·the Life and Work Committee Report 
to the 1967 Assembly: 'Many efforts have been made over 
the years to keep conservatives in the main stream of our 
Church's life and work by seeing that on Assembly and 
Presbytery committees the conservative interest gets ample 
representation. Conservatives have been specially 
included in all conferences on Church union ..• ' Blue book, 
1967, p.32a. 
84 Moreover there were rather strong tensions within some 
committees. One professor in the Church of Scotland makes 
this point: 'If there is anyone who has never seen one 
fellow Christian give another a nervous breakdown or never 
been present at a meeting of ecclesiastical top brass 
where the atmosphere could most aptly be described as 
coronary creating, then he is more fortunate than the 
present writer.' Henderson (1967) p.5. 
54. 
Since it was the stated goal of the APL to get a reaffirmation 
of the church's standards, especially as they related to the 
'resurrection', it would be expected that such a decision 
would find favour with the association. Moreover, because 
one of their senior members was on the committee, and he 
seemed happy with the statements, it seemed quite probable 
that the association would accept the proposals. 
The Outlook report on the Assembly spoke of an 
'atmosphere of spiritual elation and joy and fellowship' at 
th 1 ' f th th . SS It 1 k f e cone usion o · e ga ering. a so spo e o a 
debate in which there emerged 'a well ordered system fully 
ventl lating the opinions of representatives on every aspect 
of the controversy'. Even allowing for the degree of 
optimistic reporting characteristic of an official church 
magazine, some reconciliation appeared to have been achieved. 
Indeed, the Clerk of Auckland Presbytery described the result 
as a'miracle of reconciliation' . 86 
On behalf of South Auckland Presbytery, A.C. Webster 
withdrew two clauses on theological education from an 
overture the presbytery had presented. His assessment of 
the situation agreed with that of the Outlook: 
We saw in the debate on Thursday that while there 
were differences, sometimes deep differences, which 
were vigorously expressed, yet the bond of fellow-
ship, far from being bioken, was strengthened. 87 
Geering expressed his satisfaction at the outcome, and 
85 Outlook, (November 26 1966) p.6f. 
86 Church and PeoEl!, (December 26 1966) p.2. 
87 Dominion, (November 8 1966). 
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even Wardlaw seemed contented with the result. 88 The 
latter's brother appeared to sum up the mood of the moment 
when he said, 1 1 respect Professor Geering. I also respect 
my brother. I count them both brothers in Christ., 89 
However, a verbal compromise over the precipitating 
issue soon proved to be inadequate to meet the demands of 
the APL. Three reasons can be suggested for this. Firstly, 
there were more issues at stake than just the initial 
question of 'resurrection'. Even a satisfactory resolution 
of this issue would not settle the issues or ameliorate the 
antagonisms that had arisen in its wake. Secondly, 
conservatives were rather suspicious of the way Geering 
seemed ab to manipulate words to suit his purpose. The 
test of a compromise formula was therefore not what it said,.. 
but what it did: was Geering in any way restricted by it?90 
The newspapers the following morning carried an assertion 
by Geering that he was not. Thirdly, the conservatives 
believed that Geering 1 s belief about the 'resurrection' was 
not just an isolated theological aberration, but arose from 
an unchristian set of presuppositions. Even if it were 
possible to silence him on an issue such as the 'resurrection' 
he would 'break out again 191 in some other doctrinal area. 
88 See Chun~h and People, (Novembe7 25 1966), p. 3. 1 We 
gather that both Professor Geering and Mr Wardlaw were 
happy with this, which can only mean that they each have 
a dif understanding of what the words say.' 
Wardlaw later denied that he was happy with the decisions. 
89 Outlook, op.cit. p.7. 
90 'Ihis type behaviour, involving the use of a deviant as a negative 
referent for normality, follows closely the pattern suggested by 
Lewis Coser in 'The Functions of Deviant Behavior;and Normative Flexi-
bili t:y, 1 AJS, LXVIII ( 196 2) : 1 The criminal, the scapegoat, the men- -
tally ill-, Tn their diverse ways, allow the group to reaffirm ••• its 
:moral- identity, for they establish sign, posts which serve as norma.-
ti ve yardsticks ...• It is against the ground of their deviance that 
the righbeous achieve the canforting affirmation of their norrriali'\::y.' 
(pp.173f.) 
91 One inforrnant used this phrase to describe Geering I s introduction 
of new into the debate. 
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Because of these factors, any formulation which was 
acceptable to Geering was ipso facto unacceptable (or at 
least insufficient) for the APL. It was only because they 
believed that Assembly's decision was a rejection of much of 
what Geering was saying that they had been partly satisfied. 
But now they knew better. So the issue was becoming not 
just one the church 0 s affirming orthodox doctrines, nor 
even rej unorthodox ones; for Geering, they thought, 
could escape this net also. It was now impossible for them 
to avoid attacking personalities. This appeared to be the 
only way they could stop the radical tide. 
So the stage was set for the second part of the 
controver The APL would not be seeking merely a 
clarification of doctrine. It would be asking for an 
exclusion of people who refused to conform. Personalities 
had replaced ideas as the most accurate theological 
reference points for the subsequent debate. 
'I'hus the momentum of the controversy had carried it to 
a point where some sort of confrontation was difficult to 
avoid. For it was no longer winning policy debates or 
achieving theological goals which primarily concerned the 
APL. It was defeating an opponent. 
S7. 
CHAP'rER IV 
I. DYNAMICS OF THE CONTROVERSY 
At the beginning of 1967, the controversy was entering 
a new stage. The APL had become dissatisfied with the 
results of the 1966 Assembly, and were now beginning to 
rethink their tactics. However, in March a new issue was 
introduced into the controversy, precipitated by a 
sermon Geering preached at Victoria University. The report 
of this sermon convinced the APL once again of the dangers 
of 'secular Christianity' and hardened their resolve to press 
for the removal of its foremost advocate. Consequently, 
their policy became focused even more openly on personalities. 
The issues increased in scope and generality, while the 
level of antagonism continued to rise. 
(1) 1 The issues became more numerous 
'Prof. Geering starts new controversy', a headline read 
in the Dominion of March 14, 1967. The following report 
described reactions to a sermon in which Geering was purported 
to have denied the 'immortality of the soul'. The inference 
drawn from this by some of his opponents was that he was 
rejecting yet another doctrine fundamental to 'orthodox' 
belief. However, he claimed that he was expounding a 
philosophy of life found within the canon of scripture,expres-
sed particularly in the Wisdom literature of the Old 
Testamen~when he said that 'man has no immortal soul'. But 
l Gunn described this succinctly: 'The period between the 
Assembly of 1966 and the Assembly of 1967 witnessed the 
public revelation by Principal Geering that his agnosticism 
spread far beyond the Resurrection to include such basic 
doctrines as the Doctrine of God, of Christ, of Prayer and 
of the Life Everlasting.' Letter to ministers, (January 
1968) • 
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the innocence of his intentions had no effect on the outcry 
which followed. 
The Evening Post of March 14 headlined its article on the 
subject 'Churchmen up in arms over speech denying man an 
immortal soul', in which Wardlaw was quoted as predicting that 
Gearing's sermon would 'create even greater spiritual distress 
than his previous utterances. 12 This was then linked to the 
question of Geering's place in the church: 'It now seems 
logical that he will resign his professorship at Knox College 
and his membership of the Presbyterian Church, whose creed 
expressed belief in the life everlasting.' 
But although Geering did not plan the expansion of the 
controversy with the injection of the immortality issue, 
it was soon apparent that the development was politically 
advantageous for him, for there were th_eological innuendoes 
and complications associated with 'immortality' that the 
APL did not appreciate. He therefore linked the new issue 
with his previous understanding of the conflict, that it 
was between people with different levels of knowledge. The 
'educational' argument could therefore be used to great effect 
against the APL. 4 But it caused considerable bitterness5 and 
2 Evening Post, (March 14 1967), 
3 Loc.cit. 
4 Gordon McLauchlan of the Weekly News had this argument 
presented to him by Knox staff: 'Theologians at Knox 
College's Theological Hall •.• and many ministers acknow-
ledge what they call "the gap" between the ministry and the 
laity and they accept their share of the blame ... None of 
them underrates the need to close "the gap" between the 
modern theological thought of the ministry and the views of 
the laymen.' N. Z. Weekly News, (April 10 1967) p. 3. 
5 R.D. Arnold reacted sharply to the ·1 educational' argument, 
suggesting that 'the new secular theologians' were 'only a 
noisy minority.' He added that 'those who are so lightly 
labelling us laymen as fools for our views ••• should take 
note of the quality of the scholars who are to.share the 
dunce's cap with us.' Evening Post, (October 27 1967). 
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brought protestations of scholarship from the WF. 6 
Issues which had been introduced in earlier stages of 
the controversy continued to be mentioned, albeit in a somewhat 
revised form. 'l'he problem of 'doubting ministers I was again 
raised, but now specific assurances were being requested. 
The Christchurch branch of the APL wanted a guarantee that 
they were 'in no way being deceived by ministers who believe 
in Geering 1 s views but preach otherwise for fear of upsetting 
the faithful.,. 1 7 , 
The question of loyalty to ordination vows was also 
raised but with a more specific referent. Wardlaw, in 
hoping for Geering's resignation, noted that 'it would 
certainly be a welcome development and will enable the church 
to replace him with a theologian who really believes in his 
ordination vows. 18 
It was probably inev.i:table that sooner or later Geering 
would be 1 inked with the advocates of the O permiss_ive society'. 9 
The moderator of Wellington presbytery, J.K. Fairbairn, made 
this association, lamenting that 'at a time when there was 
so much confusion in the realm of behaviour, it was 
regrettable that statements were made which would only add to 
the confusion by tossing aside the faith and belief that had 
sustained so many throughout the ages. 110 An editorial in 
--------
6 The WF were particularly sensitive to the criticism that 
conservatism was a by-product of ignorance. When several 
members of the fellowship received Ph.D's, the EP 
commented that it 'pointed to the fact that theconservative 
viewpoint in theology is not incompatible with scholarship.' 
EP, XIX (September-October 1969) p.10. 
7 Outlo£J:::. (May 13 196 7) p. 9. 
8 Evening Post, (March 14 1967). 
9 'Ihis-relat:fonship is characteristic of conservative religious groups. 
See for instance, an article by H.J. Ruppel in Sociological Analysis, 
XXX (Fall 1969) p 176-·188, entitled ~!£.sity and ~:r:emarital _Sexual 
~~siveness: A ME!thodological Note. 
10 Dcminior~, (March 14 196 7) • 
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the APL broadsheet agreed, seeing that the same 'radicalism' 
which was 'seeking to undermine the .valid faith of those who 
accept the teachings of the Scriptures at face value' was 
also 'eroding the church's ... foundation of morality. ,ll 
Education was another issue which had become involved in 
the controversy early. Geering was now accused of interfering 
with C:hild-rearing patterns by a correspondent in a Hawkes 
Bay newspaper, who suggested that Geering was complicating 
'matters for parents who are trying to bring up their 
families in the simple facts of faith and hope as spoken in 
the .Bible' •12 
The Christian education policies of the church were also 
out of favour with conservatives and the Christian Education 
department of the church tended to be regarded as a part of 
'radical bloc' with Geering. A March 1967 broadsheet of the 
APL carried an article by Blaikie critici ing 'another 
attack on vital Easter truths', in which a comparison is drawn 
between the views of Geering and a study booklet approved by 
13 the department. 
The whole range of educational policies came into the 
debate with the APL expressions of concern about the 
theological education of the church. Renewed appeals were 
made for a second theological college with a more 
conservative staff, and the WF proposed providing bursaries 
for students to complete theological studies in more 
11 Presbyterian Laymen, occasional broadsheet, (March 1967) 
p.2. (hereafter P.L.) 
12 Hawkes Bay Herald-Tribune, (March 29 1967). 
13 Last Easter The Outlook carried Principal Geering O s message to the 
Presbyterian Church at-larg·e, that though the bones of Jesus may well 
be decomposing still in Palestine, we need not -worry, for we can still 
fiddle with words and say O He is risen! 0 - risen as a change of 
attitude and outlook in his disciples. 
This year the damp squib of this 1 secular Christianity' is to burst 
more specifically in the Methodist and Presbyterian Bible Class Easter 
Camps up and down the land .... ' P .L., p. l. 
evangelical institutions overseas. 
(2) The issues became more general 
The stab2ments of Geering on the 1 immortality 1 issue 
were seen by some conservatives as but one further step 
towards a ly-fledged atheism. Wardlaw, for example, was 
quoted as stating that 'the Professor's denial of man's 
hope of immortality was a logical extension of the things 
he had already said in direct contradiction of universal 
Christian beliefs and the hopes of millions through the 
14 
centuries and today.' 
So it was not just Geering's particular doctrinal 
idiosyncrasies which were arousing opposition, but the whole 
direction and basis of his theology. Gunn claimed that 
'conservative evangelicals ..• view secular 11 Christianity 11 
as the most dangerous heresy of our time 1 , 15 and saw 
Geering's theology as an expression of it. Blaikie, in 
numerous letters, articles, and motions before Auckland 
presbytery, felt that the underlying assumption of Geering's 
whole position was a denial of the 'supernatural'. This 
presupposition, Blaikie believed, put Geering beyond the 
theological pale altogether: 'If the Church were to accept 
it as proper or permissible for Christians to deny the 
supernatural, it would be agreeing that we may abandon the 
very heart of the Christian Faith 116 The corollary to 
this, of course, was that Geering was not really a Christian 
at al1. 17 This was made explicit by Gunn who declared that 
14 Evening Post, (March 14 1967) . 
15 P.L., p.4. - ' 
16 Outlook, (May 27 1967) p. 8. 
17 See above, p.35. 
'radical liberal theology ••• is a different religion, and 
has no right to claim that it is Christian•. 18 An Anglican 
critic agreed, adding that 'many of the things Geering had 
been saying were said by atheists and Communists before the 
f born ,.19 pro essor was 
But some of those who were supporting Geering were also 
taking their stand on a very general front. One correspondent 
to the 0!_:ag£._Daily Times felt that Geering's 'knowledge as 
broadcast now will eventually lead, within, say, the next 100 
years to a 20 , far happier world than we know today'. 
'I'his tendency towards generalization of the issues meant 
that people t:.ended to identify with a general theological 
position more consciously than before. Moreover, these 
positions were focused on diverging attitudes towards belief 
and towards church. 
Conservatives tended to be more rigid in their attitude 
to belief. They attached a considerable weight to statements 
of fai , splayed confidence in the ability of words 
to convey theological truth. 21 Radicalsv on the other hand, 
were more cautious of doctrinal formulations, but while they 
seemed prepared to use traditional terminology, they often 
used the terms in rather different ways from their conservative 
brethren. They did not identify beliefs with doctrines, but 
spoke of beliefs as being given 'historical expression' in 
doctrines. Therefore the use of particular sets of words was 
18 !:..:.!!·, Loc.cit. 
19 R.G. Nicholson, Latimer, (January 1968) p.18. 
20 Otago Daily Times, (March 23 1967). 
21 Some conservatives were well aware of the difficulties in 
taking such a position. For a thoughtful approach to the 
question of authority in the bible, see J.A. Balchin, 
1 Interpreting the Bible/ EP, XVIII (March-April 1968) 13-16. 
63. 
valid if it helped to promote faithv 22 but the words were 
secondary to the experiences they evoked and the events to 
23 which they witnessed. This priority was illustrated by 
Geering 1 s attitude to the 'Trinity'. 
I am fond of the Trinitarian formula as it links 
me with the Church of the past. I would not use 
the word Trinity because it gets me into more 
difficulties than it solves. It was a Fourth 
Century attempt to preserve the Church from error, 
the framework to hold certain affirmations 
together The Christian Church created a framework 
which served it very well. We have moved so far 
away from that setting that it does not serve us 
now. Wo no longer find it a helpful way of 
preserving truth.24 
It was not surprising, therefore, that some conservatives 
expressed bewilderment at the way Geering could use words 
without apparently believing what they said. Blaikie 
expressed this uneasiness when he brought his charges against 
Geering at Assembly: 
The New Theology, as it is often called, rather 
than deny some of the doctrines of the Christian 
FaithwFi"fch it cannot accept hap 1 re-interpreted1 
them, quietly giving to familiar words meanings 
radically different from those they have always 
had in common use. Those who are not 'in the know' 
about the new definitions are thus left either 
confused or misled about what the theologian really· 
means by what he says.25 
Opinions were also polarized around two different conceptions 
of the church, based on a divergence about belief. Radicals 
26 saw the church as 'a community with a memory'. This 
22 According to Geering in A 'frial for Heresx (1968) p. 76. 
(Hereafter A Trial). 
23 This is obviously a gross simplification of what 'radical' 
theologians believed. Some tended to stress the primacy 
of present experience, decision or self-understanding. 
Others emphasised the foundation events of Christianity 
and saw doctrines as an attempt to interpret these events. 
Most tried to J,;:eep a tension between the two. 
24 A T".cial, 38. Cf. D. Glennyv Outlook, (June 10 1967) p.9. 'Most 
Christiar1s who ever give it a thought regard the Christian Doctrine of 
the rrrinity as nonsense ., .. han1Tiered out •.. to prevent us losing our 
balance. 1 
25 A Trial, p.64. 
26 J.M. Bates (Interview). 
h . th . 27 f . emp asis was on · e experience o a community through time 1 
and doctrines were to be seen essentially as interpretations 
of sacral events made by this community. Conservatives, on 
the other hand, preferred to see the church as a more 
disciplined organization united by adherence to particular 
doctrines. Blaikie allowed a fairly wide range of theological 
exploration, as long as a few central doctrines were assented 
to. Gunn, on the other hand,· suggested that to be a 
Presbyterian, a. person must believe even that the Pope is 
the 1 Antichrist 0 • 28 For radicals, diversity in theology was 
a sign of life29 but for conservatives it was the mark of 
30 
decay. Because conservatives defined the church in terms 
of the doctrines it subscribed to, it was a very serious 
matter if these doctrines were brought into question: 
The time has come when a definite stand has to be 
made. Either the church comes out firmly on the 
side of Professor Geering and alters its teaching 
or it stands by its declared Standards. There is, 
I feel, no middle course or compromising stand when 
dealing with matters of faith.31 
27 Cf. the views of an unidentified I ag·eing scholar I from 
Knox: 'Everybody seems to think that the Christian Faith 
is a set of rules. It's an experience; and this Christian 
experience is the same as it has always been, but it can be 
expressed in the modern idiom'. N.Z. Weekly News, (April 10 
1967) p.4. (Emphasis added.) 
28 See a letter by Gunn in the Outlook of February 19 1966 
p.13. where he criticises someone for denying that the Pope 
was the 1 Antichrist 1 , for, he argues, 'if she is Presby-
terian she has accepted the Confession of our church, and 
so believes the same 1 • 
29 See Newsletter, First Church, Dunedin, (n.d. 1966) (Hewitson Library) 
'Most Presbyterians believe that it is healthy for the church to have 
within it a variety of viewpoints and opinions because this variety 
leads to qrO'Wth. 1 And contrarily, as Bates put it, 1 It would be an 
indication of decadence in the church if there could not be careful, 
substantictl reconsideration of even the most fundamental J:?Oints of 
Christian doctrine. 1 Auckland Star, (September 16 1966) • 
30 Eg. E.J. Norton, 'The New Hebrides Pre~erian Church, typed mss., p.7. 
1 '1.be vitality of a church is a reflection of its adherence to standards.' 
See also Djuro Vrga, et al. 1The Relationship of Religious Practices 
and Beliefs to Schism', Sociological Analysi~, }00( (Spring 1970} 46-55, 
where the authors suggest that those who are ' schismatic I have a 
narrower conception of the church. J.K. Hadden, (1969) similarly sees 
iI,1 Anierican Protestantism a clash ove.x the nature and purpose of the 
church, 
31 outlaol::~, (April 15 1967, p.15). 
Very little distinction was made by the APL between what was 
'legitimate 0 and what was 'true'. For them, if the church 
permitted particular beliefs to be held, it was giving 
official sanction to them. The opposite position was taken 
by J.M. Bates: 
This church, which is merged together not by 
statements of faith, but the action of the Holy 
Spirit in Christ, is surely big enough to allow 
for a broad spectrum of theological interpretationb 
••. The views that have been expressed by 
Professor Geering are not necessarily the views of 
all of us .. They're not the views which everybody 
in the church is being asked to subscribe to. But 
they are a proper thing to have in a church.32 
Thus the contending parties appeared to be not only divided 
on the content of the organizational ideology; they seemed 
divided on the nature of the organization itself. 
(3) The ideological differences were accentuated by the 
controversy 
While the:t'.'e were deep differences apparently dividing 
the groups, these were considerably exaggerated by the 
combatants. Blaikie, for example seemed to have misrepres-
ented Geering1s position somewhat: 
(A point) from Mr Blaikie ... in connection with the 
doctrine of God. I find no difficulty myself in 
saying that God has acted, in fact a lot of what Mr 
Blaikie said I am very happy with really. I wonder 
why he doesn't think I am happy with it.33 
But Geering similarly misunderstood many of his conservative 
opponents, treating them as rather uneducated fundamentalists. 
However this mutual misrepresentation was not deliberate 
malevolence on the part of the adversaries; it was probable 
32 Assembly tapes 1967. 
33 Final reply by L.G. Geering to his accusers, A Trial, 
p.109. 
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that they actually believed the stereotypes they had formed 
of their oppor1r~nts" Rather such stereotypes arose, as they 
generally do, as groups tried to achieve some degree of 
ideological consistency. 34 In this process negative 
attitudes to opponents tended to be reinforced, while 
positive attitudes to one 1 s own position were rewarded. 
Incoming information was consequently screened by loyal 
members :Ln terms of the stereotypes. When Geering made a 
statement, Blaikie usually saw is as a further denial of the 
'supernatural' or, if it appeared to be orthodox, an ambiguous 
deception. When Wardlaw made a statement, Geering saw it as 
either an ssion of a pre-scientific world view, or an 
attempt to simplify complex matters. So participants met new 
arguments with already prepared answers. 
In fact opponents were often far more in agreement 
than they were prepared to admit. This discrepancy arose 
however because the group reififorcement process encouraged 
participants to emphasise the points they had in common with 
their all sand the points at which they disagreed from their 
adversaries The effect of this distorted selection of facts 
on a debate has been well described by Kung: 
A polemical statement of truth ... runs the risk 
of being understood merely as a denial of an error. 
It thus necessarily ignores the kernel of truth 
contained in the error. This statement of truth 
thus becomes a half-truth; what is says ~correct~ 
but what it does not say is also correct. From the 
point view of the person who makes it, it refutes 
the error at which it is directed; from the point 
of view the person to whom it is addressed, it 
34 See, for instance, R.R. Blake and J ,S. Mouton, 'Compre·-
hension oE Own and Outgroup Positions under Intergroup 
Competition', JCRv V (1961), 304-310. For a more 
comprehensive analysis of the process of social reinforce-
ment see R.J Lift"on, Thought Reform .and the. Psychology of 
'I'otalism: A Study of I Brai'riwasning7"'in China, (Middlesex: 
Penguin, 19~7J. · · 
fails to refute the truth. To the former it 
seems rightly - to be true; to the latter 
not wrongly - to be false. In short, 





s fail to understand each other. Each 
his truth and sees the other's error7J°5 
7 
One visiting theologian, who happened to be a leading English 
conservative, saw this tendency present in conservative 
attitudes to Geering: 
Geering«s account of the Resurrection of Christ •.• 
is controlled by a strong· conviction of the reality 
of the living, Risen Christ. It is, perhaps, not 
always recognised by some of his critics that they 
share this basic faith with him.36 
Thus the soci 1 changes brought about by the controversy 
stimulated development of stereotyping and misperceptions, 
which in turn deepened the divisions between the groups and 
contribµted to further expansion of the controversy. 
(4) The conflict intensified 
As the scope and generality of the issues increased, 
and more people became involved, the conflict itself became 
more intense. It became seen as an 'either-or' struggle 
with one group or another apparently destined to leave the 
church altogether. Wardlaw said that he would resign his 
church membership unless Geering was censured: he was 'prepared 
to sever connections with the church unless the situation 
created by the assertions of Professor L.G. Geering was 
corrected by "appropriate discipline". 137 From the other 
side as many as a third of the minis may have resigned if 
the decision went against Geering. A writer for the Sunday 
35 H. Kung, Infallible? An Enquiry, tr. E. Mosbacher, 
(London: Collins, 1'9"rn-;pp.140f. Emphasis added. 
36 A.R.C. Leaney. 'History, Resurrection and Redemption', 
in ~RMv p. 31. 
37 N.Z. Heraldr (May 8 1967). 
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Time~ estimated their number at about 200, and an Outlook 
columnist added, 0 I am sure he was right in saying that the 
entire faculty of the Theological Hall would have been among 
th ,38 em. 
39 As well as social reinforcement of cleavages, there 
were financial pressures which were exerted in support of 
ideological positions. The e_unday Ne~ of March 26 1967, 
claimed, apparently quoting Wardlaw, that 'influential lay 
members may stop offerings to the church if no action is 
taken against Professor Geering over his claim that the soul 
. t . l ,40 is no immorta . • •. But the preferred policy of the 
APL was to engineer the departure of radicals from the 
church rather than to withdraw financial support from its 
enterprises. In a personal statement, Wardlaw made this 
explicit: 
The Church, .as property, belongs in permanent 
trust to those who hold the traditional view of 
its founders, and to be absolutely honest, those 
with the New Theology shouli establish their own 41 
new Church and prove the merits of their theology. 
The intensity of these divisions in turn reinforced the 
ideological differences, giving to each issue a ideological 
importance far greater than it would normally carry. Routine 
matters tended to become microcosms of the large controversy. 
The extent of this was illustrated in the report of the Life 
and Work Committee to the 1967 Assembly: 
38 D. McEldowney, Outlook, (December 23 1967) p.14. 
39 Outlook, (December 23 1967) p.6. 
40 Cf. N.Z. Heraldu (March 31 1967) where Wardlaw, in a 
letter to the moderator claimed knowledge of 'parishes 
where giving had been halved through the diversion of 
funds following the activities of Professor Geering, and 
we believe this to be a natural outcome of his teaching'. 
41 Sunday News, loc.cit. 
(Friction) arises in Christian education where the 
.Assembly approves and recommends one syllabus, but 
many Churches prefer not to use it. It arises in 
vacancies where a parish seeks or rejects one they 
consider to be a party man. It is seen in a lack 
of mutual confidence revealed in debate where a 
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motion is spoken to and voted upon, on the basis on 
what it is thought to imply, rather (than) on what 
it actually says. It is seen in the sometimes 
deplorable way that ministers speak of each other 
and parishioners speak of their ministers. It is 
seen in the hundred and one more or less visible, 
more or less underhand ways that ministers, Sessions 
or people lay down the law, jockey for position, lobby 
or obstruct.42 
The polarization underlying this friction can be 
illustrated diagrammatically, by using a graph Coleman 
developed in his rnonograph. 43 When a community is well 
integrated, the discord arising from conflict will be 
absorbed relatively equally at every level of political 
life. In terms of the church these would be at the 
individual, small group, parish, associational and presbytery 
Assembly levels. 'I'his can be represented: 
However when the church began to polarize, there were 
fewer individual uncertainties and greater consistency 
within groups. The main source of conflict consequently was 
between groups at the local and national level. This would 
be represented: 
42 Blue Book, ( 1967) p. 31a. 
43 Coleman, op.cit. p.23. 
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With mutual reinforcement of prejudice and internal 
solidarity that this polarization provided, the social base 
was firmly laid for an intensification of the conflict. 
(5) Disagreements become antagonisms 
Closely related to the expansion in the intensity of 
the conflict was an increase in the personal antagonisms 
between opponents. The APL made no secret of its intention 
to leave 'no stone •.. unturned to secure Professor Geering's 
. t. d' . l' 44 d h . ' h resigna ion or ismissa , an any ot er minister w o 
deviated from 'orthodoxy' was also liable for criticism. 
There were even tentative steps taken by the association to 
press heresy charges against one Auckland minister in 
presbytery and libel charges against another in the courts, 
but nothing eventuated. These were in line with the 
association policy of making 'marked men' of those who 
45 promoted 'unsound doctrine through the Church'. But it 
was Geering who remained in the forefront of their attack. 
46 His beliefs were seen as 'a cancer which must be removed', 
44 Outlook, (April 15 1967) p.11. 
45 ~-p. 3 . 
46 Press, (November 30 1967)? 
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and he was given what was described as 'a trial .•• by a 
47 process of public clamour'. He received a volume of hate 
mail, including a prediction that if he did not keep quiet, 
h ld b d d . h' . h 48 e wou e ea wit in six mont sfu 
received anonymous letters and threats. 
Wardlaw similarly 
Another APL member 
spoke of reactions to his claim that the church was following 
a 1 double standard': 
I have received public condemnation from ministers 
:for pointing out these inconsistencies. I have 
asked for a reasoned explanation. The only 
response was the receipt of a very abusive letter 
from a local minister.49 
But as it was politically more expedient for radicals to 
appeal to the norms of the organization against personal 
attacksv they tended to indulge in less public name-calling 
i 
than :their opponents. They had a tactical advantage here, 
for the APL hc1.d to make credible a distinction between 
singling out one man's theology for severe criticism and a 
persdnal attack. This advantage could have been partly lost 
when radicals exploited personality weaknesses of APL leaders 
to win policitcal arguments. They mentioned the fact that 
some!association leaders had not been Presbyterians long, or 
had been members of fundamentalist sects. They·spoke of APL 
merr~ers 'having secret girl friends' or dabbling in subliminal 
d . . 1 50 a vert1s1.ng . 
s.c. Read, who was both Clerk of Assembly and Moderator, 
was subjected to accusations of partiality from both 
.47 Outlooku (,June 11 1966, 11). 
48 N.Z. Weekly News, (April 10 1967), 2). 
49 A. Ward, duplicated letter to Nelson/Marlborough Presbytery, 
(October 13 1970). 
50 This process has been described in S. Anthony, 'Anxiety 
and Rumor · 1 , JSP, LXXXIX (1973), 91-98, who suggests that 
anxieties tend to stimulate the 9rowth of rumours. 
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. 51 sides; but while the APL, because of its mass base, tended 
t ' t 't ·t· ' 52 th' d h. . .. o prin 1;s cri ·icisms, eir opponents ma et eir criticism 
less polite but more private. Indeed, most of the rumours 
and apocryphal stories were transmitted from mouth to mouth, 
and rarely appeared in print. So since it was the appearance 
of being aloof from making personal attacks which was 
important, the radicals managed to gain political points 
without restricting their style. 
But these antagonisms were not confined to participants 
in the national politics of the church. For the real 
strength of the APL lay in men who knew nothing of national 
decision-making, but played a role in their local parish. 
The intensity of the conflict in particular areas therefore 
depended on the personalities involved. In Auckland the 
intensity was greatest, with militant leadership and active 
members. In Christchurch, 1 malcontents 153 were largely 
confined to one parish, while in Dunedin they had very little 
impact. Two Timaru leadersd the association resigned from 
the church in early 1967, apparently because they did not 
feel that 'there was (any) hope in the local situation' • 54 
(hmphasis added). The presbytery had just expressed its 
51 This tendency to react with antagonism towards an 
impartial judge has been described by Blake and Mouton, 
op.cit. The authors suggest that conflict produces 
distortions in perceptions of participants in favour of 
their own group, and consequent misperception of their 
opponents' position. So from the perspective of these 
distorted understandings, the 1 impartial 1 arbiter is 
thoroughly biased. 
5 2 They suggested that the 'don I t panic' call by Read was I an echo of 
the unfruitful soothing noises made to us Presbyterians during the 
controversy on Resurrection truths' , and were afraid that 'our 
Moderator is being a little naive in expecting that the full text of 
Principal Geering's address will resolve the dangerous doubts he has 
created 1 • Supplementa~y letter, to P.L. (March 1967). 
53 This was a term quite frequently usecfny ministers who were unsymp-
athetic towards the APL. 
54 P.L.p.3 . 
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hope that the matters in dispute would be 1 freely and fully 
discussed without rancour by people in the spirit of love 
55 and tolerance 0 • This was of course directly contrary to 
what the APL desired. The association did not believe 
that Geering's theological views were proper things to 
discuss in the church, at least not without guidance as to 
the errors contained therein. 
Thus, personal attacks, sometimes with a regional 
flavouring, helped the disagreements dividing theological 
factions to flourish into antagonisms. The first stage of 
the controversy had seen a beginning of this; the second 
saw the development of it, as the bitterness and tension 
continued to grow. 
(6) Publicity contributed to an expansion of the conflict 
While some of the most bitter personal attacks were 
confined to the interpersonal level and to unpublished 
criticisms, there was nevertheless a wide variety of 
publicity channels which were used to propagate opinions, 
disseminate news and mobilize support. But there was 
differential access to the official publicity channels of the 
church. The conservatives believed that the Outlook 
discriminated against their point of view, and lost confidence 
in it. Blaikie managed to have some of his articles published 
in the EP, others published in .::An APL magazine, and 
distributed yet others privately to members of Auckland 
55 Tirnaru presbytery showed its sympathies even more openly 
the following month, when it adopted a resolution 
declaring that it was 'gratified to know that apparently 
a large body of laymen refuses to be led by this 
association and directs that this resolution be read from 
all pulpits within the bounds'. Timaru Herald, (May 13 
1967), 
presbytery. This forced him even more into ,the conservative 
camp, as conservatives were the only group who seemed 
prepared to publish his articles. The APL used the efficient 
facilities of Wardlaw Advertising Agency to turn out br0ad-
sheets, newspapers and information leaflets. They also made 
direct statements to the press, which tended to antagonize 
some members of Auckland presbytery. Many of their 
accusations were considered libellous by their opponents, 
such as the suggestion that the Theological Hall staff 
'marked down' conservative students. But the APL achieved 
widespread distribution of their material, and the fact that 
it came in for criticism only :increased its impact. 
Radicals, on the other hand, could more easily use 
official publicity channels to their advantage. The Outlook 
printed little controversial material after the 1966 
56 Assembly, although through the Christian Education 
department material was produced which tended to be rather 
liberal. But it was often through local publications that 
the strongest political criticisms came. 
One such publication was the Friendly Visitor, a Timaru 
parish magazine which adopted a rather unfriendly attitude 
to the APL. The assistant minister of the congregation/ 
J.A. Elvidge1 saw the trouble coming from a 'vocal lunatic 
few', and suggested that their 'denials and denunciations seem 
57 little short of pious blasphemy'. His senior minister 
56 But it was still held responsible for the controversy by 
some people. One correspondent claimed that '"the Outlook" 
deserves the main credit for the Geering dispute, as a 
result of its former editorial policies'. Outlook, 
(December 9 1967) p.24. 
57 Friendly Visitor, (November 1966) p.4. 
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agreed, claiming that they were 'a kind of disease which 
could spread easily into other communions.'58 
Sermons however were the traditional vehicle of clerical 
influence, and various informants ~oke of their 'giving 
guidance 1 to their parishioners about the issues in 
controversy through the medium of their sermons. Not all 
laymen, however, appreciated this guidance. Wardlaw once 
interrupted his minister in mid-sermon when he heard himself 
being accused o~ being a 'literalist' and accepting the 
Westminster Confession as 'divinely inspired'. He told the 
minister to 1 stick to the truth 1 • 59 
These tensions were exacerbated by mass media interest 
in the controversy, which naturally highlighted the 
newsworthy aspects of the conflict. 'Theology', a 
Zealandia report regretted, 'has now been added to murder and 
mayhem as the legitimate target of the daily press 1 • 60 A 
Dominion reporter, who admitted being a 'born again believer', 
(i.e. theologically conservative) was responsible for the 
initial publicity given to Geering's sermon at Victoria 
University,and for drawing him out on the implications of it 
in discussion afterwards. 
As well as the newspapers, the medium of television 
contributed to the escalation of the controversy, or rather 
acted as a catalyst to such escalation. It focused very 
much on the personalities invoJ.ved and provided coverage of 
the heresy trial as well as ~ debate between Geering and 
58 ~., p.3. 
59 Auckland Star, (November 13 1967). It is debatable how 
much 1 guidance 1 was really given. See Stark, R.: 1 Minis-
ters as Moral Guides: The Sounds of Silence', in Glock 
(1973), 163-186. 
60 Quoted in D. McEldowney, Outlook, (May 13 1967)p-ll , 
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Wardlaw under the skilful probing of Austin Mitchell. In 
his television appearances, Geering was known more for his 
incisive debating techniques than for his diplomacy, and 
Wardlaw had difficulty coping with this intellectual 
brilliance. But it seems that television acted mainly to 
confirm and entrench opinions that had already been formed 
. th t t f ' f 61 in e con ex o primary re erence groups. 
The media also helped to spread the controversy far 
beyond the confines of the Presbyterian church. Reporters 
found it made good copy to ask members of other denominations 
for their reactions to selected extracts from Geering's 
latest statement. A Catholic bishop, asked to comment on 
Geering's 'immortality' sermon, claimed without reading or 
hearing the sermon, that ~for anyone to say these things in 
the guise of a Christian is to be ignorant of what a 
61 All of the informants questioned on this matter had their 
previous opinions reinforced by watching these programmes. 
Radicals usually saw Geering as the victor, while 
conservatives saw Wardlaw as a brave fighter against the 
arch-apostle of unbelief. See, for example, a comment ~y 
G. Kerr (an Australian fundamentalist): 'When the tele-
vision and radio networks asked for public debate with 
Professor Geering, the elder R.J. Wardlaw was left to face 
the public alone, debating with a man skilled in the 
wretched art of double-talk'. Separatism: The End of the 
Road, tract, Auckland, Bible Truth Society, (About December 
!'967) • 'I'his tendency for new information to reinforce 
already formed views was described by Geering in his defence 
at the trial: After mentioning Blaikie's criticism of him, 
he continues: 'There are no doubt others present in the 
Assembly who share these convictions of my guilt. Let me 
say to all such at the outset that I think it unlikely that 
anything I say today will' reverse your present convictions. 
On the contrary it is probable that everything I say will 
serve only to confirm your convictions of my guilt.'~ 
Trial, p. 71. 
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Christian is 1 • 62 The AOG 63 Superintendent, with a similar 
lack of information, believed that Geering 1 s statements were 
'typical of the modernists who had attempted to explain 
away the truths of God I s Word O • 64 'l'he Selwyn Society of 
the Anglican church also denounced Geering's theology, and 
used the doctrinal differences of the Presbyterian church to 
attack church union. Even the Rationalists Association was 
drawn in, offering to pay ~1000 to anyone who could prove 
to their satisfaption that the human soul was irnrnorta1. 65 
II. ORGANIZA'I'ION OF' '11 HE CONTROVERSY 
As the conflict expanded, the strategies of the groups 
developed and their organization underwent various changes 
in response to the strains of the controversy. 
(1) The conservative groups 
(a) Strategies 
During 1967, the APL came even more into the forefront of 
the conservative movement, as they were the one conservative 
group who had committed themselves to an unambiguous policy 
of opposing radicalism wherever it appeared in the church. 
While tb.is ultimately involved removing modernists from the 
Theological Hall and making 0 marked men' of any other radicals 
in Presbyterian pulpits the first step in this s~rategy was 
to get Geering removed, or at least disciplined. It was 
this task that the APL were largely concerned with during the 
year. 
62 Evening Post, (March 14 1967). 
63 'I'he AOG (Assemblies of God) we:re one of the main 
pentecostal sects in New Zealand. 
64 Do:minionJ (March 14 1967). 
65 Aucklai~9~ Star, (March 16 1967) . 
But in order to effect this, it was now necessary to 
work within the structures of the organization to a much 
greater extent than previously. The petition they had 
presented to the 1966 Assembly was essentially a protest, 
and could be dealt with by the creation of a committee. But 
the attempt to get Geering censured was considerably more 
serious, and required setting into motion formal procedures 
which culminated in the General Assembly being turned into 
a domestic court., This meant that the APL were changing 
the constituency to which they were directing their 
attention; it was not to the dissatisfaction of conservative 
laymen they were now appealing, but the sense of justice of 
an ecclesiastical tribunal. 
Moreover, because they already knew the extent of their 
support and had subsequently developed a lengthy list of 
members and sympathizers, they had no need for the large 
public mee they had organized the previous year. 
Wardlaw also refrained from making public statements after 
laying his charges. The association therefore tended to 
abstain from extra-constitutional activities, such as had 
antagonized many inside the church the previous year. Indeed, 
the only real organization the APL undertook after April was 
to prepare and distribute information sheets to keep their 
members informed of the latest developments. 
But the success of their strategy depended not only on 
a diplomatic silence on the matters coming before the 
Assembly. It also required a judicious choice of tactics. 
They seemed to have little chance of success unless such 
tactical planning was carried through carefully. This would 
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involve lobbying influential churchmen who were unesasy 
about Geering, forming alliances with those who shared some 
of their policy positions (anti-establishment feeling, anti-
intellectualism, opposition to church union, desire for more 
'balanced' teaching at Knox, and regional distaste for Otago 
theology), pn:1paring motions to win support from neutrals; 
and trying to establish themselves as a •respectable' group 
within the church. But the APL did almost nothing to enhance 
their chances of winning, and seemed unaware of the informal 
preparatory work that accompanied Assembly decision-making. 
This of tactical planning was partly due to a 
belief that the WF would organize the Assembly procedure for 
h , . d 66 t e conservative si e. But the WF were rather divided 
amongst themselves, and were not fully in sympathy with the goals 
of the APL. In fact, they did little to help the APL at 
the trial, giving the association the feeling that they had 
been 'let downv. Nor was there any more coordination between 
Wardlaw and non-Auckland members of the association on 
tactics. This led to the beginning of a rift between the 
.Auckland members of the association and the others, although 
at this stage there were no open expressions of this 
divergence. In private, however, several Mataura APL members 
admitted they were 'very angry' with Wardlaw over one such 
issue. 
Thus, although the APL had formulated some sort of 
strategy, involving concentrating on Geering, they had not 
66 Presbyterian Witnessj publication of the Presbyterian 
Fellowsti1p, (June 196 8 )p 5 . 
developed the tactics necessary for ensuring a successful 
outcome. 
However, Wardlaw's decision to press charges against 
their common opponent reduced Blaikie's chances of achieving 
his goal, which was primarily to discover what standards 
the church had that it was willing to use. For the 
emotional context of a heresy trial was not conducive to the 
dispassionate theological discussion which would have been 
necessary for apy such doctrinal delineation. Nevertheless, 
in order to prevent a situation in which all non-fundamental-
ists would be thrown into the Geering camp, he decided to 
use the judicial procedures of a trial to try and accomplish 
his constitutional objectives. 
But in order to do this it was necessary to distinguish 
himself very clearly from Wardlaw. He would have to 
establish that his case was not a E_ersonal one against 
Geering, and that the a9ctrines he saw as central were 
indeed accepted as vital within the Reformed tradition. 
However, he made tactical mistakes in both of these attempts. 
His first was to accuse, in effect, Geering of dishonesty. 67 
This made it difficult for him to deny that he was involved in 
a personal vendetta with Geering. Even in a book review 
which he wrote for the Outlook (during the time when such 
matters were supposed to be sub judice} he made a critical 
remark about Geering which did not go unnoticed. His second 
tactical mistake was to emphasize the 'supernatural', a 
belief which was not regarded as particularly vital by many 
67 His charge no.1, (A Trial, p.20) was a quotation fran the Doctrine 
Ccm:ni ttee report, wnich both Blaikie and Geering had agreed to. 
Juxtaposing this with a quotation fran Geering implied that Geering 
did not really believe the Doctrine Carmittee statement. 
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in the church. 68 Moreover, he tried to define what was the 
'substance of the Faith 1 himself, which was regarded as 
disloyalty to the Westminster Confession by those who were 
more conservative, and as audacity by others more moderate. 
Both of these tactical errors annoyed some of those who 
were generally sympathetic to the idea of supplementing or 
replacing the Westminster documents with something more 
contemporary However, Blaikie had not tried to gather 
together any sort of coalition under his leadership, and 
had deliberately avoided being identified with the WF. He 
was, rathe~hoping to win by reason what he had neglected to 
accomplish by organization. But his reason lacked the 
tactical discretion necessary to overcome the organizational 
deficiencies 
So, despite the enormity of the task of trying to 
convince the church to convict the head of its own 
theological college for heresy, no real attempt was made to 
work out tactics or mobilize influentials in support. 
(b) Policy dilemmas and their effect upon expansion of 
the controversy 
Much of the failure of the conservatives can be traced to 
dilemmas in their policy which they were unable to resolve. 
This led to a degree of organizational strain, and an 
inability to select tactics suitable for a successful 
realization of their goals. 
68 E.g. Outlook, (July 8 1967}p,14 , where G.R. Ferguson 
replies: 'this is not the way in which the Reformed Faith 
has traditionally thought of God ..• the expression is not 
normally used in our tradition because we conceive God and 
man as essentially related to each other'. Also Dominion, 
(October 12 1966), where J.A. Allan criticized the APL for 
their use of the term 'supernatural'. He said that the 
statments, 'being proposed by the laymen were very amateur-
ish. "God a supernatural being, indeed", he said.' 
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(i) Organization or determinism 
There was a tension between the ideological intimation that 
God's truth would inevitably win, and the organizational 
necessity to mobilize support for their vision of the truth. 69 
This meant that any planning or deliberate strategy had to 
be justified in some way. The only reason for organization 
that the APL could see was that some people might not be 
aware of the desperate situation the church was in, but 
this justified only the transmission of information not the 
aggregation of power. So they developed no comprehensive 
justification for the presence of organization. Nor did 
they develop any real organizational machinery other than 
a publicity network. This did not eliminate altogether any 
chance of success for it was still possible to translate 
publicity into power, 70 but it certainly made it very· 
difficult. Thus their greatest mistake was to believe too 
much in the justice of their cause and too little in the 
political means necessary for its accomplishment. 
This had the effect on the controversy of increasing 
the bitterness involved, for the APL were not forced to 
take more conciliatory stands in order to cement alliances 
or influence neutrals. However, the effect was not unambiguous, 
for it led to a diminution in the threat they posed to others, 
for they had not organized themselves in such a way that 
they needed to be taken seriously. This led to a stabili-
zation of the conflict at a fairly high level of bitterness 
69 This was a dilerrma that faced many a group who wanted to change society 
in a particular direction. In the Russian revolution, it was solved by 
the Leninist concept of a 'vanguard' , in which the revolutionary elite 
had control of the state until the 'false consciousness' of the masses 
was overcane, and the state could 'wither away'. Notice here also that 
organization was an unfortunate, but temporary1 expedient necessary 
until true doctrine had been established. 
70 The classic example of this was given by Fidel castro in CtJba. 
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but with the APL very clearly in a minority position. 
(ii) Conservatism or reformism 
The APL claimed that it was merely upholding the present 
standards of the church; that it was holding fast to a 
tradition that others were straying from. But at the same 
time they were objecting to traditional patterns of 
Presbyterian activity such as lay subservience, theological 
diversity and movement towards church union. They wanted 
to show that they were not the innovators, but at the same 
time refused to accept the status quo, with its 'hierarchy 
biased towards unbelief', and 'despotic control by the 
excessively liberal-minded'. The most clear example of 
this tension was the way many of their number were in two 
minds about the Declaratory Act. On the one hand they 
accepted it as a traditional document of the church, but on 
the other hand they disliked the theological freedom it gave 
radicals. This resolved itself into a conflict between 
loyalty to the church and distaste for the theology it 
seemed to be permitting. 
This dilemma led to a tactical conflict between the 
desire of a new partisan group to employ modern advertising 
methods and the wish of a conservative group to use the more 
cumbersome procedures of the church. They had to establish 
that they were upholding the traditions, but they were 
unwilling to follow the traditional styles of action. 
Their justification for preferring more populist methods 
in their campaign was that they were representing the 
common people against the establishment, as well as orthodox 
theology against some temporary aberrations. This might have 
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been true, but in terms of influencing the decision-makers, 
it was not particularly relevant. 
The effect of this dilemma on the expansion of the 
controversy was that it kept it at a fairly high level. For 
it annoyed professional theologians and administrators to be 
told that the APL were the~ guardians of Presbyterian 
belief and practice. 
(iii) Purity or democracy 
\ 
The APL claimed that it represented the purity of the faith 
against an encroaching tide of apostasy. But on the other 
hand they also attempted to be a populist movement represent~ 
ing the laity of the church. There was therefore a tension 
between these two responsibilities: a vision of the truth and 
a constituency. This meant that they were caught between a 
tendency to be exclusive (with a rigid doctrinal base) and 
a desire to be democratic (accommodating the wide range of 
lay opinion in the church). In resolving this dilemma the 
APL avoided the temptation to develop a consensus theology, 
which its democratic pretensions required; and chose instead 
the politically unrewarding path of ideological purism. This 
further diminished their chance of creating any lasting 
impact on the church, and reduced the seriousness of the 
conflict. 
The WF were also divided to some extent on this question. 
There was a tendency to be elitist, accepting the view of 
their confession that 'some men and angels are pre-destined 
unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting 
I 
death. These angels and men, thus predestined and fore-
ordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and 
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their number i.s so certain and definite, that it cannot be 
either increased or diminishedu. 71 On the other hand, they 
also tended tc1 b~ rather egalitarian, suggesting that anyone 
who believed ~nd was 'born again 1 could find salvation. 
The former opinion was labelled 1 Calvinist 1 and the latter 
Hevangelical' or, a derogatory term, 1 Arminian'. The 
political si9nif.icance of this division was that the 
'Calvinist' strand invoked them to accept their minority 
status withi.n the church or dt least within society. The 
'Arminia.n' ~;t, and on tht, other hand. encouraged a more 
opti:nistic att, t:.ucie I and s1.iggestEid that. it might be possible 
to cornplutE:ly ,:h:'·,nge the power alignments of the church 
through a :,pi, i.tl1al renl~Wal, As ons::: informant suggested, 
1 Nothing woul~ please m8 more than i.f Mr Geering became a 
In times of possible success there was a stress on the 
more optimistic evangelical side of their policy, such as 
during 1967. However, when they failed, such as at the 
end of thf-..: yc,.:tr, they became wi thd1: awn and even more conscious 
of their rninc1.ri ty position. 'l'hus when the conflict was in 
a stage of expansion, thei.r optimism helped it to expand; but 
when it had begun to contract, they contributed also to its 
contraction. 
( 2 ) The r:1 d :i c ,, 1 r.:: 
The style ot the radicctl organization during this period was 
largely dictdted by the conservative charges against Gearing. 




The goal of the radicals consequently was to get Geering 
exonerated. They had previously urged their opponents to 
make these formal charges to give both parties a chance to 
state their case. However, it was in their own interest to 
offer soch encouragement, for Assembly procedure was a field 
in which radicals had considerable expertise. The format 
of a here tr 1 was also favourable to them because the 
word 1 heresy 1 itself had all sorts of emotional overtones, 
and made their definition of the conflict as one of freedom 
of speech more credible. They could, and did, suggest that 
the conserva were trying to stifle the Holy Spirit 
breaking forth into new forms of expression. 
The tactics were carefully matched to their 
objective, and involved preparing acquittal motions, 
organizing sand working out the most effective 
arguments. 'I'here were three main groups involved in this 
activity., '11hE? first group was mainly from Dunedin, and 
included Bates, Nichol and W.R.M. Hay. Their major aim was 
to achieve as unambiguous and speedy an acq.iittal as possible. 
The second group came from Auckland and included Murray, 
Baragwanath Gilkison. Their major emphasis was the 
pastoral concern that they felt should be shown for both 
sides in the controversy. The third group involved Breward, 
Ferguson and Fraser, who believed that the charges should 
be referred to Dunedin presbytery, as the court to which 
Geering was imarily responsibl~ ensuring that both parties 
would retain their rights of appeal to Assembly. None of 
these groups were really in disagreement; indeed, their 
ideas were worked out in consultation. But they did have 
different emphases. It was generally felt that since the main 
07 g •• 
pastoral damage had been done in Auckland, it should be left 
to Aucklanders to stress this aspect of the situation. And 
naturally, because the Dunedin group were personal friends 
of Geering, they should be most concerned with ensuring the 
dismissal of the charges. At the Assembly itself, the main 
debate was between those who supported Bates' motion and 
those who preferred Murray's 'pastoral' amendment. This 
gave Wardlaw the (quite accurate) impression that 'the only 
motions put and discussed were those designed by the 
Principal's many friends to exonerate him 1 • 72 These tactics 
met with success, and Bates' motion was passed in an 
amended form, with Murray's amendment being referred to a 
Drafting committee commissioned to draw up a 'pastoral 
letter' to local parishes. 73 
(b) Policy dilemmas and their effect upon the controversy. 
As with the conservatives, the radicals were confronted 
with several dilemmas, which affected their strategy and 
limited the intensity of their contribution to the controversy. 
(i) Truth or variety 
There was some tension between the quest for truth and 
the encouragement of variety. With a belief in the 
importance of searching for new understandings and insights 
and developing contemporary expressions of the faith came a 
tendency to discredit those who clung to the older formulations 
and refused to think through their faith. This sometimes led 
72 Challenge, (November 18 1967) p.7." 
73 This comprised Murray himself (as Convenor), Bates, Fraser, 
Gosling, Wilson and two laymen. 
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to an intolerance for more conservative points of view, which 
could degenerate into ridicule or condescension. One 
radical informant believed that some conservatives 'couldn't 
tell the difference between a theological point and a bull's 
foot'. But on the other hand, radicals tended to believe 
that there should be a diversity of theological views 
permissible in the church, and toleration of a wide variety 
of theological understandings. 
This dilemma led to some degree of tactical confusion, 
for while Geering often took a debating posture towards the 
APL, pointing out their deficiencies, heresies and logical 
inconsistencies, some of the more pastorally-minded Auckland 
radicals were telling the APL that there was a place for 
them in the church and that their contributions to the 
debate ought to be heeded more seriously. These two 
positions were not inconsistent, for it was quite possible 
to tell somebody that their position was legitimate, but 
wrong. However, the APL could not make this distinction 
because they did not believe in a 'permissive plurality• 74 
of theological opinion. They tended to feel that if their 
particular theological position was not accepted, say by 
Assembly, then it was being rejected. So they had to choose 
between being welcomed as representatives of but one of 
the many valid theological positions in the church, and 
being rejected as remnants of an unenlightened past. In 
fact, of course, they could accept neither option, for they 
were not prepared to be part of a spectrum on which 
radicalism also appeared. 
74 P.L. p.2. 
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This dilemma made radicals more cautious, for it made 
them aware of the two quite contrary strands in their 
ideology, and provided some check on intolerance. Even 
those who agreed with the truth of a statement had therefore 
also to weigh the,wisdom of it. 75 
(ii) Unity and honesty 
A second dilemma was between the desire to permit full 
freedom of expression and the need to preserve harmony in 
the church. Geering tended to stress freedom of speech, 
while bureaucrats stressed the unity of the church. Others 
felt that both were important and it was desirable to 
preserve a balance between the two. Bates, for example, 
believed that while radicals should not 'abandon anything 
that is true' neither should they 'throw oil on the flames' . 76 
A compromise was reached during 1967 with the moratorium, in 
which freedom of speech was permitted but no coverage by the 
secular news media. 
Radicals had generally resolved this conflict between 
r1 
unity and honesty by keeping quiet about.their own beliefs. 
Thus, it came as something of a shock to many in the church 
when they learned that some apparently conservative ministers 
75 This was why there was little support for a motion put 
forward in Christchurch presbytery in May by a young 
radical, E.B. Stewart. His motion claimed that Geering's 
interpretation of scripture was more accurate than that 
contained in the Westminster Confession. While some may 
have agreed with this, it was not considered a wise thing 
to say, so the motion lapsed for lack of a seconder. 
76 Interview. 
77 One example of this habit was given by an Evening Star 
columnist. (The minister replies, April 24 1967). 'I 
remember well an old blind man in one of my former congre .. -
gations telling me that if I ever denied the historicity 
of the book of Jonah he would leave the church. I didn't 
approve of his manner of demand, but he was old and frail 
and loved his church with very real devotion. I therefore 
never preached on Jonah in his hearing.' 
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in the church believed some of the things that Geering was 
saying, but had refrained from introducing it to their 
preaching for fear of disturbing the faithful. As one 
former moderator put it, ministers on their ordination 'promise 
to preserve the peace and unity of the church, and they 
practise it in a big way'. The controversy had the effect 
of making many ministers less reticent to express their 
beliefs, which in turn increased the anxiety of others in 
the church, stimulating them to rethink beliefs they had 
previously taken for granted. 
(iii) Innovation or continuity 
Geering was regarded by the APL as both a theological 
vandal and a product of a decadent establishment. He was 
introducing dangerous innovations into the church, and yet 
represented trends which had for some time been dominant 
amongst the 'hierarchy' and in the halls of theological 
learning. 
But they were not alone in their uncertainty about 
Geering. His own attitude displayed much of the same sort 
of ambiguity. On the one hand he saw himself as part of a 
long tradition dating back to 'the patriarchs and prophets, 
78 the apostles and reformers'. And yet he wanted to suggest 
that twentieth century man had entered a new 'secular' 
world which was separated by a chasm from the world known to 
his forefathers. How could he reconcile the competing 
claims of innovation and continuity? 
78 A Trial, p.98. 
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He had a choice between two strategies. One way was 
to accept the creeds, but translate them into 'twentieth 
century' terms. Salvation could become 'liberation into a 
new dimension of life'; God could be translated into 'that 
which concerns us ultimately'; sin could be seen as 
'alienation from one's highest values'. This strategy 
involved changing some unpalatable Christian doctrines into 
more culturally acceptable concepts. It was often called 
'demythologizing', stripping the underlying truth of its 
mythological covering, in order to make it more intelligible 
· 79 
to 'modern man'. 
The second strategy involved identifying oneself with 
the direction these ideas were pointing in, thereby reducing 
doctrines to expressions of faith which were limited to 
their historical milieu. Thus the fact that the Hebrews 
believed in a personal deity was less si•gnificant than that they 
had, in a world overpopulated by supernatural beings, reduced 
god-belief to a minimum. The proper concern of theology, in 
this view was not with continuing to pay lip·service to 
particular sets of well hallowed phrases, but rather with 
79 Brendle observed this phenomenon in US churches: 'In a 
denomination where the clergy are extremely well educated 
they may accept a literal statement but have extremely 
elaborate symbolic or sociological interpretations of 
that acceptance, because it is central to their theolog-
ical stance.' Book review of J.K. Hadden, op.cit. in 
Sociological Analysis, XXXI (Spring 1970) p.584. 
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seeking to understand the traditions these words were part 
f 80 0 • 
Geering was generally accused of following the former 
strategy. In fact he tended more to follow the latter. 81 
He saw the major tradition of the Old Testament as one of 
'secularization', and found this congenial to twentieth 
82 century man. He believed that the modern world, like 
that of the ancient Hebrews, was moving away from acceptance 
of the 'supernatural', and towards a more 'secular' view of 
reality. So he recommended this ancient perspective to his 
contemporaries. He adopted, that is to say, the classical 
'strategy of return', which radicals from Mo Tzu to Hobbes 
had espoused before him. 83 Geering could therefore claim 
legitimacy from the past without being bound by its 
theological formulations. 
80 The difference between these two theological perspectives 
can be summarized as follows: the former was concerned 
with trying to discover the underlying truth veiled within 
the historical 'containers'. {E.g. Schweitzer, My Life 
and Thought 2nd edition, (London: Allen & Unwin 1957); 
'The ideal would be that Jesus should have preached 
religious truth in a form independent of any connexion 
with any particular period ••• (But) his religion of love 
appeared as part of a world view which expected a speedy 
end of the world. Clothed in the ideas in which he 
announced it, we cannot make it our own; we must reclothe 
it in those of our modern world view'. p.53. The second 
takes the historical situation far more seriously as in 
some way normative for the present. 
81 He claimed, for example, that 'we must look for the 
direction in which the faith of Israel was moving, not 
for the mythological remnints still present in its 
expression'. Geering (1968) p.152. 
8 2 For a sociological conment on this claim, see Hans Mol, 'Religion 
and Competition', Sociol~ical Analysis, XXXIII (Summer 1972) 67-
73. Mol says that 1one o the grave mistakes made by many theologians 
and clergymen is to presume that Western culture (is) inexorably 
moving tCMards a non-religious, secular view of reality and that 
around this view new social forms will c:cystallize' • (p. 67) . He sees 
a greater plurality of beliefs than ever before: fran an ascetic 
fascination for mysticism to the hedonistic pursuit of orgasm, 
83 See Pocock, (1971) for an analysis of this strategy. 
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The awareness of this dilemma between innovation and 
continuity had two main effects on the development of the 
controversy. Firstly, it encouraged radicals to explain 
novel ideas in more orthodox terms. Pressqre was put on 
Geering to speak 'positively', to rephrase radic~l 
speculations in traditional language. This helped to 
alleviate fears that he might be saying something new. 
Secondly, it annoyed many more perceptive conservatives, 
who realized that Geering was not really using words in 
what they considered a straightforward way. He could 'identify 
himself' with doctrines, without necessarily agreeing with 
them. Moreover, his argument about the direction a tradition 
was pointing in, concealed a hidden barb: it relegated 
conservatives to a prior stage of the historical process. 
This added to the personal resentment some conservatives 
felt against Geering when he used variations of the 'educational' 
argument against them. 
Thus the tensions within the radical group helped to 
contribute something to an expansion of the controversy, but 
also helped to stabilize it at a high level of bitterness. 
III. FORCES WORKING AGAINST EXPANSION OF THE CONTROVERSY 
During 1967, the controversy was in a stage of expansion 
and in November reached its peak. Nevertheless, there were 
contrary forces working to reduce its intensity and routinize 
it within the formal procedures of the church. While this 
diminution can be partly accounted for by the organizational 
difficulties and dilemmas facing the groups, it was also due 
to the conflicting role of powerful personalities. 
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(1) Moratorium was placed on public debate 
In April, the Moderator, s.c. Read, asked the partici-
pants to restrict any statements on the matters in dispute 
to the confines of the church. Speeches were to be closed 
84 to the press, television debates were to be avoided, and 
articles in church newspapers were to be prefixed with a 
warning that they were not to be reprinted without the 
moderator's permission. The moderator himself was to police 
the policy and decide which articles were suitable for 
publication. This request was framed to permit full 
theological discussion to continue without the 'inflammatory 
distortions 185 of the mass media. Moreover, since many of 
the matters in debate were to be placed before the Assembly 
as formal charges, they were declared sub judice by the 
moderator inasfar as they imputed doctrinal error to Geering. 
This meant that discussion could continue with two 
restrictions: that it was confined to the church; and that 
it avoided personalities. This decision was conveyed by 
letter to each presbytery, although the press reported that 
· 86 only public discussion was restricted. 
84 Although some APL supporters managed to smuggle a tape-
recorder into a private meeting at Canterbury University 
at which Geering spoke. They produced a full transcript 
of this address at Assembly. 
85 E.g. Geering claims (A Trial, p.72) that the Dominion 
description of his sermon at Victoria University was 'a 
piece of distorted reporting'. The APL, on the other hand, 
accused Geering of using the media to inflame the situation: 
'Principal Geering is quite intelligent enough to know just 
what he was doing when he went into public with his views 
and statements to the Press. He chose his own battle~ 
ground very deliberately to create what can only be 
considered a public scandal related to the faith.' Ibid 
p.27f. 
86 E.g. Auckland Star, (April 12 1967), 'Church antagonists 
undertake to say no more.' 
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This, however, worked slightly more to the advantage 
of the conservatives. Although Wardlaw, whose main impact 
was through press statements and public addresses, was 
immobilized by the moratorium, Blaikie and Gunn continued 
to air their views in public. Blaikie had an article 
published in the EP, entitled 'Professor Geering's 
A t . · ' 87 d t 1 tt h 1 k h' h gnos 1c1sm, an sen a e er tote Out oo w ic was 
banned by Read, but nevertheless printed and lifted out by 
the secular press. Gunn, through his editorship of the EP, 
carried on his personal crusade against Geering and 
88 attacked the Assembly itself before it had even met. But 
an unexpected regional variation of the moratorium resulted 
from intelligent control of information by the Dunedin 
presbytery Advisory Committee convened by a WF minister, F.R. 
Belmer. Belmer was responsible for conveying to his presby-
tery the contents of the letters received, and when Read's 
letter came asked for debate to be confined to theological 
issues and kept out of the media, his committee discreetly 
omitted mention of the fact. This meant that Geering and 
his colleagues at the Hall were acting on the erroneous 
press report which suggested that Read had asked for a 
89 suspension of all public debate on the matter. Consequently, 
Dunedin presbytery, the centre of support for Geering, was 
87 E.P., XVII (September-October 1967) 266-275. Blaikie 
claims that 'Professor Geering has now come ..• to a 
position of agnostic unbelief which has hitherto been 
regarded as involving a reJection of the Christian Faith'. 
(p.272). Read was criticized for permitting this to be 
printed, but he argued that as the article was written 
before charges were laid, it was not subject to any ban. 
88 Ibid., p.257f. 'The Assembly, no doubt, will seek a 
compromise solution. There will be the usual talk of 
"differing interpretations", "academic freedom", ''new 
theological insights" and the like. But this is no time 
for soothing words which merely confuse the issue'. 
89 Interview, T.E. Pollard. 
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quieter than it otherwise might have been during B67. 
Thus the moratorium had mixed success. It helped to 
stabilize the conflict by curtailing the escalatory effect 
of mass media coverage and curbed the tendency towards 
personal attacks on opponents. 
(2) The effect of individuals 
The most influential person during the 1967 crisis was 
probably Read. This was not just because of his official 
position as Moderator (and Clerk) but also because of the 
wide respect he commanded in the church. Even before his 
moderatorial year people who were dissatisfied with church 
policies had usually written to him rather than to the 
moderator of the time. He had won many friends by his 
impartiality in dealing with such issues and his helpfulness 
to those who were uncertain of constitutional procedure. 90 
He also kept on speaking terms with every theological group 
and so was well informed of attitudes around the country. 
This information led him to the conviction that a 
moratorium on public debate should be called and that the 
Doctrine Committee should make some doctrinal statements for 
the guidance of local congregations. Both of these efforts 
met with success. However despite his seeming omniscience, 
his omnipotence faltered pn occasions. He suggested to the 
Doctrine Committee, for ~xample, that they examine the 
charges against Geering point by point, and decide which of 
his views were outside the 'substance of the faith'. The 
90 Wardlaw, in an interview, admitted that Read 'did every-
thing in his power to make sure we got a fair go'. A 
radical minister agreed, suggesting that 'people believe 
him more than God, because he's more visible'. 
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committee politely told him that he was guilty of over-
simplification and rejected his request. The fact that many 
influential radicals were on the committee (Geering, Nichol, 
Pollard, Bates and Ferguson) might not have been unrelated 
to this rejection. 
Another prominent leader who used his influence to 
dampen·down conflict was J.S. Murray. Murray was a former 
moderator and had a good knowledge of the Auckland situation. 
It was he who was responsible for preparing the 'pastoral' 
motion for Assembly which tried to do justice to the charges 
of Wardlaw and Blaikie without condemning Geering, and it 
was he who was chosen as the convenor of a Drafting Committee 
to compose a 'pastoral letter'. 
The Convenor of the Business Committee, W.A. Best, was 
also respected by both sides. His role, however, was not so 
much in conciliation, or convincing others to keep quiet, 
but in safeguarding the rights of each group by ensuring 
that Assembly procedure was fair to both parties. 
Some conservatives were also attempting to introduce a 
note of moderation to their case. In an EP article, for 
instance, one WF committee member stressed the need for 
careful representation of opponents' views, and gave a 
warning not to take it upon oneself to judge who was a 
legitimate Christian. 91 Lewis Wilson later acted in a 
conciliating role at Assembly: in his speech he dissociated 
himself from any personal criticism of Geering and confined 
91 Mrs W. Lewis, EP, XVII, (January-February 1967) 45-52. 
•will there be aChristian Faith for our Children?' was 
the title of the article. 
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himself more to the actual theology in question. 92 His 
critique was less infktm110.tory than either Wardlaw's or 
Blaikie's, for unlike them, he made the assumption that 
Geering was (a) honest (b) Christian. 93 This did not have 
the effect of restraining other conservatives, however. 
Indeed, Wilson found that some of the hostility usually 
reserved for Geering was now directed against him. 
On the local level, too, there were people who used 
their influence to promote reconciliation or reduce conflict. 
In Dunedin, for example, R.H. Gardner, who had been to bible 
class with Read 45 years before, provided more restrained lead-
ership for the APL than the Association had further north. 94 
In Christchurch, some of the 'elder statesmen' such as 
L. Jones and R.M. Rogers kept a moderating hand in the local 
situation the same way Murray was doing in Auckland. 
92 'I speak on this with some anguish, and I appreciate 
what my brethren have said about receiving us and I don't 
make any reflection about Professor Gearing's integrity 
or sincerity or Christian faith or anything like that'. 
His criticism of Gearing was that the approach to the N.T. 
he was expounding - giving a late dating to the gospels, 
heavily emphasising oral tradition etc. was not really 
representative of contemporary scholarship. Assembly 
tapes 1967. 
93 Blaikie claimed that he was not suggesting that Geering 
was unchristian. (A Trial) p.69; However in implying 
that his theology was an abandonment 'of the very heart 
of the Christian Faith' and tying orthodoxy to certain 
doctrines, he seemed to be suggesting that Geering too 
was unchristian. From the point of view of conflict ex-
pansion it was irrelevant whether his accusations had been 
deciphered correctly. 
94 At the time when Wardlaw was resigning from the church in 
disgust, and Arnold was accusing it of aposta y, Gardner 
sent a letter to Otago APL members, which included this'\ 
assessment of the 'Greyfriars' meeting with Read and I 
Wilson: 'The writer felt that addresses by Mr Read and 
Mr Wilson were most helpful and certainly 'cleared the air' 
quite a deal, although it was evident from the quest.ions 
asked that there was a great deal of concern.' 
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Others won reputations for themselves as diplomats in 
the exercise of committee convenorships. The most prominent 
of these was L.H. Jenkins, under whose leadership the Doctrine 
Committee produced theological statements meeting with 
widespread approval. His committee played an important 
balancing role in the whole controversy. Gilkison reGeived 
considerable prestige from his successful convenorship of 
the Overseas Missions Committee as well as from his skill 
in presbytery diplomacy. Men such as these had a stabilizing 
influence in the church and had the ability and experience to 
prevent precipitate action by the Assembly. 
So the intensity of the conflict was alleviated somewhat 
by the moderating influence of church fathers. Some such 
leaders dissuaded participants in the controversy from 
making personal attacks on their enemies, while others found 
themselves made into political scapegoats by their friends. 
But even when personal attacks were redirected towards those 
who were trying to foster reconciliation, this did not 
directly contribute to an expansion of the controversy, for 
not only did it take some of the pressure off the opponents, 
but it increased the conviction of moderates that the 
extremes must be curbed. So while criticism of opponents 
usually increased the levels of hostility, redirection of 
such criticism against the moderators only strengthened 
their determination to moderate. 
IV. CONCLUSION OF THE SECOND STAGE 
November 1967 saw the abortive attempts of conservatives 
to get Geering convicted of doctrinal error. Their failure 
marked, however, not the end of the conservative movement 
as some feared, but rather ironically, the end of the 
radical ascendancy in doctrinal matters. For after the trial 
radicals lost interest in the doctrinal debate, having 
succeeded in their goal of getting Geering exonerated. They 
therefore had no desire to extend or improve their 
organization, and turned their attention to other matters. 
Moderates like Storkey and Breward were concerned about 
the effect the Assembly decision appeared to have had on 
conservatives and were rather apprehensive about the 
possibility of a permanent rift. They felt they had 
fulfilled their duty to Geering as a person by preventing 
his condemnation, and were now free to placate the 
conservatives by offering suitable doctrinal palliatives. 
They were therefore quite receptive to the types of demand 
the conservative groups would make during the following 
year. 
Meanwhile, the conservatives were learning from their 
defeat, and were determined to reverse the decision one way 
or another. A small minority seceded, forming splinter 
d th N th Island. gs B t t t d 'th' groups aroun e or u mos· s aye wi in 
the church and began to learn how to use its procedures to 
their advantage. Both the APL and the WF would split, but 
their rumps would provide far more tactically sound policies 
than the groups had previously adopted. 
The situation one in which one side had won and the 
other side had lost. For one group the matter had been 
95 Wardlaw set up a 'Presbyterian Fellowship' which called 
an Australian fundamentalist, B. Gillard 1 to be its 
minister. 'Orthodox Presbyterian' churches sprang up in 
Manurewa (with G.A. McKenzie as minister), in Whakatane 
(under J.A. Mitchell) and in Hawkes Bay. However, the 
Hawkes Bay group could not afford their own minister, and 
so were given the services of Gillard for one weekend a 
month. 
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settled. For the other it could never be resolved until 
'the people of the church prove their real faith by rising up 
in protest to replace those kindly, friendly, comforting 
unbelievers in many of its pulpits with true ministers of 
96 the Gospel' • 




'I'he period from the end of 1967 until the beginning of 
1971 began with the departure of Wardlaw and concluded with 
a mild censure for Geering. After the peak of November, 
1967, the intensity of the conflict slowly began to diminish 
and the style of organization to change accordingly. It 
was therefore a period of contraction in which issues lost 
their saliency and policies much of their bitterness. But 
the conservatives persevered in their attempt to turn back 
the radical tide, and after developing the procedural skills 
and doctrinal base necessary for this, finally persuaded 
the 1970 Assembly to dissociate itself from some of 
Geering's statements. 
I. DYNAMICS OF THE CONTROVERSY 
With the resignation of the Auckland leadership of the 
APL, the controversy lost much of its momentum and 
conservatives reverted to more traditional styles of dissent 
within the church. The range of issues generated by the 
controversy began to shrink and the accompanying antagonisms 
to soften. But while the debate was less dominated by 
personality clashes, a degree of polarization remained and 
mistrust engendered by the conflict was transferred into 
other areas of church life. 
(1) The extreme groups decided to exit 
Wardlaw, and later the entire Auckland executive of 
the APL, resigned from the association after the heresy 
10 ® 
. 1 1 tria • They passed the leadership to R.D. Arnold and a 
more moderate Wellington executive who tried to steer a 
more conciliatory course than their predecessors had done. 
But a similar upheaval was taking place in the WF, 
where a disagreement had developed between moderates like 
Wilson and extremists like Gunn. The result of the struggle 
was that Gunn {along with several others) left the 
Fellowship and his position of influence as EP editor. 2 
One of Gunn 1 s most vociferous followers, R.E. Donaldson, 
had recently resigned from his charge after some questions 
had been asked about'his credentials. Another of Gunn's 
friends, G.A. McKenzie 3 set up a rival 'Orthodox 
Presbyterian' churchlover the road from. Gunn's church in 
Manurewa. 
A few radicals were also disillusioned with the 
decision of Assembly, and withdrew from active participation 
in church politics. One of these was J.K. Nichol, a 
Christchurch teacher, who regarded the 'pastoral letter' 
as 'wishy-washy' and too much of a compromise for his liking. 
He thought that Geering should have been formerly acquitted, 
rather than the charges against him merely being declared 
not proven. 4 There were a few other laymen who felt 
1 The official reason given for his relinquishing the 
editorship was illness, but this was scarcely the only 
reason, as shown by the refusal of the WF to entrust the 
journal to a single editor after Gunn's resignation. 
1 In Wardlaw's terms, it was not he who left the church (and 
therefore the APL)1 it was the chu~ch which had departed 
from its standards, and left him defending orthodox Pres-
byterian doctrine. This typeor attitude, quite common in 
the sectarian wing of Protestantism, has been eloquently 
described by G.K. Chesterton: 'He was orthodox. He had no 
pride in having rebelled against them, they had rebelled 
against him ..•• If he stood alone in a howling wilderness 
he was more than a man, he was a church. 1 Heretics (London: 
Dodd Mead, 1923) p.11. 
3 McKenzie had been interim-moderator of Gunn's parish during the 
latter's illness, and the two had worked together closely on many 
occasions. 
4 Interview, J. K. Nichol. 
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similarly and a handful of ministers. 
The exit of these extremists from positions of influence, 
and the departure of some of them from the church, meant 
that organizational roles could be filled by more moderate 
leaders, and decision-making could take place in a less 
embittered atmosphere. 
(2) The issues were not perceived as threatening by the 
radicals 
Before the trial the radicals had seen their role as one 
of protecting a trusted teacher from the attacks of his 
enemies. This role was no longer necessary, for Geering's 
exoneration had upheld freedom of speech in the church. 
They had therefore achieved their goals and were not worried 
by conservative attempts to define the substance of the 
faith more rigorously. After the 1968 Assembly, for instance, 
at which the conservative requests for doctrinal definition 
were treated favourably, one radical saw this as in no way 
restricting his theological freedom: 'The atmosphere has 
now been created in which theological discussion can 
continue on a less emotive level 1 • 5 Another radical saw it 
as a 'pastoral' gesture designed to placate the conservatives: 
The Assembly has acted in a gracious and pastoral 
way toward a group of people who were troubled 
about where the church stands in the affirmation 
of her faith.6 
Radicals were therefore quite unperturbed by these moves, 
and even welcomed them since it was hoped they could restore 
harmony in the church. Because theological language for 
5 T.E. Pollard, Dominion_, (November 6 1968). 
6 G.R. Ferguson, Loc.ett 
105. 
them was metaphorical anyway, radicals had no difficulty in 
accepting any statements of faith the Assembly might agree 
to. 
(3) The controversy was decomposed into its constituent 
. 7 issues 
After the trial, the conservatives realized that they 
could not attack Geering again until they had established 
some constitutional basis on which to do so. They therefore 
distinguished between three issues which they felt were 
at stake: whether the church had any theological line, what 
line it should have, and whether radicals such as Geering 
conformed to it. 
(a) Did the church have any theological line? 
One Auckland conservative, B.F. Harris, thought that the 
1967 Assembly had established such a line - Geering's. 
However the real position was quickly pointed out to him by 
the clerk of Auckland presbytery, L.R. Miller: 
There is a vast and vital difference between endorsing 
the theological views of Principal Geering, and 
granting that there is room in the church for his 
dedicated radical scholarship. If Professor Harris 
does not think there is such room, then he should say 
so. But he, as a scholar, should not join the ranks 
of those who display a wilful refusal to believe 
that the Assembly did not endorse Principal Geering's 
views.8 
Other conservatives disagreed with Harris, claiming that there 
were no constitutional limitations on belief at all. As one 
7 See J.M. Orbell and G. Fougere, 'Intra-party Conflict and 
the Decay of Ideology', Journal of Politics, XXXV, (1973) 
439-458, who see 'decomposition' as a strategy enabling 
a party to maximize its appeal. 
8 N.Z. Herald, (November 16 1967). 
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of the more moderate WF members saw the situation, 'after 
this test case it seems that it doesn't really matter what 
b 1 . h 't 9 you e ieve, or ow you express 1 • This opinion was more 
accurate, in that there was a wide range of theological 
views which were considered 'valid'. So the answer to the 
conservatives' first question was in the negative: there 
was no single line approved by Assembly. Rather, there 
were several points of view which it was permissible to hold 
in the church. 
(b) What line should the church have? 
There was some division between conservatives over this issue. 
Some, like Gunn, took a firm line, basing their claims on 
the Westminster Confession. Others, like Arnold and Blaikie, 
were more flexible and wanted an affirmation of only what 
they considered the substance of the faith. But they all 
agreed that some line was necessary to prevent doctrinal 
anar~hy. One formulation which met with the approval of all 
. but the extremists was a 'statement of fundamental doctrines', 
added as Appendix III to the Doctrine Committee's 1968 
report. Two years later this achieved regulative status, 
thereby 'negat(in~ the unfortunate Pastoral Letter. 
1 10 
At the same time, the Doctrine Committee was exploring 
the question logically prior to the question of which 
standards the church subscribed to: what did it mean to 
subscribe to a statement of faith anyway? The committee 
suggested that 'where any office-bearer affirms a Statement 
9 D.F. Sage, E.P., XVIII (January-February 1968) p.7. This 
statement was"expressed more forcefully by Kerr, the 
Australian fundamentalist in N.Z. to encourage secession: 
'(rhe Church) has exonerate~ Profes~or Geer;i_ng r pr:ocla,iming 
itself finally to be a church without a bible, an institution withou~ 
standards, a society that believes everything and therefore nothing.' 
Qrristian Beacon, (December 28 1967) p.1. 
10 Report of the APL National Conference, December 1968, p.8. 
or Confession of Faith he is bound by the faith expressed 
in the Statement or Confession rather than by the precise 
words themselves.' (Emphasis added} 11 This was something of 
an eicape clause for radicals, but it did not meet with 
serious criticism. 
However, this line was still too broad for some of the 
more extreme ministers still in the church. One such person 
e\.rentually resigned from the church, telling his congregation, 
'it has •.• become my conviction that our standards still 
fall far short of our doct.rinal standards and at the best 
they are paper tigers having no authority or disciplinary 
status. 112 
(c) Did radicals such as Geering conform to this standard? 
This was one question on which they had no doubt. Arnold 
expressed it clearly on behalf of most conservatives: 
One thing I believe is abundantly clear; these 
two sets of teachings cannot both be correct; they 
cannot be reconciled by taking a middle position 
between them (any more than you can go to North 
and South at the same time); and they cannot exist 
together peaceably in the one church, for each is 
death to the other.13 
But it was not until 1970 that this question was raised 
officially again, when Geering made some rather unconventional 
remarks on Brisbane television. The transcript of this 
interview was quickly obtained by the APL and South Auckland 
conservatives, and they asked the Assembly to dissociate 
itself from statements made in it. This request was granted, 
11 Blue Book, 1968, 132a. 
12 W. Davies, Outlook, (October 10 1970) p.23. 
13 R.D. Arnold, typewritten mss., speech given on North 
Island tour, May 1968 p.3. 
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despite belated opposition from some of the radicals. But 
the way the issues had been decomposed prevented any real 
bitterness and helped to reduce the intensity of the conflict. 
(4) The issues were less personal 
Because the conservatives realized the futility of 
attacking Geering again.until some constitutional change 
had been effected, they avoided making any personal attacks. 
For it was the church which was responsible for the fluid 
doctrinal situation, not Geering personally. Wardlaw 
expressed this in one of his final public statements as 
chairman of the APL: 
The responsibility for today's agnosticism now 
rests exactly where it should - not on the shoulders 
of a single theologian, but on the whole chrirch 
through its ruling section.14 
So Geering could not be touched until the church had clarified 
't . t' 15 is own posi ion. 
Moreover, the APL learned from their 1967 failure that 
personal attacks were counterproductive: all they had 
succeeded in doing was to make a martyr out of Geering. 
This mistake they were determined to avoid in the future, 
and Arnold expressly disclaimed any personal attacks in a 
speech he gave to the 1968 Assembly: 
May I make it clear before I proceed that I am not 
wishing to raise the question of the standing of 
any person in the church, but rather to illustrate 
the doctrinal position of the church as a result of 
last Assembly's ruling on certain teachings.16 
14 Southland News, (November 29 1967) p.15. 
15 General solutions to this problem were suggested, ranging 
from a request for a mass exodus of all the 'Doubting 
Thomases' to a proposal that ministers be chained to their 
bibles. ('Once the Bible was chained to the pulpit, and it 
would be a good thing if the majority of our ministers 
were chained to their Bibles.') See the Outlook's of 
March 2 1968 p.25 and July 18 1970 p~ 
16 Typewritten mss., p.2. 
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Nor were there any personal attacks from any of the radicals, 
partly because there were no conservative personalities 
standing out as particularly objectionable; and partly 
because they were no longer interested in continuing the 
controversy. 
(5) The issues were less numerous 
The APL tried to establish its theological position in 
'the broad central stream of Christian orthodoxy'. 17 
Consequently, they were careful to avoid peripheral issues 
which appealed only to the narrower conservatives in their 
ranks. Because they wanted their policies to have wide 
appeal they tried not to take stands which might restrict 
it. The effect of this policy was to reduce the number of 
issues the APL paid attention to. But this was not just a 
ploy, for there was genuine divergence in the APL ranks. 
Arnold, for instance, spoke on one occasion in favour of 
homosexual law reform. 18 
The association also tried to avoid any anti-clerical 
undertones in its publications claiming to 'seek the 
understanding and co-operation of our ministers, and 
acknowledge with gratitude the help many of them have given 
• t' I 19 to our Associa ion~· Its petition to the 1968 Assembly 
was sent under the signature of three ministers, so it was 
· . 20 a serious change of policy. 
17 P.L., (April 1968), occasional broadsheet p.l. 
18 In Assembly debate on tpe subject. Interview, R.D. Arnold 
19 P.L.,pl. 
20 The APL of course claimed that it was never anti-clerical, 
but nevertheless many ministers believed it was and acted 
accordingly. So the effect on the controversy was the 
same whatever their intentions had been. 
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It also kept clear of the anti-intellectualism of its 
early days, and now went as far as to assert. the scholastic 
merits of its own position. Occasionally they even tried 
to challenge the integrity of Geering's scholarship: 
It is unfortunate that I shall have to give further 
publicity to a man who has already been over-
publicized, I do not consider that the quality of 
Principal Geering's scholarship merits the heavy 
price the Presbyterian Church is paying for it, or 
the amount of attention it is receiving •.• What 
Principal Geering offers us is often careless and 
inaccurate, often irresponsible; and •.• what is 
distinctive about it is not its scholarship, but 
the way in which its basically anti-Christian pre- 21 
suppositions time and again vitiate its scholarship. 
However, this came perilously close ·to a personal attack on 
Geering, so this argument was widely jettisoned in later 
speeches and publications. Thus one issue which could have 
been added to the APL arsenal was avoided. 
(6) Inertia set in 
After two years of doctrinal controversy many people 
in the church began to tire of it, and much of the energy 
which had fed 
largely spent 
the firer of 
itself. / For 
controversy until the trial had 
instance, in the February 1968 
meeting of Auckland presbytery, a question relating to the 
controversy was met with groans and a refusal to discuss 
the matter. Many ministers just wanted to be left in peace 
to restore any pastoral damage done in their parishes by the 
controversy. Any attempts to put pressure on the church in 
one way or another were usually counterproductive, as one APL 
21 R.D. Arnold, Typewritten mss, speech given in Nelson, 
(December 17 1967) ,p.2. 
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member found to his cost. 22 
This coincided with a slackening of the media interest 
in the church's domestic difficulties. The type of 
policies which the APL were following were cautious and not 
particularly newsworthy. Geering tried to avoid exposure 
on television, and so all the attractive personalities had 
either left the church or were unavailable. The 
consequent lackcf media interest caused some comment in APL 
circles, especially after what they had considered a minor 
victory in 1968: 
The fact that Assembly moved unanimously in this 
direction was to me remarkable, well-nigh momentous 
thing, yet it made only a small column in the N.Z. 
Herald on the following morning. Here after three 
years of heated debate, controversy and upset in the 
Church, the Church was making a firm statement of 
its beliefs. This is what our members had been 
waiting for, yet the significance of it seemed to 
escape the secular press.23 
It was only with the disassociation moves in 1970 that public 
interest returned, but even then it was far less dramatic 
to suggest that someone's unguarded comments were not 
official church policy than to charge him with heresy. 
Moreover, Geering had never claimed that his opinions had 
official sanction. 
(7) The conflict was transferred to other areas 
Much of the bitterness that had characterized the 
controversy a.tits height still simmered away under the 
22 When I.M. Moses threatened to withhold his budget contributions because 
he disapproved of the 1967 doctrinal decisions of l\...ssembly, his threat 
backfired. One highly respected missionary wrote back to the Outlook, 
'For Mr Moses the budget seems to be sane sort of weapon. For me and my 
family the budget is bread and butter and rice • • . I 'WOUld like Mr 
Moses to write to me personally explaining why he thinks my W'Ork is not 
W'Orth supporting, and I and my family are not W'Orth keeping alive. ' 
Outlook, (May 25 1968) p.2. See (March 16 1968), p.25, for Moses' 
original letter. 
23 Report to APL National Conference, by E. Campbell, (December 1968) p.5" 
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surface, and although the APL and other conservative groups 
managed to follow a more moderate line on doctrine, the 
hostility found other outlets. 
The Christian raucation department, described by one 
conservative informant as 'a bunch of misfits', took part 
of this criticism. Many of those on the departments staff 
were unashamedly radical24 and did nothing to conceal their 
distaste for conservative opinions. R,H. Hamlin, who became 
director on the resignation of D. White, was reputed as 
having 'not one evangelical bone left in his body'. He was 
roundly criticized when he later testified in favour of 
HAIR at the public trial of the stage show. E.B. Stewart, 
the Director of Youth Ministry, was also a radical who was 
highly articulate. He was responsible for compiling a kit 
on 'secular' marriage services, which were another radical 
innovation conservatives opposed bitterly. 
Stewart was also an able writer, and he p"Jayed a major 
role in producing the publication Moment, an interdenominat-
ional youth magazine. This was regularly reviled by 
conservatives, who were not altogether happy with its 
theological leanings: 
It would be appreciated if you would cancel my 
subscription to Moment immediately. I am thoroughly 
disgusted with this publication, which could not be 
called Christian even with the help of the wildest 
imagination. 
The latest issues I received made me realize that -
with a magazine of this low standard on its side -
Christianity's enemies need do nothing. I am all 
in favour of attracting the attention of the younger 
generation - but not at the cost of degrading our 
faith to a standaralower than the gutter.25 
24 Although some of the opposition to the CE Department was 
transferred, this was accentuated by internal disagree-
ments and bad public relations. 
25 Moment, VI (December 1972), p.5. 
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But the main arena into which conservative disaffections were 
channeled was church union, in which a referendum was held in 
mid-1971. Arnold was not an ardent anti-union advocate, nor 
did the APL provide any real outlet for anti-union sentiments. 
Instead, an 'Association of Continuing Presbyterians' was 
set up to fight union and distribute literature encouraging 
people to vote 'No' in the referendum. So, of those who had 
their first taste of church politics with the APL, some now 
joined the ACP. 
(8) Social polarization reduced friction 
As a result of the controversy, people were more aware 
of their theological position and tended to associated more 
with their allies. Minority groups often formed themselves 
into theological ghettoes, rather than hold their opinions 
in the antagonistic climate of a larger unit. Some of the 
more conservative churches in 'liberal' areas cut themselves 
off from other Presbyterian churches in their presbytery, 
supporting their own missionaries and sometimes withholding 
'budget' funds. Those churches also tended to draw others of 
a similar theological persuasion into their congregations, 
thereby reducing the tension within congregations. 26 This 
growing insularity of minority groups meant that there was 
very little contact between those with different views. This 
could of course lead to mutual reinforcement of prejudice. 
But, on the other hand, when issues were less salient, the 
social polarizatioh encouraged churchmen at the local level 
26 A letter sent out by the APL accepted such withdrawal 
where other avenues of change were cbsed: 'Some of you may 
feel that your loyalty to Christ is compromised if Sunday 
by Sunday, you are present while destructive teaching is 
preached •.. If an impasse is reached, some may find a 
solution in moving to a,more congenial congregation, for 
the sake of peace and a good conscience'. (February 7 
1968) p.2. 
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to forget the rift that still separated the groups. 27 
(9) The major particpants tended to be moderates 
Despite the continuance of the APL, those who held the 
centre of the stage were largely moderates. When general 
questions of theology were raised, it was to men such as 
I. Breward that the church turned for answers. Breward 
wrote a book on 'Authority and Freedom', suggesting that 
the two were not incompatible, and gave his opinion that 
while the church should not take refuge in statements of 
faith, they were, on occasions, necessary. 28 
The Doctrine Committee was also in the centre of the 
debate with its statements and reports. When the APL 
petition came before the 1968 Assembly, it was not this so 
much as the Doctrine Committee report and the sessional 
committee proposals which became church policy. 
In 1970, the Assembly decision to disassociate from 
Geering was not because of the oratory of WF ministers or 
APL laymen, but largely because of the intervention of two 
11 k d k d . 29 h k . we - nown mo erates, Storey an R.T. Feist, w o spo e in 
favour of the move. 
Thus there was a general diminution in the intensity of 
the conflict after 1967 which was marked by a decrease in 
interest, participation and antagonism of the extremes. 
27 M. Sherif argues that intergroup contact during a conflict 
only reinforces the prejudices existing between groups 
for part1.c1.pants tend to ignore any favourable information 
about their adversaries. 'Superordinate Goals in the 
Reduction of Intergroup Conflict', American Journal of 
Sociology, LXIII (1958) p.349-358. So polarizations 
reduced this tension, and made it possible for local church 
members to continue in the Presbyterian church. 
28 Authority and Freedom, (Christchurch: Presbyterian Bookroom, 
1969}, See also artides in the Outlook, September 14,28, 
October 12, 1968. 
29 Feist was convenor of the church's Public Questic:ns Ccrnmittee. 
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ORGANIZATION OF THE CONTROVERSY 
The organization of the groups underwent consiierable 
changes after the trial and the departure of the extremists. 
The APL refined both its strategy and its tactics, while 
radicals lost their unifying link and offered very little 
concerted opposition to the rejuvenated association. 
(1) The conservative groups 
There was much greater cooperation between the main 
conservative groups after 1967, partly b~cause they began 
to realize the value of concerted action, and.partly 
because their policies had moved closer together. 
(a) Goals 
The common goal of both the APL and the WF was to reestablish 
'orthodox' doctrine in the church. Geeting was still taken 
as a negative referent, but they realized the unwisdom of 
making further personal attacks on him. Moreover, they 
realized the futility of such a course, for the Assembly had 
ruled that Geering 'had not stepped out of the bounds of 
reasonable liberty of thought or expression or doctrine 1 • 30 
(Emphasis added). It was therefore necessary to establish some 
doctrinal standards which the church was prepared to use. 
This was the aim of Blaikie as much as that of Arnold, so 
the general approach of the laymen was similar to that of 
the conservative ministers. 
(b) Strategy and tactics 
The strategy the conservatives were following was far more 
realistic than previously. It involved capturing the 
'middle ground' of the Assembly, rather than hoping to use 
30 P~storal Letter, A Trial, p.111. 
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the outside threat of lay dissatisfaction and mass 
disruption. The strategy involved influencing decision-
makers at the national level. 
It was in the area of -tactics that the conservative 
organization had faltered before. They had failed to 
realize the importance of developing tactics compatible 
with their strategy, and working out in detail the techniques 
which would have most chance of success. From 1968 to 1970 
these deficiencies were largely remedied by careful 
organization. 
(i) The APL 
The APL had a dual set of tactics: one set for their own 
members and one set for the larger constituency to which they 
were appealing. They realized the necessity for holding 
their membership by preventing widespread secession, for the 
rules of the APL stated that only those who remained in the 
church could be members of the association. They realized 
also the need to appear moderate if they were to have any 
impact on the national scene. So a double set of tactics 
was developed. 
Internal tactics 
To appease the membership, Arnold took a tough line. 
He had to convince them to stay inside the church without 
in any way approving of the Assembly's decision to tolerate 
radical theology. So he echoed the cry of the secessionists 
that the church was betraying its standards. 'I believe', 
he declared, 'that we as a church are flirting with apostasy 
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and compromising our loyalties to the Lora•. 31 He went on, 
however, to claim that the APL provided a sanctuary in which 
one could remain in a compromised church without betraying 
one's beliefs. 'We believe', he stressed, that 'we have the 
support of thousands of Presbyterians who feel that they can 
only stay within the church if they can express their dissent 
from its compromised position through a protest movement such 
as ours•. 32 But this did not mean that he could admit to 
trusting the procedures of the church, which had so recently 
· 33 
exonerated a blatant unbeliever. For the procedure~ had 
proved unjust: the partiality of the church court was clear, 
a~~ should have been declared openly. 34 The church 'would have 
done better to have admitted that she did not intend to 
maintain equal justice •.. than to carry through the kind of 
trial that she did' . 35 
He spared no mercy for Geering personally whom he 
denounced as 'often irresponsible' as well as 'unchristian', 
an advocate of 'pernicious doctrinal error', and one whose 
theological vandalism had left behind 'the rubble of unbelief1 • 36 
31 R.D. Arnold, op.cit, p.2. Cf. Statement of National 
Conference of APL after meeting in Wellington, (January 20 
1968), lf. in which the Presbyterian church is seen as a 
'church with compromised loyalty to her Lord'. 
32 Arnold, op.cit. 
33 'For the present we will put no further confidence in 
working through the machinery of the courts of the church. 
We will, instead, make our appeal directly to the consciences 
of individual members'. Loc.cit. 
34 'I have no doubt in my mind that the trial was not 
conducted by Assembly in a manner which could have given 
true justice. It is freely admitted that it was not 
conducted by the standards laid down in the Book of Order 
... The proceedings in my opinion departed from the 
requirements of common justice.' Ibid, p.5. 
35 Ibid, p.4. ---
36 Ibid, p.2f. 
1 
Those who had tried to reconcile the two parties fared little 
better however: 
Our Church's present compromised position is leading 
fine men to act beneath their better selves. It is 
pathetic to watch their pitiful endeavours to put a 
politic coat of whitewash on the Church's mistaken 
decisions. I admire their loyalty, but deplore its 
prostituation to such ends.37 
The association also declared that it would not accept the 
decision of the court to dismiss the charges against Geering. 
They used an inversion •.of the • decision by Holy Spirit' 
argument, only with less,specificity as to which person of 
the Trinity was being invoked: 'Th~s case may be declared 
closed in the courts of the church. Of this I am convinced: 
God has not closed it.• 38 
This was a very effective policy in retaining the 
support of the members who were contemplating resignation 
from the association. Even the Presbyterian Fellowship was 
mild by comparison. 
External tactics 
However, the constituency they were appealing to was 
quite different from the membership; holding the organization 
together was orily the first step. 39 Their tactics for wooing 
the larger audience were in complete contrast to those they 
had used to retain the support of the conservative laymen, 
and involved careful diplomatic activity within the accepted 
procedures and without their accustomed excesses. 
37 Ibid, p.4. 
38 Loc.cit. Cf. Henderson, op.cit., p.31: 'Quite the best 
way of getting what you want is to persuade other people 
that it is what God wants.' 
39 However this more moderate policy was accepted by only 
two votes at the May executive meeting, and it would 
probably have been lost had not bad weather prevented the 
flights of two of the members. 
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They stressed their willingness to work through the 
courts of the church, putting forward a mild petition which 
40 was carefully worded to avoid antagonizing anybody. They 
vehemently disavowed any semblance of personal attack, and 
were careful not to mention Geering by name. They showed 
respect for church officials and were 'profoundly grateful' 
f mbl d . . 41 or Asse y ecisions. They lobbyed effectively, getting 
moderate conservatives like H.O. Bowman and w.t. Woods to 
identify themselves openly with association po{icies. 42 
Another tactic they usedb diffuse the radJcal's superiority 
in procedural skills was 'to exaggerate their own powerless-
ness, trying apparently to induce guilt in their opponents 
for having so ruthlessly cut down humble laymen. 43 This 
was aided by frequent threats of secession, so~ething which 
I 
would be regretted by radicals who wanted to prove that 




This tactic succeeded, in that it made the whole church 
conscious of the need to placate conservatives. But this 
40 This contrasted with a petition drawn up by Gunn. The 
APL commented on this in a newsletter: 'The Rev. Gunn's 
petition is designed, he has explained, tol bring about a 
"confrontation" at next Assembly. We feel. that such an 
"all or nothing" approach is not the most wise, and would 
not gain wide support.' cyclostyled letter, (May 28 1968). 
41 Dominion, (November 6 1968). 
42 These two, along with Sage, signed the covering letter to 
the APL petition. 
43 See, for example, J.M. Carlsmith and A.E. Gross, 'Some 
effects of Guilt on Compli~nce.' in Freedman et al. (1971) 
522-563: '(Experiments ~ndertaken) provide convincing 
evidence that a very powerful technique for obtaining 
compliance is to first induce a person to do something 
which harms another person~ .. guilt about the action is 
the mediating factor in producing this compliance.' 
p.563. 
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conciliation could be taken too far, some radicals feared: 
as one Christchurch minister told the writer, 'we bend over 
backwards to hold the conservatives, but let radicals walk 
out in droves'. 
Another successful tactic for winning some aura of 
respectability was to get highly respected members of the 
church to speak at their meetings. These included Norman 
Perry (a former lay moderator) and Breward. But even when 
speaking at Assembly APL members tried to refrain from 
mentioning the a~sociation at all, lest they incur some of 
44 the wrath it had earned the previous year. 
(ii) The WF 
The WF had to similarly criticize the AssemQly decision 
without advocating disruption. But they made no real 
attempt to develop a different argument for internal consump-
tion than they did for the larger constituency. So although 
they critici2ed the Assembly decision, they left the option 
open that it did not really mean what it said. 'The 
fellowship repudiates the apparent departure from long-
established doctrinal standards as evidenced by the 
45 decisions of the recent General Assembly.' (Emphasis added). 
But the fellowship refused to excuse itself from responsibility 
as the APL has done: 'We should resist any tendency to stand 
over against the Church and criticise it as though we are 
distinct from it. As part of the Church we are all involved 
in its inherent imperfections and in its present sickness; 
44 Interview, E. Campbeli. 
45 Cyclostyled letter from WF executive, signed by J.N. Smith 
and G.I. Thompson, (December 12 1967). 
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and consequently, share in some measure, responsibility for 
the state of things out of which Assembly decisions issue•. 46 
But they too learned many of the skills they had previously 
neglected. One Southland informant said that they sometimes 
learned the last two lines of a colleagues speech in order 
to be first with amendments. 
! 
Because they did not develop internal tactics, they 
I 
were unable to retain the support of their extremists. Gunn 
and several of his followers left the fellowship to protest 
against its mild stand. 47 One conservative associate of 
Gunn's claimed that 'one year ago the WF of NZ was known as 
a vigorous evangelical witness. Today it is a spent force 
and a laughing stock to the world 1 • 48 This type of attack 
did something to give the WF stand some respectability. 
(2) The change in conservative strategy, 1970 
In 1970, the WF and the APL felt strong enough to 
reintroduce the question of Geering's orthodoxy, but 
continued to use the same moderate tactics they had 
developed after 1967. They asked only that the Assembly 
'dissociate' itself from some statements Geeting had made in 
I 
a television interview. The groundwork for this had already 
been laid when 'Appendix III' had become regulative in 1969, 
and so there were now some doctrines that the church had 
unreservedly assented to. 
46 Loc.cit. 
47 This is perhaps too charitable an explanation. He 
attempted to get the WF to merge with the APL; he accused 
Bates of trying to make it impossible for a continuing 
church to get property, he predicted 'a strong attempt 
.in 196 8 to eradicate evangelical minorities' . When the 
WF rejected his ideas, he left. 
48 G. Kerr, op.cit., p.2. 
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When Geering appeared to deny some of these, it was a simple 
matter to contrast his statements with those of the previous 
Assembly, and ask the Assembly to reaffirm that his 
statements were not the official position of the church on 
these points. 
This was an intelligent strategy for the conservatives 
to adopt, for it had widespread appeal. It could play on 
the theological exhaustion of many in the church who were 
tired of discussing doctrine, even if they did not 
particularly disagree with Geering. It could appeal to 
those who wanted full theological discussion to continue, but 
preferred to keep the mass media out of it. It could attract 
those who were prepared to give Geering's ideas legitimacy, 
49 but notthe stamp of official approval. 
So the same group of uncommitted neutrals who had been 
prepared to vote for freedom of speech and defend Geering 
against personal attack in 1967, were equally prepared to 
disassociate themselves from his statements and to remind him 
of the responsibilities of freedom in 1970. 
Thus through moderation and compromise the conservatives 
had managed to capture the middle ground, and win what one 
APL member described as 'an overwhelming victory for the 
truth' . 
(3) The radical response 
During the years after the trial the radicals had very 
little in common to hold them together. Some of Geering's 
friends felt they had a responsibility to protect him, and 
49 It was the method recommended by an American Episcopal 
Commission to·deal with doctrinal error. See (ed) S.F. 
Bayne, (1967)pp.28f. 
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so they opposed any move which could be constructed as being 
critical of him. Others wanted to make a 'pastoral' 
geature to conservatives. 50 Yet others were genuinely in 
sympathy with the desire of conservatives for some clear 
d t ' 1 'd 1· Sl S th 1' t 1l d oc rina gui e ines. o ere was very it e concerte 
action at Assembly level to oppose the APL, although disasso-
ciation moves were soundly defeated in both Dunedin and 
Wellington presbyteries. 
One of the reasons behind this radical disorganization 
in 1970 was the belief that while they had succeeded in 
defending Geering's right to speak, they were not committed 
to approving everything he said, especially in the heat of 
a television interview. Moreover, what they were being 
asked to do in 1970 was in effect rather similar to what 
they had asked Assembly to do in .1967. In 1967 the Assembly 
ruled that what Geering said was permissible (though not 
necessarily official) while in 1970 it ruled that it was 
not official (though not necessarily impermissible). 
They had become rather complacent after 1967, and 
tended to assume that they could command a working majority 
in Assembly. However, they seemed to forget that they, 
like the conservatives were only a minority in the Assembly. 
Unless they succeeded in capturing the middle ground, 
the uncommitted neutrals, their procedural skills would be 
in vain. And so, in 1970, they were finally out~manouevered 
by their conservative adversaries. 
50 G.R. Ferguson was renowned for this phrase, but others 
shared his opinion. E.g. 'It is a way of going along 
with those who found it hard to take', was how one 
moderator described the disassociation, in reference to 
previous doctrinal decisions. 
51 E.g. L.R. Miller, letter to N.Z. Herald, (November 15 
1967): 'I am sure that the most liberal in the Church 
would agree that the present doctrinal position in 
Presbyterianism is unsatisfactory.' 
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(4) How did the organization affect the development of the 
controversy 
Just as the organization provided a spur to escalation 
during the first period of expansion, so it provided a check 
to growth during the final stage of contraction. 
(a) The moderate policies of the APL (at least for 
external consumption) meant that they were no longer a source 
of irritation to many in the church. The association could 
now be considered more properly "not a lot of loose-footed 
fly-by-nights and malcontents,but ... of the bone and sinew 
52 of the Church". They had become almost respectable. 
(b) The division between internal and external tactics 
meant that the association could be conciliatory without 
losing the support of their membership. It also meant that 
their external policies could be more moderate and the 
bitterness of these policies considerably reduced. This 
consequently brought less reaction from their opponents. 
(c) The policies of the APL and WF were not directed 
against any particular member of the radical group, at least 
not in a personal way. This reduced the level of 
participation from those who had rallied around Geering 
the previous year to defend him from personal attack. 
(d) Because conservativ~ strategy was more cautious, 
and concentrated mainly on constitutional change, it 
attracted very little publicity from the media. This 
helped to reduce the level of interest in the issues and 
52 R.D. Arnold, typewritten mss., speech given in Wellington, 
October 26 1966. 
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consequently their saliency. 
(e) The new stand of the APL tended to draw support 
from a wide range of church opinion, even from those who 
wanted to make 'pastoral' gestures to conservatives. So 
the cleavages had become cross-cutting, and the level of 
polarization was reduced. 
(f) The fact that radicals did not really involve them-
selves at all, let alone organize their efforts, meant that 
there was considerably less friction between the groups. 
Consequently, the antagonisms began to diminish. 
III. FORCES WORKING AGAINST EXPANSION 
While most of the patterns of controversy and 
organizational trends were working for contraction of the 
conflict, some mention should also be made of the other 
efforts which were made to reduce tension and diminish the 
intensity of the controversy. 
(1) Co-optation 
This was a practice the church had often used to defuse 
conflict and absorb dissidents. It also invigorated some 
of the church committees to have different perspectives 
available to them in their deliberations. Arnold found 
himself on the Doctrine Committee, while Campbell not only 
joined. an Assembly committee, but became convenor of an 
important presbytery committee as well. The effect of this 
co-optation was apparently to show some conservatives that 
their own opinions were quite similar to those of many others 
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on the committee concernea. 53 It may have also encouraged 
some radicals to revise the stereotypes they had held about 
conservatives. 
However, there were risks in co-optation. It might lead 
to defection, by exposing people to the risk of realizing 
that they had many points in common with their opponents, 
and could therefore not in honesty carry on as if they were 
still implacable foes. The way to escape this possibility 
was to develop a two-tier system of response, as Arnold did 
very successfully. 
But a more serious risk was that of a loss of credibility 
in any one associated with compromise. This was all the more 
critical if such a person had been a moderating influence 
on his colleagues. This happened to some extent with 
Wilson and Gosling after their involvement on the 1967 
drafting committee, when they became less influential with 
more extreme conservatives than they had been earlier. 
However, this did not have much impact on the course of the 
controversy, for the extremist group left the church shortly 
afterwards. 
(2) . t t 54 Appoin men s 
: . 
During the third stage of the controversy, moderates 
tried to act in a reconciliatory way. One of the ways they 
tried to make conservatives feel they still had a role in 
the church was to make suitable appointments to vacant 
positions. One such position was a newly-created chair of 
53 This was suggested by W.A. Best and T.E. Pollard, in 
interviews. It was not always successful however. See 
above p . 5.3 • 
54 This could be seen as the conflict-restoring tactic of 
'widening the agenda', which is described by Boulding in 
'Organization and Conflict', Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, I (1957), 122~134. 
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pastoral theology, where there were two major contenders. 
The first was G.H. Robinson, who was considered to have the 
best academic qualifications for the post, and who had been 
. lecturing in Christian education at the Theological Hall. 
He was considered fairly radical during the controversy. 55 
The second was C.I.L. Dixon, who had won himself a 
reputation as a successful parish minister, but was less 
academically qualified than Robinson. He had come out 
openly against Geering in Forum, accusing him of 'general 
muddlement'. in his thinking, and making remarks about 
' • 'I 
prayer 'of the nature that any pagan rationalist could 
think up•. 56 
While the position called for a person with practical 
rather than just academic qualifications, this was not the 
only reason Dixon received the appointment. There was some 
reaction against academics in general which was influencing 
the mood of the church. But more pertinent was the desire 
to see a 'more balanced' theological faculty at Knox. One 
of those most closely involved with Dixon's nomination 
admitted that such political considerations played an import-
ant part in the committee decision. This nomination met with 
Assembly approval, and Dixon became professor of pastoral 
theology. 
The second appointment was to the editorship of the 
Outlook, which had become vacant with the death of its 
previous editor. C.L. Gosling, who had been the first 
editor of the EP was the successful applicant for the 
55 See Outlook, April 15 1967, p.14, where he wrote a letter 
to the editor, expressing the view that there was no harm 
in very open theological discussions. 
56 Forum, XXI (July 1968), p.7. 
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position. A couple of years earlier the fact that he was 
a leading member of the WF would have prejudiced many 
churchmen against him. But at a time when it was considered 
important to pacify conservatives, he won general approval. 
Any misgivings about his partiality were soon dispelled, for 
he was very careful to give a balanced coverage of doctrinal 
issues in the magazine. 
Many of those who had played a leading role in concili-
ation were rewarded in one way or another. L.H. Jenkins, 
who as convenor of the Doctrine.Committe~.had been highly 
regarded, became moderator-designate in 1970. G.F. McKenzie, 
who had been convenor of the 1968 sessional committee, 
followed two years later. N.F. Gilkison became convenor of 
I 
the important Council of the General Assembly in 1973, and 
W.A. Best became Executive Secretary of the Church the 
following year. None of these appointments were directly 
related to roles these men had played during the controversy, 
but the skills they displayed in conciliation were not 
overlooked as important positions became vacant in the church. 
CONCLUSION OF THE THIRD STAGE 
The final stage of the controversy saw a dimunition in 
the intensity of the conflict and a gradual decline in the 
interest from that it had once stimulated. By the middle of 
1971 even the personalities in the centre of the stage had 
changed considerably from the early months of 1966. Wardlaw 
had long since resigned from the church, while Geering had 
just taken up a new chair at Victoria University. The APL 
had gone into abeyance, and Gunn had lost most of the 
influence he had once exerted. The 'WF was more moderate, 
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though still rather weak, and a new conservative 
organization, the Association of Continuing Presbyterians 
was beginning to take over the leadership of the conservative 
movement, as the attention of the church focused once more 
on church union. APL leaders, such as Arnold and Campbell, 
who had earlier shocked the church with their extreme views, 
had now been co-opted into an establishment they h~d once 
attacked. 
So the issues had finally faded. The controversy had 
played itself out until both parties were reasonably 
satisfied with its outcome. Neither side could be said to 
have really 'won', in the sense of defeating their 
opponents consistently. And yet both sides achieved their 
policy goals: the radicals succeeded in defending Geering 
against his attackers and preserving their right of free 
speech, and the conservatives succeeded in getting certain 
doctrines defined as fundamental and accepted as regulative. 
But, more importantly, both groups had found a role for 
themselves within the church. The organization had managed 
to absorb its dissidents without any disastrous schism. 
This did not mean that there would no longer be tensions 
and the conflicts within the church. On the contrary, 
these would continue to characterize the denomination. 
However, the church had s~cceeded in routinizing conflict, 





The Geering controversy has now been investigated in 
terms of the dynamics of its development and the organization 
of its participants. But a case study may also stimulate 
questions and suggest conclusions beyond the confines of 
the particular events it seeks to describe. What then can 
this case study indicate about similar controversies, or to 
, be more precise, about the role of ideology in such 
controversies? 
Coleman, it was suggested, derives his framework from 
an analysis of community controversies in which ideology did 
not play a central part. Certainly 'value' issues had an 
effect on these controversies, but the values were not 
systematically related; nor were they usually precipitating 
factors. Their role was rather to accentuate divisions 
which already existed. A dispute over fluoridation, for 
example, would be based on a technical question: the proper 
chemical composition of a town's water supply. It would 
probably involve such values as individualism, antiscientism 
and distrust of authority. But these values would not be 
coordinated into an ideology, and would not be organically 
related to the specific issue of fluoridation. 
However in this study the precipitating issue was 
clearly an ideological one, the 'resurrection' of Jesus 
Christ, and the whole debate took place within the contours 
of an ideology. Nevertheless other issues became involved. 
There were personality clashes between Geering and Wardlaw, 
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between Bates and Gunn, between Read and Pollard, and 
between scores of other participants. There were also 
'power' issues at stake: whether the church was under the 
'despotic' control of a 'hierarchy biased towards unbelief', 
or whether the ordinary laymen had some real influence on 
church policy. There were economic issues introduced as 
well: whether prolonged controversy would seriously deplete 
the treasury, and why members should contribute to a budget 
at all if they disagreed with one of its items. 
Since there were both ideological issues and more 
practical questions involved, it is interesting to ask what 
was the relative impact of each one on the development of 
the controversy. Was ideology merely a 'smokescreen' 
concealing a power struggle, or was it an important 
constraint on action? Did participants rationalize selfish 
behaviour with high-flown ideological excuses, or did they 
really act on principle? This is by no means easy to 
answer, for it was the ideology which informed its adherents 
what sort of things were valuable in the first place. To 
take a simple example, a person who became 'reborn' would 
be both following self-interest (ensuring his own salvation) 
and also following the dictates of his ideology. Here self-
interest and ideological purity would coincide. But it 
might be countered that this was not always the case, for 
during 1966 and 1967 the APL followed a policy which ran 
directly contrary to their best interests: they alienated 
most of their potential supporters by using tactics which 
displayed more ideological conviction than political sense. 
There is certainly some truth in this from an outsider's 
perspective. Nevertheless what 'winning' itself involved 
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was prescribed by the ideology. It did not involve 'doing 
deals' with unbelievers, and thereby jeopardizing their own 
immortal souls. In their own terms they were acting quite 
rationally in refusing to engage in political infighting. 
So because it is ideology which allocates values, it would be 
very difficult to disentangle actions 'on principle' from 
actions motivated by self-interest. 1 
However the role of ideology can be assessed by using 
Coleman's model as a basis of comparison. With such a 
baseline one can estimate the extent to which the Geering 
controversy deviated from 'normal' controversies, and 
subsequently decide if this deviation can be accounted for 
by the concept of ideology. So, if ideology had had some 
impact on the course of the controversy, what perceptible 
differences might be expected? 
(1) Because an ideology will tend to be comprehensive, an 
ideological controversy should involve a greater range 
and generality of issues than an 'ordinary' controversy; 
and because it also tends to be coherent, the issues 
arising should be systematically related. 
Coleman suggests this when he claims that 'political 
controversies' are less likely to exhibit a shift from the 
specific to the general than 'disputes based primarily on 
differing values or economic interests•. 2 To continue his 
argument it could be said that when the differing values are 
1 This is recognized by G. Drake in an essay on 'The 
Ideology of Oliver Cromwell', Church History, XXXV (1966) 
~59-272. He suggests that Cromwell's success depended 
on his being able to distinguish 'God's will' from his 
own. See also R. Currie, 'Power and Principle: The 
Anglican Prayer Book Controversy, 1927-1930', Church 
History, XXXIII (1964) 192-205. 
2 Coleman, op.cit., p.10. 
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systematically related, the number and generality of the 
issues would be increased still further. This hypothesis is 
best tested by comparing the range of issues involved in 
different controversies. An election struggle in Athens, 
Tennessee involved, according to Coleman, only one major 
issue: 
the control of the community 3 
This was a non-ideological conflict in which former G.I.s 
were attempting to oust a party machine which had been 
running the city for some time. 
One type of issue which did involve values was that of 
fluoridation. A controversy originating with such an issue 
would typical¥ involve the following issues: 
the best methods of preventing dental decay 
the costs and dangers involved in fluoridation 
whether experts are given too much influence 
possible infringements of individual liberty 
extent of administration's mandate 
the control of the community 
The issues here are certainly more general than in the 
Athens controversy. But they lack any ideological unity or 
coherence. This contrasts with the issues raised during the 
Geering controversy: 
resurrection of Jesus 
creation of the world 
immortality of the soul 
possibility of miracles 
personal morality 
education of children 
place of experts (intellectuals) irt the church 
control of theological education 
participation of the laity in decision-making 
control of the church 
church'union 
role of the church 
the place of confessional statements 
the nature of confessional authority 
the importance of the bible 
the substance of the Faith 
nature of beliefs 
3 Loc.cit. 
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Here the issues are clearly more numerous and general 
than in the two previous examples; and although their range 
is diverse, the issues tend to be organically related. If, 
for example, the 'resurrection' of Jesus was a physical 
revivication of the body of Jesus, this would constitute 
for many a definitive proof of the possibility of miracles. 
If such doctrinal certainty was possible, then this should 
be reflected in Christian education programmes, where 
instruction should replace discovery. If these programmes 
were sufficiently clear in the guidance they gave young 
people, much of the confusion about moral standards might 
be averted. Moreover, some would say, proper standards of 
conduct and doctrine had already been laid down in the 
bible, and summarized in the confessions. The church there-
fore ought to remain loyal to its standards, and avoid any 
church union arrangements which might threaten them. 
Some of the issues which arose were of course not 
wholly ideological. The control of theological education 
and participation of the laity in church decision-making 
contained elements of personality conflicts and power 
motivations. Other issues displayed suggestions of ingrained 
prejudice, such as a dislike of experts in general which 
would find expression in a fluoridation debate as much as a 
'resurrection' one; it would be present whether the 
organization was dedicated to the salvation of souls or the 
preservation of teeth. Nevertheless the general pattern is 
confirmed: the issues were both more comprehensive and more 
coherently related than in controversies which were not 
fundamentally ideological. 
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(2) It would be expected that personal attacks would be 
slower to develop than in non-ideological controversies, 
because of the centrality of beliefs to the dispute. 
When a debate centres around questions of ideology, 
one would expect ideas to be more important than personalities. 
Was this the case in the Geering controversy? 
Examples of non-ideological controversies could be 
taken from some elections in the U.S. South, in which there 
were virtually no issues dividing the major contenders. 
These election campagins very quickly degenerated into 
personality conflicts, muckraking and charges of misadmin-
. t t' 4 is ra ion. 
Half-way along the continuum would be some American 
school controversies. While these involved values such as 
equal opportunity and personal initiative, they nevertheless 
fairly quickly came to include personal attacks on teachers 
who had committeed moral indiscretions or engaged in 
'subversive' activities. But here there was a limit on the 
sort of personal attacks which were permissible. 
However in the Geering controversy, personality attacks 
tended to be avoided during the first year of the controversy. 
This was partly because the major participants were conscious 
of the ideological prohibitions on such attacks, and partly 
because they knew any breach of this norm would earn them 
the censure of those more conscious of their ideological 
duties. Geering was obviously unpopular with more 
conservative members of the church, but their official 
publications aimed more to discredit the theological viewpoint 
4 Ibid., p.11. 
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he represented than criticize him personally. He was made 
the focus of their attack only when it seemed to them that 
radical excesses could be curbed in no other way. But once 
the level of bitterness started to rise, personal antagonisms 
also began to flourish. Nevertheless the fact that there was 
a delay in this process would suggest that at least some of 
the norms prescribed by the ideology, those prohibiting 
personal attacks, were taken seriously. 
(3) Because of the importance of beliefs in the controversy 
it would be further expected that antagonisms would 
disappear more quickly once the matters in.dispute had 
been settled. 
If the participants really took their ideology seriously, 
they would be likely to forgive their opponents when the 
controversial issues had begun to fade. This seemed to 
happen with many of the central participants. Wardlaw, when 
interviewed, spoke of Geering without bitterness, and was 
quick to recognize his opponent's virtues. Geering was 
similarly fair in his comments about Wardlaw. However this 
forgiveness did not prove particularly contagious. Many 
of the lower-level participants had been politicized for 
the first time, and were more easily incited than controlled. 
Six years after the heresy trial some conservative 
informants still saw Geering as an agent of the devil, and 
some radicals continued to trade rumours about their 
opponents' moral lapses. This continuing bitterness was 
illustrated in the Presbyterian youth movement as seen by 
its chairman: 
The biggest single destructive force of the youth 
movement has been the lack of trust in people of 
differing Christian theological and ethical stances. 
It seems that when an event is arranged in the 
Presbyterian Church, we ask two questions; Who 
is organizing it? What is their theological 
viewpoint? On the basis of those answers we 
decide whether we can trust the event and 
participate in it.5 
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So when the national issues began to die down, many of the 
local conflagrations continued to rage unabated. At least 
one congregation split over the issue, although social 
polarization often softened the impact of such antagonisms. 
Thus, localized residues of bitterness remained, unaffected 
by the reconciliatory policies of leaders at the national 
level. 
(4) Because of the coherence of an ideology, it would be 
expected that groups would disagree consistently on a 
wide range of issues, and therefore find it very 
difficult to compromise. 
This was the expectation, and there was certainly an 
unwillingness on the part of groups to budge from strongly-
held opinions. Nevertheless compromise was possible precisely 
because the goals of the groups~ ideological rather than 
power-seeking or economic. This paradox can be resolved 
once it is realized that ideological goals are often non 
zero-sum; that is to say, where one group gains the other 
does not necessarily lose. As the result of a fluoridation 
controversy, for example, ·the water can either be 
fluoridated or left in its existing state. It would be 
physically impossible for the water of a particular locality 
to be both fluoridated and unfluoridated at the same time. 
However in ani::1eological controversy this is less likely to 
5 A. Taylor, President's Report, C.Y.M.P., cyclostyled 
sheet, June-1973. 
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be so; and the goals of combatants may well be compatible. 
In the Geering controversy itself one group was recommending 
tolerance of diverse opinions, while the other group was 
emphasizing the need to stand any new opinions against 
confessional statements on the issues. One group was 
stressing relevance for the present, the other group loyalty 
to the past. These opinions were not irreconcilable, and if 
a statement of faith was necessary to show that tolerance 
extended to conservative opinions as well as more liberal 
ones, then radicals would not seriously oppo~e it. 
The disassociation in 1970 was a compromise of this 
sort. It established for conservatives that some of 
Geering's views were not the official dogmas of the church: 
this was of little consequence to radicals who never 
claimed that they were. 
I 
It told radicals that the type 
of theological rethinking Geering represented was not 
prohibited: this did not matter to conservatives who saw 
disassociation as but one further step along the road 
towards a restoration of orthodoxy. 
So despite the initial expectation, compromise was 
possible. Moreover it was ideology which allowed this 
possibility to be realized. 
(5) The extremes would be more prepared to engage in various 
forms of exit. 
Amitai Etzioni, in a study of complex organizations, 
suggests that groups which rely on norms to ensure compliance 
are more prone to rebellion and secession than groups which 
employ coercion or financial reward. 6 This is because, he 
6 Etzioni (1961), p.105. 
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contends, such organizations combine high levels of 
consensus and commitment with low levels of constraint. A 
prison on the one hand does not offer its inmates the chance 
of leaving if they dislike the conditions; nor is it 
necessary that they believe in the prevailing philosophy of 
incarceration. A church on the other hand is a voluntary 
organization, which members may leave at any time, and it 
does require some ideological consensus from its members. 
Moreover in the Presbyterian church it was quite 
possible to leave without incurring too many costs. In a 
city it might involve considerable sacrifice to withdraw 
from the community merely because one disagrees with a 
fluoridation proposal. It would noramlly be easier to stay 
and fight, or to use Hirschman's term, 'voice•. 7 In the 
religious arena, however, there were often equally 
acceptable alternatives to the Presbyterian church, as 
the constant interchange between it and other denominations 
testified. 
This ready availability of alternative churches made 
conservatives unwilling to widen the theological base of 
8 the church. The Presbyterian church had been founded by 
believers; if the doubters disliked its doctrine, they 
courl leave. Radicals similarly saw Presbyterianism as 
offering a distinctive policy, one of accommodating a 
diversity of theological perspectives. For both groups then, 
7 Hirschman (1970). 
8 This follows closely Downs' prediction that in a multi-
party system, parties will 'strive to distinguish them-
selves ideologically from each other and maintain the 
purity of their positions'. Downs, op.cit., p.126f. 
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if the church decided to deny their idea of its standards, 
it would be quite practicable to exit altogether. This was 
what Wardlaw and some of his followers did after the heresy 
trial, 9 and what a considerable number of his adversaries 
I 
might have done had the decision gone the other way. These 
departures made it more possible for moderates to take over 
the leadership of the conservative movement again. 
However there were costs involved for conservatives in 
leaving the church. One of these was losing the chance to 
bring the whole body back to orthodox doctrine rather than 
just a gathered remnant. Another was the practical 
difficulty of establishing a new sect, or joining another 
denomination in which one had no influence. 
But there were also costs in 'voice'. Those who 
remained within the church to try to change its policies 
would have to defend themselves against the charge that they 
were collaborators with an apostate church, and therefore 
betraying their ideological convictions. 
So they found an intermediate strategy, which could be 
called 'internal exit 110 involving remaining formally 
within the church while withdrawing one's allegiance to it. 
9 Some informants suggested that Gunn encouraged others to 
exit, but did not have enough conviction to leave himself. 
A more accurate explanation would be that he was prepared 
to leave if his congregation would secede witnnim. At 
a congregational meeting of December 12 1967 he suggested 
this as a possibility, in a cyclostyled sheet he had 
prepared for the occasion .•. If the national church did 
not return 'to its traditional ••. standards', the congre-
gation should reserve ~he right to reconsider its relation-
ship to the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand'. This 
threat was deleted by 58 votes to 53 in a meeting when 
finished at 12.30 a.m., and saw the resignation of the 
Session Clerk. 
10 This was similar to the strategy of 'boycott', which 
Hirschman describes, op.cit., p.86. The difference was 
that in internal exit the conservatives sacrificed nothing. 
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This enabled conservatives to receive the benefits of 
membership without accepting all of its responsibilities. 
They gained the advantage of full exit, because they did 
not comply with the decisions of Assembly if they did not 
like them, and withheld their budgetary contributions if 
they did not wish to pay them. But they also acted as full 
members, in that they continued to voice, very loudly their 
dissatisfactions. They were just as entitled to anyone 
else, perhaps more so, because they were not responsible 
for the present doctrinal anarchy. 
So the extreme groups were quite prepared to exit, 
although they showed some imagination in the forms of exit 
they actually adopted. 
(6) Because of its ideology, the church would be insensitive 
to its best organizational interests. 
If it had been a business firm the APL were attempting 
to influence, the organization might very well have ceased 
to do business with them once they started to engage in inte-
rnal exit. If it had been a city council, it might have 
prosecuted them for failure to discharge their financial 
duties. However, it was a church, which was also influenced 
by an ideology. It would certainly have been easier for 
the peace of the church if more extremists had left the 
church with Wardlaw. But they did not, and men such as Read 
and Wilson did everything in their power to encourage them 
to stay. Indeed, it was, for radicals especially, a matter 
of principle that men with as varied perspectives as Geering 
and Gunn should be included in the community of faith. As 
one radical put it: 
This is not because I sit lightly to the truth, 
but because I believe that it will be found only 
within the fellowship of faith. A fellowship 
which shows genuine openness to the Holy Spirit 
may expect to obtain such leading of the Spirit 
as will enable it to glorify God in word and life. 
142. 
This opinion was shared by many others, who did not 
think that efficient functioning of the organization was the 
only goal of the church; indeed it was not necessarily a 
major one. Geering was of the opinion that: 
the church as it has been known to us through 
European Christendom is destined to die, and we 
must let it die ••• That which is permanent in 
the church is not its structures, its doctrinal 
confessions and its liturgies, but its faith and 
the hope and love associated with it.11 
One president of the APL agreed that it was not of 
fundamental importance whether the institutional church in 
its present form survived. 
Thus ideology had the effect of making the church rather 
insensitive to its organizational interests. The exit of 
more extremists would have been quite functional for the 
institutional church, but its leaders chose to follow the 
ideologically preferable path of reconciliation. 
In conclusion, ideology did seem to play an important 
part in the controversy. While the dispute showed many of 
the patterns suggested by Coleman, it also showed noticeable 
differences which can be plausibly explained by the inclusion 
of ideology into the model. Ideology, then, was not the only 
motivating factor behind the actions of the participants. 
But it stimulated proliferation of the issues, encouraged 
a departure of the extremists, and finally, facilitated a 
resolution of the controversy. 
11 Geering (1968), 176-7. 
143. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to thank firstly those who have given me access 
to the numerous documents of the controversy: the staff of 
the Presbyterian publicity studios, Christchurch; Rev. E.R.E. 
Ross of the Hewitson Library, Dunedin; Rev. L.R. Miller, 
Mr R.J. Wardlaw and Rev. R.J. Blaikie, who had been closely 
involved.with the debate in Auckland; Rev. John S. Murray 
and Dr R.D. Arnold who were similarly involved in Wellington; 
Rev. Dr E.J. Norton and Rev. Professor T.E. Pollard, who had 
kept their files of the events in Dunedin. I am grateful to 
the following members of the Church with whom I have had 
interviews or conversations: the Very Rev. Drs J.M. Bates, 
I.W. Fraser and J.S. Somerville; the Very Rev. L.H. Jenkins; 
Professors L.G. Geering, T.E. Pollard and I. Breward; Drs R.D. 
Arnold, G.R. Ferguson and E.J. Norton; the Revs. R.J. Blaikie, 
I.D. Borrie, N.T. Creighton, s. Dalziell, D. Glenny, 
C.L. Gosling, J.T. Gunn, L~ Jones, M. Leadbetter, T.W.I. Lewis, 
J.S. Murray, L.R. Miller, L.G. Richards, D.F. Sage, W.J. 
Schrader, H.S. Scott, D.M. Steedman, D.W. Storkey and 
J.L. Wilson; Messrs E. Campbell, R.H. Gardner, W.J. Keir, 
H. King, J.K. Nichol, J.C. Smaill and R.J. Wardlaw. I am 
particularly grateful to the Rev. J.A. Elvidge whose hunches 
always turned out to be right; the Rev. R.W. Sinclair, 
whose enthusiasm proved contagious; the Rev. W.A. Best, who 
continually provided useful tips during the writing of the 
draft; Professor J.G.A. Pocock, Dr J.G. Wilson and the 
Rev. N.F. Gilkison, who read earlier chapter drafts and gave 
encouragement at crucial times; and finally to the Very Rev. 
s.c. Read, Professor Geering, Mr Gosling, Professor Pollard 
144. 
and Mr Wardlaw, who kindly read the manuscript and offered 
valuable suggestions. I am indebted to Miss K. Howells for 
her efficient and accurate typing of the thesis. 














A Manual of Doctrine. (2nd edition) 
Christchurch: Presbyterian Bookroom, 
1960. 
145. 
'Secular Christianity' and God Who Acts. 
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1970. 
La man's Answer: An Examination of the 
New Theology. Lon on: Ho er and 
Stoughton, 1968. 
Fifty Years S¥ne: A Jubilee Memorial of 
the Presbyterian Church of Otago. 
Dunedin: J. Wilkie and Co., l899. 
The Story of the Otago Free Church 
Settlement, 1848 to 1948: A Century's 
Growth by a Southern Sea. Christchurch: 
Presbyterian Bookroom, 1948. 
History of the Presbyterian Church of 
New Zealand. Dunedin: J. Wilkie and Co., 
1899. 
History of the Presbyterian Church of 
New Zealand, 1840-1940. Christchurch: 
Presbyterian Bookroom, 1940. 
God in the New World. London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1968. 
Resurrection: A Symbol of Hope. London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1971. 
Em~ty Tomb or Em~ty Faith? The Geering 
De ate. Aucklan: G.W. Moore Ltd., 1968. 
Opinions. n.p.: Publications Committee 
of the Presbyterian Church, 1973. 
Did Jesus Rise From the Dead? Auckland: 
Blackwood and Janet Paul Ltd., 1967. 
146. 
BOOK OF ORDER, OR RULES AND FORMS OF PROCEDURE OF THE 
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF NEW ZEALAND. Christchurch: Presbyter-
ian Bookroom, 1970. 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN 
CHURCH OF NEW ZEALAND, 1965-73. {referred to as 'Blue books') 






Hawkes Bay Herald-Tribune 
Manawatu Evening Standard 












N.Z. Weekly News 







N.Z. Theological Review 
Outlook 
Psychic News 










G l:F H ING , L. G. 
GIFFORD, P.J. 




Faith and Credulity: An Investigation 
of the Theories of Unbelief concerning 
the Resurrection of Jesus from the Dead. 
Wanganui: A. Ferguson, 1903. 
Professor Geering's Agnosticism. 
Auckland, privately published, 1967. 
Authority and Freedom. Christchurch: 
Presbyterian Bookroom, 1969. 
The Fundamental Principles of the 
Reformed Conception of the Church. 
Aberdeen: J.G. Bisset, 1924. 
The Bible in Our T,ime. Wellington: 
NZSCM, l949. 
And Their Eyes Were Opened. Melbourne: 
Presbyterian Board of Christian 
Education, 1959. 
God in the 20th Century. Wellington: 
NZUP, l969. 
(ed.) What is our Gospel? (Faith and 
Order Studies: 1963) Christchurch: NCC, 
1963. 
Geering in Perspective. Wellington: 
Hicks Smith and Sons Ltd., 1969. 
The Authority of the Bible. (A Senior 
Bible Class study book) Manurewa: WF, 
1965. 
Our Presbyterian Faith. Manurewa: WF, 
1964. 
What DO Presbyterians Believe? Perth: 
Paterson Brokenshaw Pty. Ltd., 1962. 
A TRIAL FOR HERESY: CHARGES AGAINST PRINCIPAL L.G. GEERING. 
Christchurch: Presbyterian Bookroom, 
1968. 
WHAT DOES THE RESURRECTION MEAN? (Articles and correspondence 
from the Outlook, April-October 1966) 
Christchurch: Presbyterian Bookroom, 
1966. 
WILSON, J.L. {ed.) He Rose A ain: A 
Contri ution to the Resurrection Debate. 







Wellington Concert Chamber,· October 26 
1966. 
School of Music, Nelson, December 17 
1967. 
North Island tour, May 1968. 
General Assembly 1968. 
Old Testament lectures 196lff. (Hewitson 
library). 
The Eternity in Man's Mind. Victoria 
University, March 12 1967. 
The New Reformation and Secular 
Christianitf n.p. (tape held by Presby-
terian publicity studios) 1966. 
The Quarrt from which you were Digged. 
4YA, Marc 20 1966. 
When the Spirit of Truth Cornes, 'People's 
Night' address, 1968 Assembly, Auckland. 
Why Study Religion? VUW inaugural 
lecture, 1971. 
The Word of God. (Inaugural lecture) 
Theological Hall, February 28 1963. 
TAPES OF GENERAL ASSEMBLIES OF 1966 AND 1967. Courtesy of 




Nelson, December 17 1967. 
Auckland Town Hall, November 28 1967. 
(6) Interviews with journalists 
MEET THE PRESS, Brisbane television (Channel 7) May 24 1970, 
involving Geering. 
POINT OF VIEW, NZBC radio (National Programme), March 26 
1967, involving Geering and Arnold. 
PRESS CONFERENCE, Nelson, May 11 1967, involving Geering. 
TOPIC, NZBC television (WNTVl), September 29 1966, involving 
Wardlaw and Geering. 
149. 
(7) Broadsheets 
Presbyterian Layman, March 1967 and April 1968 (APL) 
Presbyterian Witness, June 1968 (Presbyterian Fellowship) 
Newsletter from Orthodox Presbyterian Church, October 20 1968 
and late 1969. 
II SECONDARY SOURCES 
{1) Books 
APTER, D • E. (ed. ) 
ARENDT, H. 






Ideolog! and Discontent. 
Press, 964. 
New York: Free 
Between Past and Future: Six Exercises 
in Political Thought. Cleveland: World 
Publishing Company, 1963. 
Theological Freedom and Social 
Responsibility: Report of the Advisory 
Committee of the Episcopal Church. New 
York: Seabury Press, 1967. 
The EUd of Ideology: On the Exhaustion 
of Political Ideas in the Fifties. 
Glencoe: Free Press, 1960. 
A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and 
the Rediscover! of the Supernatural. 
New York: Doub eday, 1969. 
The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a 
Sociological Theory of Religion. Garden 
city, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967. 
The Precario~s vi7io~: A Sociol2.5J_is~ 
Looks at Social Fictions and Christian 
Faith. Garden city: Doubleday, 1961. 
The Anatomy of Revolution. (2nd edition) 
New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. 












GATEWOOD, W. B. 








On War. Edited by A. Rapoport. Middle-
sex: Penguin, 1968. · · 
Community Conflict, Glencoe, Free Press, 
1957. 
The Secular City: Secularization and 
Urbanization in Theoloiical Perspective. 
New York: Macmillan, 1 65. 
An Economic Theory of Democracy. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1957. 
The Heret 
woode, 19 
>ndon: Eyre and Spottis-
A Systems Analysis of Political Life. 
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963. 
A Com~arative Analysis of Complex 
Organizations: On Power, Involvement, 
and their Correlates. New York: Free 
Press, 1961. 





Readings in Social Psychology. N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1971. · 
Civilization, War and Death: Selections 
from Three Works. Edited by J. Rickman. 
(Psycho-Analytical Epitomes No. 4) 
London: Hogarth Press, 1939. 
Controvers! in the Twenties: 
Fundamenta Ism,· Modernism, and Evolution. 
Nashville: Vanderbilt U.P., 1969. 
Religion and Society in Tension. Chicago: 
Rand-McNally and Co., l965. 
To Com£ort and to Challenge: A Dilemma 
of the Contemporary Church. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967~ 
The Gathering Storm in the Churches: The 
Widening Gap between Clergy and Laymen. 
New York: Doubleday, 1969. 
Autho!,ity and Power in the Free Church 
Tradition: A Social Case Study of the 
American Baptist Convention. New Jersey: 
Princeton U.P.,. 1959. 
Power Without Glory: A Study in 
Ecumenical Politics. London: Hutchinson, 
1967. 
HIRSCHMi\N, A.O. 
KRAMER, R.M. AND 
SPECHT, H. 







MERTON, R.K. AND 








Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to 
Decline in Firms, Organizations and 
States. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 
1970. 
Readings in Community Organization 
Practice. New Jersey: Prentice~Hall, 
1969. 
The Sociology of Religion: An Anthology. 
New York: Appleton- Century-Crofts, l967. 
A History of Christianity. London: 
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955. 
The Relilious Factor. 
day, 196 . 
New York: Double-
'The Art of War,' The Chie~ Works and 
Others, tr. A.H. Gilbert, North Carolina: 
Duke University Press, 1965. Vol II, 
561-726. 
Against the Self-Images of the Age: 
Essi;iys on Ideology and Philosophy. 
London: Duckworth, 1971. 
Selected Military Writings. Peking: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1963. 
Magic, Science and Religion and Other 
Essays. New York: Doubleday, 1954. 
Contemporary Social Problems (2nd edition) 
New York: Harcourt, Brace and World 
Inc., 1966. 
The Church as a Social Institution: 
The Sociolog of American Religion. 
Clif s, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
Sociology and the Study of Religion: 
Theor, Research, Inter retation. New 
Yor : Basic Boos Inc., 970. 
Essa~s in Sociological Theory. (2nd 
edition) Glencoe: Free Press, 1954. 
If This be Heresy. New York: Harper and 
Row, 1967. 
and Time: Essa son 
Fights, Games and Debates. Ann Arbor: 











VAN BUREN, P • 
152. 
The New Reformation? London: SCM, 1963. 
The Honest to God Debate. London: SCM, 
1963. 
Religious Dissent in the Middle Ages. 
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971. 
Ideolo and Or anization in Communist 
China. n edition Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1968. 
The Organizational Weapon: A Study of 
Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics. New 
York: McGraw Book Co. Inc., 1952. 
Science and Human Behaviour. New York: 
Macmillan, 1953. 
A Study of Generations: Report of a 
Two-Year Study of 5000 Lutherans between 
the Ages of 15-65: their Beliefs, Values, 
Attitudes, Behavior. Minneapolis: 
Augsburg Publishing House, 1972. 
The Social Psychology of Social Movements. 
London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1966. 
The Secular Meanin~ of the Gospel, Based 
on an Analysis of its Language. London: 
SCM, 1963. 
VANDENHEUVEL, A.H. The Humiliation of the Church. London: 





Soundings: Essays concerning Christian 
Understanding. Cambridge: CUP, 1962. 
The Sociology of Religion. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1922. 
Religion in Secular Society. Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1966. 
Politics and Vision: Continuity and 
Innovation in Western Political Thought. 





















American Behavioral Scientist 
American Journal of Sociology 
American Political Science Review 
Administrative Science Quarterly 
Church History 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 
Journal of Politics 
Journal of Religious History 
Journal of Social Psychology 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 
Psychiatry 
Partisan Review 
Political Science Quarterly 
Sociological Analysis 
Scottish Journal of Theology 
Social Problems 
Social Research 
ABELSON, R.P. 'Modes of Resolution of Belief Dilemmas' 
~' III (1959), 343-352. 
ALLPORT, G.W. 









'The Religious Context of Prejudice' 
JSSR, V (1966), 447-457. 
'A Skinnerian Analysis of Conflict 
Behavior: Walden II Goes Cross-National', 
ABS, XV (1972), 883-909. 
'Anxiety and Rumor,' JSP, LXXXIX (1973), 
91-98. -
'Ideology and Discontent,' in Apter (qv.), 
15-46. 
'Religion in the Sixties,' SR, XXXVIII 
(1971), 447-497. 
'Comprehension of Own and Outgroup 
Positions under Intergroup Competition,' 
JCR, V (1961), 304-310. 
'The Dynamics of Bureaucracy,' in 











DEMERATH, N.J. AND 
THIESSEN, V. 
DENTLER, R.A. 








'Role Conflicts of the Urban Protestant 
Parish Minister,' in Knudten (qv.) 
212-217. 
'Organization and Conflict,' JCR, I 
(1957) 122-134. 
Book review of Hadden (qv.). g, XXXI 
(Spring 1970) 58-59. 
'Some Effects of Guilt on Compliance,' 
in Freedman (qv.), 552-563. 
'Religion as a Secular Ideology,' PR, 
XXIII (1956), 495-505. -
'Community Disorganization and Conflict,' 
in Merton (qv.), 657-708. 
'Social Cleavage and Religious Conflict,' 
in Knudten (qv.), 305-314. 
'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass 
Publics,' in Apter (qv.), 206-261. 
'Some Functions of Deviant Behavior and 
Normative Flexibility,' AJS, LXVIII 
(1962), 172-181. -
'Power and Principle: the Anglican Prayer 
Book Controversy, 1927-30. CH, XXXIII 
(1964), 192-205. -
'On Spitting Against the Wind: 
Organizational Precariousness and American 
Irreligion,' AJS,LXXI (1966), 674-687. 
'The Functions of Deviance in Groups,' 
SP, VII (1959), 98-107. 
'The Ideology of Oliver Cromwell,' CH 
XXXV (1966) 259-272. 
'The Nature of Confessional Authority,' 
SJT, XXIV (1971), 271-289. 
'On Face Work: An Analysis of Ritual 
Elements in Social Interaction,' P, XVIII 
(1955), 213-231. -
'Decisional Conflicts: A Theoretical 
Analysis,' JCR, III (1959), 6-27. 
'Some Thoughts on Heresy,' in Bayne 
( qv . ) , 3 7 - 4 6 • 
'Studies in Community Decision Making,' 
in Kramer (qv.), 62-76. 


















VRGA, D. AND 
FAHEY, F.J. 
'Conflict in Organizations,' in 
Organizations, (New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1958) 112-135. 
155. 
'Sources of Power of Lower Participants 
in Complex Organizations,' ASQ, VII (1962), 
349-364. 
'The Development of Political Ideology: 
Framework for the Analysis of Political 
Socialization,' APSR, LXIII (1969) 
750-767. --
'Religion and Competition,' SA,XXXIII 
(Summer 1972), 67-73. 
'Five Dilemmas in the Institutionalization 
of Religion,' in O'Dea (qv.) 240-255. 
'The Ideologists and the Missing 
Dialogue,' in O'Dea (qv.) 88-95. 
'Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of 
Ideology,' JOP, XXXV (1973), 439-458. 
'Doctrine, Data and Due Process,' in 
Bayne (qv.) 117-137. 
'Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems,' 
APSR, LXIII (1969), 398-411. 
'Foundations of the Theory of 
Organization,' in Etzioni (qv.), 19-32. 
'Superordinate Goals in the Reduction 
of Intergroup Conflict,' AJS, LXIII (1958), 
349-356. -
'Sources of Leadership Ideology in 
Dissident Clergy,' SAr XXXIV (1973), 
185-198. -
'The Willingness to Live in Tension,' 
in Bayne (qv.), 146-158. 
'Redemption and Politics,' PSQ, LXXXVI 
(1971), 205-231. -
'Ministers as Moral Guides: The Sounds 
of Silence,' in C.Y. Glock (ed.), Religion 
in Sociological Pers ective: Essa sin 
the Empirical Study of Religion, Belmont, 
Calif.: Wadsworth, 1973), 163-186. 
'The Relationship of Religious Practices 




'Political Ideology: Belief and Action 
in the Arenas of Politics,' in R.M. 
Christenson et al., Ideologies and 
Modern Politics, {New York: Dodd, Mead 
and Co., 1971) 1-35. 
